Is the socio-political category, post-colonial state, a singular and a universal? This was one of the simple questions put to me that do not have simple and precise answers, particularly in the context of India and Pakistan.

I answered in the negative and that triggered quite a lively debate. How come the colonialism experienced by India was any different from what Pakistani part of the subcontinent had experienced? Pakistan is not a post-colonial state the way India is because it didn’t come into being as a result of a struggle waged against the British Raj.

The Muslim League leadership never made such a claim. It treaded the path of separatism, a political course, couched in religious exclusion. Contrariwise, the whole thrust of the Congress’s struggle was against British, which throughout the 20^th Century its ideologues peddled as the Other.

I have quite a different perception on the subject that whetted the interest of my listeners. Therefore, when the discourse started unravelling, young interlocutors listened intently. That indeed was gratifying. I think my interaction with the flock of young minds merits to be shared with the readers of this column.

Both the Congress and Muslim League were founded on the premise that these political parties would cultivate cordiality between the ‘natives’ and the British government. The Congress, despite having been conceived as a party with a composite character, could not sustain it for long. Despite Muslim stalwarts like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan not very keen on Muslims becoming part of Congress, Muslim gravitation to that party remained a strong possibility.

However, the influences of prominent Hindu writers and thinkers soon started making a tangible impact on the Hindu middle classes, which had swung into the socio-political foreground in the late 19^th Century in an astounding fashion. The urban Hindu middle class had intellectual representation in figures like Bankim Chandra Chatterjee or Chattopadhyay’s ideas, Swami Vivekananda’s philosophical formulations and Aurobindo Ghosh’s agenda of Hindu reformism permeated the inner sanctum of the Congress.

The unequivocal love for India as Bharat Mata in the Vande Matram anthem irked the Muslim literati. Similarly, showing antipathy to those who had come from outside India and established their rule here, all ‘invaders’ were severely castigated without making any distinction between the British and the Muslims.

That was the beginning of the exclusionism that set the two communities apart from their own terms of engagement with the British. Even cultural icons like Rabindranath Tagore appeared steeped in the notion of an India with its Hindu cultural essence. Even Gandhi calling for a Ram raj; setting up of Wardha Scheme and concepts like Vidya Mandir pointed to Muslim exclusion from his much-hyped socio-political reform agenda.

Having said this, the partition of Bengal in 1905 and the radicalising impact it engendered both on the Congress leadership and on its rank and file etched the line of difference between the Muslims and the party. Congress went all guns blazing against Lord Curzon’s decision to divide Bengal. The Swadeshi movement brought in the impulse of autochthony persuading people to boycott foreign goods and start using the locally manufactured goods.

That laid the foundation on which the Indian nationalism, championed by the Congress, evolved. Subsequently it culminated in the establishment of post-colonial state of India. Colonial suppression, drain of wealth, meddling into the Indian culture and divide and rule were the fundamental postulates that the Congress leadership ran its anti-colonial campaign on.

The aggressive political posturing of the Congress leadership amounted to pushing Muslims against the wall. The annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911 dealt a severe blow to the morale of the Muslims. Particularly after Gokhale’s death in 1915, the liberal political ethos that the Congress had so far adhered to, was eroded.

The Muslims’ fear of Hindu domination was a driving factor that made Muslim leaders call for concessions from the British so that Hindu unilateralism could be reined in. Pan-Islamism got so much traction among the Muslims because their distrust of Hindus had multiplied.

Temporary rapprochements like the Lucknow Pact and the bonhomie witnessed during the Khilafat Movement instead of forging unity, served in fact to embitter the communal relations in the long run. Muslims in the vanguard of politics remained wary of the impending Hindu domination. Ideologues of Hindu reform movements were extremely aggressive and political zealots of the Congress nursed uncanny repugnance for anyone not subscribing to the agenda of their party. Given that scenario, compromise of any kind was impossible.

All the recommendations or suggestions put forward by Quaid-i-Azam were essentially to seek legal and constitutional guarantees in case the Westminster model of democracy transpired in India. The Muslim struggle was not against the British or any colonial dispensation but against the hegemony of the Hindus. Muslims from Sir Syed Ahmad Khan to Quaid-i-Azam saw British as a mediatory force. They wanted the British to prolong their stay in India until some judicious resolution of the communal tangle was worked out.

That insecurity was so deeply embedded in the collective psyche of the Muslims that once Pakistan was achieved all possible measures were taken to build a very strong army. A close look at the archival sources gives a good glimpse of the correspondence between Pakistani officials and US State Department in which mostly arms deals are negotiated.

Thus, the two political communities had different aims, divergent sets of objectives to achieve and the methods to attain the desired results were starkly different. The Muslim League leadership went for a mediated settlement. Therefore, it didn’t opt to alienate the British government. It ran a well calibrated campaign whereby it kept both the British and the Congress engaged instead of shedding one for the other.

Given its massive popular support, the Congress was not ready to strike any deal, neither with the British nor with the Muslim League. Its anti-colonial posture was very clearly stated and became an intrinsic part of its post-colonial ideology. Since Pakistan did not come into being as a result of an anti-colonial struggle, its post coloniality is of a different hue. Sadly, the post-colonial specificity of Pakistan has not been theorised by its academics. That, exactly, is where the problem lies.