he World Economic Forum recently published Global Gender Gap Index for 2022, which benchmarks the current state of gender parity in 146 countries across four key dimensions (economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment). Not surprisingly, Pakistan stands at an unenviable 145^th place.

Afghanistan narrowly beat Pakistan in this race to the bottom. Iceland, Finland, and Norway took the first, second and third places, respectively. Bangladesh ranked 71^st on the index.

Why is Pakistan one of the worst countries in the world in terms of the gender gap? Some valuable insights may be gained by zooming in on the individual components that make up the index.

The Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) is a simple average of four sub-indices: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. Each subindex is a weighted average of underlying indicators converted as female-to-male ratios. For example, if the share of women in the labour force is 20 percent in some country, the ratio is 0.25.

Let’s consider two illustrative cases. If the female share in the labour force is 50 percent, the ratio is one – implying complete parity. If the female share is 0 percent, the ratio is zero implying complete disparity. It is important to mention the methodological caveat here. What if women perform better than men in some countries? If the female share in the labour force is 80 percent? The resulting ratio would be four but the GGGI assigns it a value of one. This is called data truncation. This is because it is considered better to err on the side of favouring women.

The following paragraphs list the indicators associated with each of the four dimensions and give Pakistan’s relative rank in the parentheses.

The first sub-index, namely, the economic participation and opportunity, consists of five indicators, including labour force participation rate (145^th), wages equality for similar work (141^st), estimated earned income (86^th ), legislators, senior officials and managers (143^rd) and professional and technical workers (130^th).

The second subindex of educational attainment consists of four indicators, including literacy rate (133^rd), enrolment in primary education (missing data), enrolment in secondary education (124^th) and enrolment in tertiary education (102^nd).

The third sub-index, namely, health and survival, consists of two indicators, including sex ratio at birth (141^st) and healthy life expectancy (140^th).

The last sub-index of political empowerment consists of three indicators, including women in parliament (97^th), women in ministerial positions (114^th), and years with a female/ male head of state in the last 50 years (31^st).

As is apparent, Pakistan‘s ranking in individual dimensions is not uniform. Pakistan ranks 145^th, 135^th, 143^rd, and 95^th regarding economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment, respectively. Pakistan did relatively better in the political empowerment dimension.

Pakistan ranked 31^st in the years with female/ male head of state indicator because Benazir Bhutto was the prime minister for roughly five years. If the effect of this episode 26 years ago were partialled out, Pakistan would be at the lowest place in the world with regard to the gender gap. Pakistan also lags behind the world in the dimensions of health and survival as well as economic participation and opportunity.

One might argue that every society has a unique worldview regarding the attributes of a desirable life. Some goals considered desirable in one society may be considered undesirable in another. Consequently, if we include other indicators in the GGGI index, Pakistan’s relative position may be dramatically different.

Such reasoning may have merit partly because all indices are subjective by default. However, the desirability of most of the indicators and the four dimensions of the GGGI enjoys a broad consensus.

It may be instructive to note that Pakistan’s performance is equally dismal on other indices of well-being, such as the Rule of Law Index (130 out of 139 countries) and the Human Development Index (154 out of 189 countries). So, the strong correlation between different human development indices seems to converge towards a system of core social values.

It may also be instructive to make further inquiry into what explains the economic and health outcomes for women in Pakistan, which are one of the worst in the world. Two interrelated factors figure out conspicuously. The first relates to an abject failure of the state to ensure a minimum living standard for the vulnerable population groups.

In Pakistan, the system of social security and old age benefits is available only to the public sector employees and a fraction of private sector employees. (As an aside, recruitment, even in the public sector has increasingly been done on a contractual basis in recent years.) For the rest of the employees (which makes up a majority of the workforce), the social security and old age benefits are unheard of. It is rational to look for alternative sources of security for old age, and a critical source of economic security during old age is children. The gender gap may be rooted in this mundane preference for children as a hedge against economic insecurity.

Son-preference is widespread in Pakistan. This may well be the first trigger behind a massive gender gap. Social customs and patriarchal structure of Pakistani society reinforce son-preference. The society views women as vulnerable and in need of protection by male family members. Isn’t this a costly proposition? It is because it requires a significant investment of time. Sons can go to school alone but daughters need to be accompanied.

The very idea that a female family member is being harassed on the way to school or college is one of the worst nightmares for parents and families. This is not an ordinary denial of the right to freedom of movement. Harassment of women has far more significant implications. The society has a queer way of looking at a victim of harassment with attendant social consequences for the rest of her life.

The judicial arm of the state is not famous for serving an effective deterrent. The combined effect of lack of social security, inept judicial system, and warped moral values creates and accentuates gender gaps.

Several simultaneous interventions are called for to reduce the gender gap. The first intervention relates to the responsibility of the state to provide economic security to all citizens. Providing economic security for a population of 230 million is easier said than done. When people are insured against pauperisation, there will be less dependence on children in general and male children in particular, resulting in less gender discrimination at the household level and a narrowing of the gender gap.

This is the type of demographic pattern observable in most of the developed world. The desire for economic security through male children is the biggest driver of large family size. The oft-quoted reason for large family size, namely, the unmet contraceptive demand, comes way behind.

For economic security of a massive population the government needs massive investment in the human capital for increased productivity to improve the living standards. Shifting focus away from security to public welfare is imperative. Among other things this requires a radical shift in foreign policy.

Making the judicial arm of the state an effective deterrent is another precondition for changing gender-related social norms. The current conviction rate in cases of harassment and gener-related violence is hardly reassuring for a general sense of security.

When people are convinced that the state can and will punish those transgressing the limits, women will no longer be considered a liability. When people are confident that the state can take care of their needs and guarantee a desirable standard of living, the son-preference will fade away. Herein lies the key to reducing the gender gap in Pakistan.

The writer is an associate professor in the Department of Economics at COMSATS    University Islamabad, Lahore Campus