In what is being seen as a “major reshuffle,” the government has transferred the high command of the Lahore Police, including the capital city police officer (CCPO), Ghulam Mahmood Dogar, and Operations DIG Sohail Chaudhry. The reason cited is the police’s “mishandling of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan’s violent rally.”

Several regional police officers (RPOs) and district police officers (DPOs) in the Punjab have also taken the heat.

The Lahore police came under fire recently for their alleged failure to contain the rioting mob affiliated with a banned outfit, first in the city and then on the GT Road. Media reports said seven policemen had been martyred and more than 80 injured in a series of violent clashes. Taking notice of the incidents, Prime Minister Imran Khan sought a report from Chief Minister Usman Buzdar, asking him to identify reasons why the protesters had managed to exit Lahore despite a heavy deployment of cops including the Anti-Riot Force (ARF).

Shortly after the TLP protest rally, the police bosses decided to hold a flag march on the city roads, apparently to cover up for their shortfalls.

It is pertinent to mention here that this wasn’t the first time the city police underperformed. The question arises as to why could the police not deliver? Do they lack training, resources or the morale? Is the police high command to blame, or does the blame lie with the intelligence wing or Special Branch?

It transpired that Inspector General Rao Sardar Ali Khan had reprimanded the Lahore police command over what he called “the height of unprofessionalism” in coping with the TLP rally. According to sources, the IG met the police high command, including CCPO Ghulam Mahmood Dogar (now transferred and posted as Additional IG in charge of Logistics and Procurement) and Operations DIG Sohail Chaudhry (transferred and posted as DIG in charge of Technical Procurement) at his office. Khan expressed his extreme displeasure over the performance of the Lahore police in stopping the protesters.

DIG Tariq Abbas Qureshi told TNS that the cops did not lack the training or resources required to deal with a rioting crowd. He said, “The fact is that the Lahore police are the largest force in the country in terms of human resource, capacity and equipment.”

He also spoke of “thousands of policemen backed by a trained Anti-Riot Force.”

According to him, the problem lay in “the [police’s] failure to assess the threat and chalk out an appropriate security plan. This led the protesters to make their way out of Lahore.

“The police can handle the protesters in small numbers. But if the crowds are allowed to grow, the chances of them getting out of control increase big-time.”

According to the DIG, the problem lay in “the [police’s] failure to assess the threat and chalk out a foolproof security plan. The police can easily handle the protesters if the latter are small in numbers. If the crowds are allowed to grow, the chances of them getting out of control increase big-time.”

To substantiate his point, Qureshi recalled how the police had commendably “thwarted the TLP’s former protests, and cleared 21-odd trouble points across the city, under the command of the former DIG Sajid Kiani.

“Even when BA Nasir was the CCPO Lahore, the police weren’t just successful in arresting [the late] TLP leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi, they were also able to keep the members of the banned organisation from disrupting public life in the city.”

Qureshi insisted that the “situation [in the recent TLP protest rally] could’ve easily been averted if the police hadn’t let the crowd grow.” He said the police had failed to stop the mob outside the TLP headquarters, besides being unable to check their movement in the city over the next couple of days.

It is noteworthy that after the city police had failed to stop the protestors in Lahore, the IGP ordered the police officials to reach Muridke, on GT Road, and provide assistance to the Sheikhupura police. Around 15,000 policemen, including the then CCPO (Dogar) and the Operations DIG (Chaudhry), were part of the fleet. However, when the crowd turned violent, on GT Road, somewhere between Imamia Colony and Rana Town, the police retreated.

In a letter written to the IGP, some policemen lashed out at the senior officials as well as other law enforcers for the “flawed plan” which had resulted in the death of at least seven cops. They also pleaded with the IGP to constitute a fact-finding committee to ascertain as to why the back-up force did not show up when the frontline was trying to push the protesters back. Some junior policemen demanded that a criminal case be lodged against those responsible for putting the lives of frontline officials in jeopardy.

Requesting anonymity, a Lahore police superintendent said, “the TLP is no ordinary organisation. It’s a proscribed terrorist organisation. The police cannot fight them with just batons and teargas. When cops are fired at, they have to respond in kind.”

He maintained that the police had been “strictly and clearly directed not to carry firearms. They were allowed to use only pepper guns, paintball guns and teargas. There were no lapses of strategy, capacity and capability on our part.”

The SP was of the opinion that the police must be afforded constitutional and legal protection in case they are to open fire on violent protesters. He added that the Model Town incident and its aftermath had demoralised the police: “No one stood behind them after they had only acted upon the orders of their seniors.”

The writer is a senior journalist and can be reached at ahsanzia155@gmail.com