Both Pakistani and Indian media recently highlighted the mediatory role of the United Arab Emirates between the two adversaries. This is highly plausible given the excellent relations the two countries enjoy with the Emirates. As the opportunity arises for a change of minds, strategic planners on both sides should acknowledge the realities confronting their nations.

Pakistan cannot take the Indian Administered Kashmir by force. When it tried in 1965, it was militarily and economically stronger than India. The operation failed and led to an all-out war. Later years saw the strengthening of the Indian security apparatus. Pakistan, meanwhile, went through political turmoil till the separation of East Pakistan and the Simla Agreement took Kashmir off the United Nations radar.

In the 1970s, Pakistan became an active players in the Cold War, leading to the engineering of resistance in Afghanistan and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Similarly, despite its military might and chest-beating, India cannot take Pakistani Administered Kashmir by force, given the insurmountable physical barriers and the fact that both countries are nuclear powers.

India has historically suffered from an illusion of grandeur. Military and economic development has added to the Indian establishment’s confidence. Coupled with an aggressive diplomacy, riding on a wave of world condemnation of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, Hindu nationalist majority decided to browbeat Pakistan and redefine the Kashmir agenda. They have apparently realised now that the independence movement in Kashmir is indigenous and not some Pakistan-sponsored mischief.

By abolishing the special status of Kashmir and annexing Ladakh, India has brought a third party, i.e. China, into the equation.

The Indian bid to encircle Pakistan by fomenting terrorism in Balochistan and through support of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan has forced Pakistan to look for more robust security and economic aid. With USA squeezing Pakistan through drying its security and economic assistance and threatening it with drone attacks, the Silala post incident and the OBL raid, Pakistan’s reliance on China increased.

The CPEC was a consequence of this embrace. It is vital for Pakistan both from an economic and security point of view. The Indian military strategists, when appraising the reasons for the Ladakh incursion, must have factored the annexation of Ladakh and the threat to CPEC as one of the reasons, no matter how much they try to downplay this at the political level.

The US efforts to make India a key player in the Afghan endgame prompted a balancing act by Pakistan which encouraged China and Russia to play a more active role towards the future of Afghanistan.

It should be acknowledged that given its historical links with the Afghan people, India cannot be excluded from Afghanistan. A settlement in Afghanistan will not only secure our Western border but also open a whole vista of economic opportunities for Russia, China, Pakistan, Central Asian Republics and India. The issues between India and Pakistan are no longer bilateral. Therefore, a multilateral approach is imperative.

This is why the CPEC becomes exceptionally relevant for the whole region.

CPEC is a reality that can neither be wished away nor rolled back by force. It would be better for India to take advantage of it rather than threaten it.

The CPEC will open western China to the world and provide a convenient link to India as an alternative land route given the present status of the Indian road infrastructure. It will re-establish the ancient trade routes of northern India with the West. India should not miss out on this. The sixth-largest economy of the world (by nominal GDP), historically, it has always been divided between the south and north India. The south has been trading through its numerous ports and the north through land routes.

Recently, The Hindustan Times carried a column by a friend and colleague from the Indian Administrative Service, DS Jaspal. He emphasised the need for basing decisions on geo-economics rather than geopolitics, advocating free movement between India and Pakistan.

He viewed the CPEC as a transport corridor rather than an economic corridor and articulated the advantage to north India in using it. According to him, manufacturing in north India has become uncompetitive because of the “high cost of inland haulage “, as manufacturers have to incur 25 to 40 percent more cost. Resultantly northern Indian states have lagged in development. He proposes taking advantage of Pakistan’s highway and road network to export through Karachi Port to save time and money.

In a 2002 Report on Indian Transport Sector, The World Bank had concluded that poor transport is a significant drag on India’s economic growth. Economic losses from congestion and poor roads, which are 80 percent of land transport, are estimated to cause a loss of up to $6.5 billion annually. Trucks take four to five days from Delhi to Karnataka, with much of the time spent on interstate check posts.

Big container trucks should take 15 hours from Wagha-Atari border to Karachi port (1,250 km) with the new motorway infrastructure. This promises a considerable advantage to Indian exporters to the extent that transporting farm products to south Indian metropolises may be much cheaper and take less time via Karachi port. This is not the only advantage. It is more convenient for travellers from Indian Punjab to take a flight from Lahore Airport than the Indian international hubs, which are much further.

The CPEC is a reality that can neither be wished away nor rolled back by force. It would be better for India to take advantage of this rather than threaten it. This will open a vista of opportunities for the SAARC region and the Far East. The time has come for both sides to change the old mindset. Geo-economics should supersede geopolitics.

The CPEC presents a tremendous opportunity for all. All sides should abandon the zero-sum game, show flexibility and embrace the new paradigm.

The writer is a former secretary of the Establishment and Information Divisions