n the 2018 general elections, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan did not reach the magic number, which is 172, of seats in the National Assembly to form the federal government on its own. The PTI could secure only 155 seats and had to negotiate with smaller parties like the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement to form a coalition government that remained in office till last week when it was brought down by the united opposition, called the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) by winning over the MQM and the Balochistan Awami Party through a lengthy but successful bargaining process. The leadership of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F) played a pivotal role in the sustained campaign against the Khan-led PTI government that had started a plethora of corruption cases against the Sharifs, Zardari and several other key opposition leaders. This gave the latter common ground to united against Imran Khan who was working on building a populist aura for himself through excessive use of state and social media. The opposition in general and the PDM in particular also did protest politics and projected their anti-PTI agenda through an effective use of social media. The opposition called Imran Khan a “selected” prime minster, implying that he exercised power not by legitimate election but through the strategic support of the country’s establishment. The latter’s alleged political role was highlighted by the PML-N in its political processions. This opened room for backdoor negotiations and eventually, Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minter, flew out of the country apparently on medical grounds.

This was a political miscalculation on Khan’s part. He might have wanted to be rid of Sharif. Once in London, the latter became more of a challenge for Khan. Quite regularly, Nawaz Sharif took to social media to point out economic mismanagement, poor governance and sloppy foreign policy moves of the Khan-led government. Indeed, ordinary Pakistanis faced high inflation, a high unemployment rate, non-progressive taxes and energy crisis. In the Punjab law and order deteriorated even in urban areas due to ineffectiveness of the provincial government run by an inexperienced, visionless and docile chief minister, Usman Buzdar, who was hand-picked by Khan himself. Excessive shuffling of the civil bureaucracy further compounded administrative problems.

On the foreign policy front, the Imran Khan government offended China when one of his advisors commented critically on the CPEC, indirectly bringing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into disrepute. The COAS, Gen Bajwa, then made efforts to cool the matter down. Saudi Arabia, one of the top lenders and oil exporters to Pakistan, was resentful too because the prime minister wanted to give more importance to non-Arab countries like Malaysia and Turkey in the OIC. He also had a contradictory take on the US. He met Trump warmly in the White House and expected President Biden to give him a telephone call. When India unilaterally changed the constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, the Khan government failed to persuade the UN to hold an emergency session on Kashmir. The OIC paid lip service only. All the government did was replace ‘Kashmir’ with ‘Srinagar’ Highway in the federal capital in a poorly conceived move considering Kashmir, as an identity and nomenclature, might as a result discursively and cognitively recede from popular awareness.

Imran Khan also fumbled at managing relations with the country’s powerful military. The latter has been a key stakeholder in the country’s foreign, defence and economic policy. In the past, economic mismanagement by the civil governments was cited as a major reason for their ouster through a military coup or dismissal through presidency. The Khan government’s poor economic indices carried negative implications for the military, too, which required resources for its needs. Since the country’s export base could not be expanded, the government imposed more taxes on ordinary people. The latter, thus, had enough reasons to be attracted by the opposition’s narrative that Imran Khan was ‘selected’ and was not delivering.

However, rather than mitigating these challenges, Khan continued with his style of governance and politics. Being a populist leader who believes in a direct contact with people, he maintained a hot line with his support base in terms of “live” television programmes in order to provide them relief rather than discussing issues in the parliament. Indeed, Khan’s parliamentary attendance remained below average compared to his predecessors. Many said that he was obsessed with his personality and popularity as a former cricket celebrity, his connection to a white British family, winning the cricket World Cup and building a cancer hospital and defeating the Sharifs and Zardaris. The PTI, the party he founded in mid-1990s, could not overcome the cult of his personality.

On the foreign policy front, the Imran Khan government offended China when one of his advisors commented critically on the CPEC, indirectly bringing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into disrepute.

At the peak of his cultist politics, Khan started treating rival politicians as untermensch – “inferior people”, a term Hitler used for non-German races. Little wonder, he did not feel morally compelled to not use abusive language against the top leadership of opposition parties. This is a dangerous a trend he solidified in Pakistani politics and society. The domineering mind-set was also at play when Khan had to deal with the ‘extension’ issue related to COAS Gen Bajwa in 2019 as well as the appointment of the ISI director general last year.

His interventions in the internal matters of the military and non-delivery on economic front precipitated “neutrality” on the part of the establishment. Khan hated this notion of neutrality. The opposition on the other hand, particularly the PDM, welcomed and used it to great effect. The latter had been discussing a no-confidence vote against Khan since 2019. Khan had challenged the opposition on several occasions to try just that. Sensing a chasm in government-establishment relations, the united opposition not only won over Khan’s allies but also several members of his own party. They filed a no-confidence motion on March 28. Compelled by the survival instinct, Khan tried his best to personally win back allies and the so-called dissidents. The effort came too late and was in vain. It was in this context, that Khan started talking about initially a ‘foreign’ and later ‘American’ conspiracy against his government. In his speech at PTI congregation in Islamabad on March 27, Imran Khan showed a piece of paper, dubbing it as a threating letter. In the following weeks, the so-called “letter-gate” caused ripples in Pakistani politics. It even made the US authorities issue a statement to publicly deny it.

The anti-Khan opposition persisted in pushing for a no-confidence vote. After using some delaying tactics, the government called the National Assembly session on April 3. However, rather than going for the vote count, the deputy speaker, Qasim Suri, dismissed the no-confidence motion, ruling it unconstitutional in terms of Article 5 of the constitution. Within no time, Prime Minister Imran Khan appeared on the state TV and announced dissolution of the National Assembly which the president, who hails from his party, upheld. That was a severe blow to the opposition which then appealed to the courts. In a very tense political environment, the Supreme Court, having listened to all parties including Khan’s PTI, set aside the ruling, thus, restoring the assembly. The top court also directed the government to fulfil the constitutional requirement by holding the assembly’s session on April 9. Noticeably, Khan’s lawyers could not convince the Supreme Court of any foreign conspiracy against the government.

The power tussle continued on April 9. Acting apparently on Khan’s instructions, the NA speaker, Asad Qaisar, employed delaying tactics till resigning literally at the eleventh hour. Finally, the no-confidence resolution was put to vote and carried. Khan was thus ousted constitutionally. Next, the leader of the opposition, Shahbaz Sharif, was elected as new prime minister. The military arguably had an opportunity to stage a coup but it let the political process move forward. This was a sane decision. A martial law at this stage could only add to Pakistan’s persisting crisis of political and economic instability.

The new government has received greetings from major powers including Russia. The Sharifs and Zardari have enjoyed cordial relations with the entrepreneurial community extra-regionally. It is time they put their best foot forward in order to keep the country on the path of composite stability. However, the economic woes may persist due to limited options. It is obligatory for the new dispensation to strengthen ties with major global and regional stakeholders including the US, China and Saudi Arabia in order to explore markets, investment and opportunities.

The writer has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and a post-doc from UC-Berkeley. He is a DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright fellow and an associate professor at the Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He tweets @ejazbhatty