The United States kept a close eye on the Middle East during and after the Cold War. Indeed, it rushed to rescue Kuwait from Saddam-led Iraq in the early 1990s when the latter tried to disturb the rules of the game in the region with huge carbon resources.

Joe Biden, then a senator, opposed the US military intervention in the war. Nonetheless, a decade later, Biden supported the US-led war on Iraq; he, however, regretted it during his presidential campaign last year. Some years down the line, as vice president during the Obama years, he not only familiarised himself with the Middle Eastern region but also influenced the US stance on Iraq. Though Biden takes pride in having maximised the US interests in the region as part of the Obama team, his political rivals, especially former president Donald Trump, and some rights groups accused him of destabilising the region to the extent that non-state actors such as the ISIS found an enabling environment to pursue their particularistic agendas. However, if waging and supporting wars is a liberal criterion to evaluate senator-ship and/or (vice) presidentship, then Trump himself failed the test for his administration politically, if not militarily, when he supported armed conflicts in the region. For example, the Trump team turned a blind eye to human rights violations in Yemen. Importantly, his administration cut a billion dollar weapons deal with Saudi Arabia, implicitly perpetuating militarisation of the Middle East. Other regional stakeholders, such as Russia and Iran, are not lagging far behind in arming their allies and proxies in the region.

Having assumed office, President Biden has started expressing his views on global security, international political economy and, among others, climate crisis. Strategically, the Biden administration is supposed to pursue America’s long-term interests with an added focus on the Indo-Pacific region. Being a liberal democracy and economy, the US has, over the decades, developed an institutional ethos and practices to make and implement a grand strategy regardless which party is in power. Little wonder, the Trump-era strategic policy vision, commonly known as Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), that was legislated in 2018, has, in principle, been embraced by the Biden team. The ARIA carries immense strategic, economic and political implications for the Indo-Pacific region.

In his first visit to the Asia-Pacific region last week, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken strongly criticised China’s sweeping use of “coercion and aggression”. “China uses coercion and aggression to systematically erode autonomy in Hong Kong, undercut democracy in Taiwan, abuse human rights in Xinjiang and Tibet, and assert maritime claims in the South China Sea that violate international law,” Blinken said at a news conference in Japan. “We’re united in the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, where countries follow the rules, cooperate whenever they can, and resolve their differences peacefully. And in particular, we will push back if necessary when China uses coercion or aggression to get its way,” he said.

President Joe Biden, who spoke to Chinese President Xi Jinping last month, has previously said that his approach to China would be different from his predecessor’s in that he would work more closely with allies in order to mount a pushback against Beijing. “We will confront China’s economic abuses,” Biden said in a speech at the State Department, describing Beijing as America’s “most serious competitor.” “But we’re also ready to work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interest to do so. We’ll compete from a position of strength by building back better at home and working with our allies and partners.”

To begin with, the Middle East will rank lower on the US strategic policy list. The three regions to be assigned greater priority by the US in the foreseeable future are: Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Western Hemisphere. South and West Asia (latter usually regarded as Middle East) is the least prioritised by Washington.

On the other hand, the ARIA has, by default, implicated the Middle East too, but for different reasons. To begin with, the Middle East would onwards rank lower on the US strategic policy list. The three regions to be assigned greater importance by the US in the foreseeable future are: Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Western Hemisphere. South and West Asia (latter usually regarded as Middle East) are the least prioritised by Washington.

By and large, the latter is likely to engage with these regions tactically, not strategically. If the preceding is the point of reference, the US would only maintain its tactical presence in the Middle East in a “recalibrated” fashion which, to an extent, has been communicated to the regional leadership and the world just lately. For instance, Biden administration did not object to the release of an intelligence report holding Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman directly responsible for ordering “capture or kill” of a US-resident Jamal Khashoggi who was killed at the Saudi Embassy in Istanbul.

Moreover, Biden has withdrawn US support to the Riyadh-led war in Yemen. In addition, Biden-led US has frozen sale of some arms to the Kingdom. These are crucial indicators for bilateral and regional engagement. It can be safely deduced that the US-Middle East policy will be institutional, and not personal as it was between Trump and MBS. In the future, MBS or any Saudi leader, would have to align with the recalibrated framework if bilateralism is desired.

In addition, much to Riyadh’s disdain, the US is likely to engage with Iran diplomatically. United States’ European allies desire the same for market connectivity and economic dividends.

As far as other Arab countries in the Middle East are concerned, Biden had already alerted Sisi-led Egypt, for instance, that it is the latter that needs the US and not vice versa. The Egyptian president is seemingly under pressure to stop authoritarian measures such as stifling critical voices. Cairo has been dependent on the US financial and military largesse since 1979. In addition, foreign aid, and loans to Egypt from, for example, the IMF are contingent on the nature of Cairo’s ties with Washington. In February, Blinken had told his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry during a call that human rights would be “central” to ties between Cairo and Washington. “The Secretary and the Foreign Minister highlighted the importance of the strong strategic partnership between the United States and Egypt, particularly in security and ongoing counterterrorism cooperation, and exchanged views on regional issues,” the US State Department spokesperson later said in a statement. “The secretary raised concerns over human rights, which he emphasised would be central to the US-Egypt bilateral relationship.”

The Biden administration’s stance on Syria and Iraq is grounded in tactical reasoning which contextually may provide some room for initiating diplomatic conversation with the non-Arab regional stakeholders such as Iran and Turkey. Both countries have, over the years, shared commonality of interests regionally, i.e, countering (the US backed-) Saudi influence.

Last, but not the least, as far as Israel is concerned, Biden administration is not likely to alter conventional fault lines. If conventional logic is a guide, the US would continue to support the state of Israel strategically. However, political differences, for example, with the current Israeli government would be expressed tactically. Though it is to be seen how Israel would react if US and its allies re-engage Tehran diplomatically. However, during the Obama era, certain Israeli and American scholars saw an element of stability for not just the entire Middle East but also Israel is relations with Iran are structured on a sustained basis. Such arguments may be put forth in a renewed context as well.

In a nutshell, under Biden the US has ‘recalibrated’, and not ruptured, its relations with the key stakeholders such as Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. However, such relations would be characterised tactically, and not essentially strategically in so far as Arab countries are concerned. The US is very likely to mark its tactical and, at places, logistical presence in the Middle Eastern region. However, its strategic interests rest in the Indo-Pacific. For those, the legal foundation has already been laid out. Lastly, since India is bracketed as a key country from South Asia of the Quad under the Indo-Pacific strategic, Pakistan has to tread very carefully since the US interests in Afghanistan will only be of logistical nature. Thus, Islamabad has to plan innovatively in order to engage the US more meaningfully.

The writer has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and a post-doc from    UC-Berkeley. He is a DAAD, FDDI and    Fulbright fellow.   Currently, he is   associate professor,  Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad.   He tweets @ejazbhatty