oreign policy is a core component of a country’s grand strategy through which national interests are articulated and achieved. Irrespective of variance in ideological orientation, political system, economic model, territorial and demographic size of a country, no nation-state can survive without a foreign policy. Pakistan’s early leaders, thus, set the foundational principles of its foreign policy grounded in state sovereignty, regional cooperation and global peace and security. While pursuing its core strategic objectives in the early days of the Cold War, Pakistan allied with the United States in the 1950s. However, during the mid-1960s, it pursued close strategic relations with China in order to reduce reliance on Washington. With the latter, Islamabad cooperated in the 1980s and 2000s; the interaction was mostly military in character and transactional in nature. Overall, US-Pakistan relations can be termed tactical whereas China-Pakistan relations are strategic in orientation.

In the past 75 years, Pakistan’s topmost foreign policy agenda has centred around the Indian threat. It has tried to counter India through its bilateral relations with the US, China and other countries such as Saudi Arabia. Even in multilateral arrangements such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Pakistan has remained preoccupied with India. As far as the Muslim world is concerned, Pakistan projected itself as a leading Muslim state with comparative strengths in military capability and human resources. Pakistan has taken a pro-Palestine stance since 1948 even as some of the key Arab countries such as the UAE have established diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020.

In the government led by Imran Khan, the civil-military leadership apparently remained on the same page with respect to foreign policy conduct. The Bajwa-led military took the lead to determine the contours of Pakistan’s relations with, for example, the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and China. With respect to the latter, the economic element was added through the CPEC. However, the previous government initially fumbled at managing its relationship with Beijing. In September 2018, Razak Dawood, the advisor for commerce and investment to the previous government, annoyed the Chinese authorities through his remarks criticising the CPEC, which has been a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Gen Bajwa then visited China to sort things out.

As far as Pakistan’s foreign policy towards the US was concerned, the Khan government damaged relations with the Biden administration by not attending the ‘democracy summit’, unnecessarily hyping the ‘air bases’ matter neither demanded by the White House nor offered by the Pakistani authorities; visiting Russia just as the Ukraine war started; and, above all, fanning anti-American sentiment in the society. Nonetheless, since Pakistan is a key stakeholder in ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan, the US officials remained engaged with the Pakistani authorities, particularly the military. Little wonder, in July 2019, Gen Bajwa accompanied the then prime minister to the US. The former met with key officials of the Trump administration and discussed Afghan affairs at length. As US militarily withdrew from Afghanistan in September 2021, it urged Pakistan to work to ensure a negotiated settlement of political authority in Afghanistan. Pakistan, for its own interests, seems in agreement with the US in this respect. Importantly, the US-Pakistan military-to-military ties have remained intact.

Besides China and the US, another key country that the Khan government offended was Saudi Arabia. Though, initially, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman was accorded a warm welcome in February 2019, situational shocks jolted bilateral relations later on. Riyadh’s dislike for the Kuala Lumpur Summit remained talk of the town. At the eleventh hour, Khan postponed his Malaysia visit to appease MBS-led Saudi Arabia. In August 2020, Saudi Arabia, as per media reports, pressured Pakistan to pay back $1 billion Saudi loan on a short notice. Then foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi reacted by issuing a sharply-worded statement, that added fuel to the fire. The military authorities then prevented a further deterioration in relations by appointing a military-man as ambassador to the Kingdom. As far as bilateral relations with Turkey and Iran were concerned, there were no significant developments that could have economically helped Pakistan. Relations with India remained confrontational owing to India’s unilateral revocation of Articles 370 and 35A of its constitution. Khan once hinted at opening trade with New Delhi but later abandoned the idea. On Afghanistan, the Central Asian States mostly remained closer to India than Pakistan.

To cap it, the government led by Imran Khan disturbed, if not disrupted, Pakistan’s relations with the sole superpower, namely the US, and major powers such as China and Saudi Arabia. These countries are major economic actors regionally and globally. Indubitably, the US and the EU are major export markets, and thus a source of forex, for the country. China, under the CPEC, has invested in the country at a critical time. The Saudis have traditionally supported Pakistani economy through concessional oil supply and deferred payments.

The key foreign policy challenge for the Shahbaz Sharif government is to repair relations with Washington, Beijing and Riyadh. With respect to the latter, Prime Minister Sharif made a timely visit to the Kingdom. It certainly boosted bilateral engagement since the Sharifs enjoy warm, personal and commercial ties with the Saudis. Reportedly, Pakistani authorities got a much-needed $8 billion economic package. Pakistan ought to stay engaged with the US for economic, diplomatic and military purposes. There is no match for American military technology currently. In addition, Pakistan has to satisfy growing Chinese security concerns in order to consolidate the CPEC. Both the countries ought to expand the CPEC to Afghanistan and Iran to enlarge the market and attract foreign direct investment. Last but not the least, Pakistan ought to commercially engage Central Asian States and gain their diplomatic support on Afghanistan.

Finally, Islamabad must buy peace by not indulging in any armed conflict with India. Bilateral trade will be a win-win arrangement for both countries. However, the idea needs to be discussed at length with relevant domestic stakeholders, including the military. Unilateral action on this count could backfire.

In a nutshell, the Shahbaz government must engage with important countries and stakeholders in terms of economic diplomacy so that our economic woes are addressed amicably.

The writer has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and a post-doc from UC-Berkeley. He is a DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright fellow and an associate professor at the Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He tweets @ejazbhatty