With five policemen killed in encounters with rioters and 520 injured, including 17 critically injured; trenches dug up on a highway; and life of ordinary citizens in suspended animation for weeks on end, the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan mounted a remarkably daring challenge to the writ of the state.

The response of the state was no less remarkable. The terms of the agreement between the government and the TLP remain something of a mystery. An en masse release of the arrested TLP workers indicates that freeing them was a part of the deal.

Also, the TLP is no longer a proscribed entity. The allegations of receiving funds from India to destabilise Pakistan have been binned and the party has been encouraged to take its role in the electoral politics. The TLP’s change of fortunes is just as stellar as it is astounding.

Reports emerging recently have contradicted earlier media reports that the government-TLP deal was concluded after TLP dropped its demand for the expulsion of the French ambassador. In a recent column, Mufti Muneeb ur Rahman, the lead mediator and guarantor, has categorically denied that the TLP has dropped its demand(s). He says the TLP and the government agreed that the matter would be presented in the parliament and the TLP would accept the decision.

Rahman has reiterated that the establishment, which is “the real centre of power” [sic], fully backed the mediation that ultimately led to the successful conclusion of the dialogue. He says there was no possibility of the TLP espousing an extremist agenda because its workers were infused with religious passion, loyal to the nation and scions of those who had sided with Muhammad Ali Jinnah during the Pakistan movement.

Rahman made no mention of the deaths of the policemen and the misery faced by the citizens because of the violence unleashed by TLP workers.

Ever since the deal was concluded, there has been an intense debate on the implications of launching and mainstreaming a party of an overtly sectarian character. There is a point of view that the approach is not going to work. A similar role was assumed by the TTP in the past but the adventure ended in disaster. The TLP.eanwhile, has already been registered as a political party and shown spectacular performance in the previous general elections.

The deep state may have been influenced by two factors in its warmth towards the TLP. First, the Barelvi sect has been politically inactive for a long time while parties led by Deobandi clerics politically active since 1979 (read: the Afghan jihad and Iranian revolution). It may have been tempting therefore to test the political potential of the majority sect, which could turn out to be a political goldmine. Second, a new ‘religious’ party might be counted on to dent the PML-N vote-bank, especially in the Punjab.

If we are willing to learn, the lesson is that political engineering through fiat is no substitute for genuine political representation.

The approach is fraught with risks. A sectarian mindset, by definition, is an exclusive mindset. How religious minorities might fare under the rule of the majority sect is a relevant question in a country like Pakistan.

Strict allegiance to Deobandi tradition and insistence on its enforcement has been blamed for the excesses of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan where girls’ education was banned; women’s movement in public spaces was made conditional on the presence of a male guardian; barbers were flogged for shaving the beards of adult men; and the demolition of Buddha statues in Bamiyan was justified.

Rule of sectarian parties can be particularly problematic in scoiteties where judicial institutions are weak, public trust in the judicial arm of the state is lacking and enforcement of the law is seen as selective and disproportionate. The previous record of public lynching of the religious, sectarian and ethnic minorities in Pakistan portends more trouble.

Vested interests have long sought to achieve their ulterior motives using religious and sectarian slogans.

Islam attaches utmost importance to right of life. It categorically declares that saving a single life is in essence saving all of humanity. Conversely, unjustly taking a single life amounts to the murder of all humans.

Pakistan regularly witnesses one of the largest religiously motiated gatherings in the world. It is also one of the top countries in terms of making pilgrimages to sacred places.

The poor state of rule of law, abuse of power by public office holders, a widespread culture of corruption and pilferage from the public exchequer are inconsistent with an overtly religious society. A culture of lies, disinformation and deceit by public office holders bears testimony that religion is observed more in breach than compliance.

The space for dialogue has shrunk drastically under the incumbent government. One can imagine the state of dialogue on issues of crucial importance when the government is run by a political party of sectarian domination equipped with religious emblems and fatwas.

Pakistan witnessed one of the most violent Shia-Sunni conflicts in the 1980s and ’90s. It can ill afford a repeat of the sordid saga of Saudi- and Iranian-backed sectarian militias spilling blood on the streets of Pakistan. Terrorist attacks on the Hazara community, explained in terms of their sectarian denomination are a stark reminder that the spectre of sectarian strife has not vanished.

Political engineering has a rodid history in Pakistan. Introducing a linguistic identity in the politics of Sindh was a disaster as Karachi remained hostage to organised crime for decades after that. If we are willing to learn it, the lesson is that political engineering through fiat is no substitute for genuine political representation.

The writer is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics at COMSATS   University Islamabad,   Lahore Campus