The social contract is a fundamental concept of political philosophy. It dates back to the 17^th Century and is closely associated with Egnlish philosophers Hobbes and Locke and French philosopher Rousseau. In an earlier avatar it is mentioned by Greek sophists of the Fifth Century BC. Currently, it is at the heart of theory and practice of political organisation.

A social contract is the process by which everyone in a political community, either explicitly or tacitly, consents to state authority, thereby limiting some of their freedoms, in exchange for the state’s protection of their rights and security and for the adequate provision of public goods and services.

Faith in government is the biggest marker of a vibrant social contract. Declining faith in government can negatively affect its legitimacy, weaken its ability to carry out its functions, such as maintaining order, defending national sovereignty and managing economic conditions, and eventually lead to the deterioration of social cohesion, justice and solidarity.

In times of trust deficit the rulers don’t trust the ruled, the ruled do not trust the rulers and most importantly, the ruled do not trust one another. The controversy stirred up by the proposed Pakistan Media Development Authority (PMDA) is a case in point. The media houses see the law as draconian and synonymous with stifling the freedom of expression. However, the government is hell-bent on crashing it through the parliament.

In essence, the PMDA issue shows that the government is not willing to allow the type of expression that is not palatable to it. As a matter of practice, there has never been any limit in Pakistan on maligning, mud-slinging, and browbeating politicians as a class. The political class is the softest target in Pakistan. So what might have prompted this legislation to gag the freedom of expression?

The only visible development in this regard is that social media users have criticised state institutions in unprecedented ways. Some TV channels too have taken digs at the transparency of the last general elections. Apart from this, there has been no new development that warrants drastic media regulation. The need to regulate expression is itself an indicator of weakness of the social contract.

The use of electronic voting machines is another bone of contention. The government seems in an unusual hurry to pass the bill on EVMs. Other political parties are legitimately concerned because the proposed bill seems to bypass the Election Commission of Pakistan by seeking powers to appoint persons to access the EVMs data and announce results. The failure of the Result Transfer System (RTS) on the day of the 2018 general elections and irregularities in Daska by-elections justifiably make the opposition parties suspicious. The EVM is probably the only issue on which the government sees it fit to engage the opposition. A shift to EVMs without developing a national consensus is almost sure to create doubts about the next general elections and further polarise the nation and weaken the social contract.

Afghan policy is another major issue with a bearing on the social contract. Many people believe that the elected governments have limited control over foreign policy in general and Afghan policy in particular. The Afghan war has cost Pakistan 80,000 lives and billions of dollars. There has rarely been a debate on the Afghan policy in the parliament. So the ordinary citizen is clueless about the direction of national foreign policy on Afghanistan and the losers and winners in the context of frequent foreign invasions of Afghanistan.

The use of electronic voting machines is another bone of contention. The government seems in an unusual hurry to pass the law on EVMs. Other political parties are legitimately concerned because the proposed bill seems to bypass the ECP.

The treatment meted out to the opposition under successive governments smacks of a vendetta rather than an opportunity to factor in the diversity of opinion for better policymaking. Once the opposition is put in the straightjacket using NAB cases and their only concern is to save their skin and outsmart other opposition parties waiting in the wings to clinch a deal, they should not be expected to play a constructive role on the legislative front or development of national policy. It is an irony that the tainted past (such as being part of financial scams) does not bar individuals from entering the parliament and even reaching the opposition benches. However, once they reach the parliament and challenge the government, the law takes its course and starts dispensing justice. Is this not tantamount to gagging the voices of dissent, a prerequisite for any functioning democracy? The social contract is weakened in the process.

The social contract in Pakistan has always been stressed because of a hybrid system of governance. Pakistan’s political history is characterised by direct military rule or a hybrid democratic system. Freedom in the World project has one of the world’s largest and most comprehensive databases on the degree of political freedom worldwide and in individual countries. Freedom in the World publishes an annual report on the state of political freedom based on two indicators: political rights and civil liberties. According to the Freedom in the World, Pakistan was designated as “Not free” from 1979 to 1984 and then from 1999 to 2007: the two periods correspond with the rule of military dictators Gen Zia ul Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf. More disconcertingly, Pakistan has been designated as “Partly Free” during the other years. Put in another way, Pakistan has never been free politically.

Pakistan has paid an enormous cost for a hybrid system of governance in terms of the credibility and sanctity of social contract. When the Bengali nationalist Awami League won the largest number of seats in the 1970 general elections, the state hesitated to hand over power to it. This intransigence precipitated the inevitable. The sowing of the seeds of separation dates back to Gen Ayub Khan’s martial law era, though.

As suggested earlier, declining faith in government can adversely affect its ability to carry out its functions. Pakistan is facing severe challenges on the economic and administrative fronts. The macroeconomic indicators are disappointing. There was a massive 18 percent increase in the unemployment rate from 2019 to 2020. There was an increase in extreme poverty among the working population by 31 million globally and 9 million in Pakistan. Put in another way, 29 percent of the increase in extreme poverty in the whole world was accounted for by Pakistan. This figure indicates that Pakistan has weak capacity to absorb economic shocks. In another development, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) has downgraded Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from Emerging Markets to the Frontier Markets from December 1, 2021.

At an individual level, the heart-wrenching stories of mothers killing their children because of hunger should be an eye-opener and jolt the rulers and the ruled out of complacency.

On the administrative front, the government seems no less adrift. In the three years of the PTI government in the Punjab, seven IGs and five chief secretaries have been changed. The federal government too is known for similar musical chairs. Recently, the prime minister picked the sixth FBR chairman in three years. The abrupt exits of Asad Umar, Hafeez Sheikh, Hammad Azhar from the finance portfolio also show the lack of direction in the government’s economic policies.

The extra-constitutional power struggle within the elite and powerful institutions creates confusion about the basic concept of a social contract. The non-state actors are generally the direct beneficiaries of such confusion. In an ironic twist of fate, very few people now believe that a positive change is possible by adhering to the constitution.

Most people see a way out only in an elusive “revolution” or “the change.” They conveniently forget that in Pakistan’s national life, the constitution has been hardly adhered to in its true spirit. How would the father of the nation, a great constitutionlist, have reacted to this state of affairs?

The writer is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics at COMSATS University Islamabad, Lahore Campus