When the word “clemency” was first used in a late 2015 briefing of security officials, it was followed by a long silence that ended with a participant asking: “But what about those who lost their loved ones in terror attacks? The tribesmen will never forgive them [militants].”

The official leading the briefing paused momentarily to ponder over the question. “People who have taken up arms (against the state) also have families,” he said, carefully choosing his words. “There are newborns and septuagenarians amongst them.”

He argued that the tit-for-tat killings will only breed more militancy. “There is no end to such a war. If we continue to fight, Pakistan alone will incur losses.”

Six years later, the state is once again at a crossroads.

Since last December, Pakistan has been in direct contact with various militant groups including the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In October, Prime Minister Imran Khan revealed that the government was considering a clemency deal for the terrorists.

“This isn’t an alien concept,” says an official involved in the exercise. “About 900 militants belonging to the Lashkar-i-Islam terror outfit surrendered in 2015 and were granted clemency. They were gradually rehabilitated and have remained law-abiding citizens.”

Official say that the terms of the agreement offered to the militant groups bar them from raising troops and acquiring weapons.

There is a catch. “Crimes against state can be forgiven but atrocities against individuals cannot be forgiven,” he adds. “The TTP carried out target killings in several tribal regions. Forgiveness for those crimes is up to the relevant tribesmen.”

Soon after Khan’s interview, his statement was endorsed by the Gul Bahadur group. Sardar Hayat, one of the top three commanders of the group, sent out an audio message with Maulvi Sadiq Noor, announcing a ceasefire.

Although the Bahadur Group is part of the Shura-i-Ettihadul Muhajideen, it is not among the TTP conglomerate. The government had a peace deal with the Bahadur group before its 2014 military operation in North Waziristan. However, he escaped later to Afghanistan and has since carried out terror attacks in Pakistan from Afghan soil.

The government had also entered peace negotiations with the TTP - leading to a ceasefire that was suspended two weeks later when the militant outfit beheaded 23 Pakistani soldiers. The talks were abandoned following the attack at Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport.

This time around, both Bahadur and the TTP led by Noor Wali Mehsud were on the negotiating table.

“There have been three meetings with the TTP,” an official privy to the developments tells The News on Sunday (TNS). “The first meeting lasted only two hours. The second went on for more than 24 hours.”

The third meeting was held in Afghanistan’s Khost province. It was attended by government officials and a 14-member group of TTP commanders, led by TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud and representative commanders of the groups’ various factions including Omer Khalid Khorasani from Mohmand, Maulvi Faqir from Bajaur and others from TTP Swat, Gandapur Taliban, Taliban from Darra Adam Khel and TTP North Waziristan. “Senior leadership from both sides was present to show seriousness towards ending violence” he said.

Valle Riccardo, a researcher tracking militancy in the region, says that holding talks with jihadis is not an easy task. “They have inflexible demands,” he tells TNS. He says the biggest mistake by the government was to use the Afghan Taliban-US negotiation model. “The situation is very different.”

“The biggest obstacle was getting all factions of the TTP on the negotiating table,” says another official. “Reservations were expressed by the Mohmand, Bajaur and Swat chapters.”

The TTP fighters who had escaped to Afghanistan are largely based in a region called Loya Paktia (Larger Paktia) that includes Khost - a hotbed of the Haqqani Network that has brought them to the negotiating table.

Islamabad has tried on several occasions over the past decade to engage the TTP but without an official acknowledgment.

“Negotiations usually have three prerequisites for a favourable environment to be pursued. First, there is a geopolitical shift. The second can be an incident with far-reaching consequences and the third is a change in leadership,” says an official. “In Afghanistan, Pakistan saw all three this time”.

For the recent attempt at peace, separate consultative processes were launched in Pakistan’s tribal districts with tribal elders building a consensus in support of talks. “So far, they agree that a ceasefire is necessary to maintain peace until a conclusion is reached,” says a source with direct knowledge of these meetings.

The talks broke down in early December after a month-long ceasefire.

“The ceasefire had taken over a year to negotiate,” says an official.

Valle Riccardo, a researcher tracking militancy in the region, says that holding talks with jihadis is not an easy task. “They have inflexible demands,” he tells TNS. He says the biggest mistake by the government was to use the Afghan Taliban-US negotiation model. “The situation is very different.”

During this time, the authorities released 48 of the 102 prisoners originally sought by the TTP. In its statement announcing an end to the ceasefire the TTP said the government had failed to meet its conditions for talks to go ahead.

“Prisoner releases have always been the bane of negotiations,” says Riccardo.

Meanwhile, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) dismissed the notion that the TTP was a part of it. Yet, its spokesperson criticised Pakistan for not installing an Islamic system.

“This may be a political strategy, a way of saying that the TTP is not a part of the IEA and that their conflict with Pakistani state is an internal problem,” says Riccardo. “This is in line with the Afghan Taliban’s strategy to legitimise their government in the eyes of regional powers and internal community.”

“The reality, however, is very different.”

The TTP has sworn allegiance to Afghan Taliban Emir Haibatullah Akhundzada as well as to Haqqani Network’s Siraj Haqqani. Zabihullah Mujahid’s remarks that the Afghan Taliban have no role in TTP-government talks were contradicted by Amir Khan Muttaqi, who said his government was mediating the negotiations. The claim was endorsed by the TTP.

“The contradictions may be linked to pro- and anti-Pakistan positions within the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban have considerable influence over the TTP, but it is unlikely that they will take coercive action against the militant organisation,” says Riccardo.

“I think that the Afghan Taliban have a divided and cautious approach,” he concludes.

The writer is a freelance journalist and a former editor