In December 2001, an attack on the Indian parliament prompted a massive Indian buildup on the border, responded to by Pakistan. The High Commissioners were withdrawn, and the countries were on the brink of war.

The stalemate continued till a ceasefire agreement in 2003. In 2004, Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled to Lahore to attend the SAARC summit. It appears that we have come back full circle since then.

On February 25, on the second anniversary of Operation Swift Retort against India, the DGMOs of India and Pakistan, after a hotline contact, announced an agreement “on strict observance of all agreements, understandings and ceasefires along LOC and all other sectors”, essentially meaning going back to the 2003 agreement. The move raised questions as to whether it was sudden or with some prior understanding.

According to reports from India, the two countries’ National Security Advisors have been in contact and that they had met in the UAE. They have been talking for the last three months to come to some arrangement to keep the peace. As a result of the agreement, specialised units deployed to launch an offensive against each other were pulled back. Both the Indian and Pakistani military chiefs had made conciliatory statements immediately preceding the agreement.

Pakistan had been consistently urging India for talks until the abrogation of Article 370 when it took a hardline stance. However, the underlying motive has always been to push India towards talks.

In a softening of posture, Pakistan recently announced its support for Prime Minister Modi’s proposal for health coordination and health visas during a SARC workshop, having earlier turned down a proposal to be part of the SARC virtual summit.

The situation had come to the point that cooling of temperature was a necessity.

At the height of the 2002 tensions, there were over 5,700 ceasefire violations along the Line of Control. In 2020 the violations had again exceeded 5,000, with close to 600 in the first two months of 2021.

Several factors seem to have influenced the Indian decision although Pakistan bashing has been a hallmark of Modi’s India. The policy has won him two elections.

However, lately, it has seemed to realise the futility of controlling Pakistan through coercion. The strikes on Balakot failed miserably, and Pakistan’s response surprised the Indian security establishment. The downing of an aircraft led to the realisation of inadequacies in equipment and planning, leading to a statement on the necessity of procuring Rafale aircraft by Modi.

The stand-off with China on LAC further exposed its inability to fight on two fronts.

The reduction in violence is seen as the first step towards improvement in the overall environment. The next would be to restore full diplomatic relations and agreement on resumption of visas, border trade and trade across LOC.

The Chinese incursion in Ladakh caught India unprepared. They had to reposition one of their strike corps facing Pakistan to reinforce their borders at Ladakh. The situation has prompted a severe rethink in India, which now sees China presenting a more significant strategic challenge than Pakistan. Ever since Ladakh, saner voices in India have been advocating talks to neutralise Pakistan to deal with China.

The Indians seem to have realised the futility of action in Kashmir, which is ever disturbed. Violence has not abated. They have not been able to achieve the objectives for which they had imposed the new constitutional mechanism. Even moderate Kashmiris are angry. Public protests on the Citizenship Act and the farmers’ movement have made India lose whatever goodwill there was in the international community. The economy is not performing well.

The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan must also have entered into the Indian calculations, with Pakistan letting China assume a senior partner role in Afghanistan, Iran and South-East Asia. With greater interoperability between the armed forces of the two countries, the emergence of China as a dominant power in the region, and the Ladakh incursion has brought a third power into the Kashmir equation, to the chagrin of India, which always thought it could handle Pakistan.

Except for President Trump’s statement to mediate on Kashmir, the Americans have not made any overt gesture to bring the two countries closer. However, it has been silently nudging them towards talks. American thinking has not changed with the change of administration in Washington.

Yet pressure is on India because of President Biden’s statements on Kashmir during his election campaign. India would like to start its dealings with the Biden administration on a positive note, knowing it will not want to pressure Pakistan. It needs support in Afghanistan and it wants to prevent Pakistan from moving further into the Chinese camp. Both India and Pakistan would like to placate the Biden administration, with the latter needing its support to override the FATF threat. The reduction in violence is seen as the first step towards improvement in the overall environment. The next would be to restore full diplomatic relations and agreement on resumption of visas, border trade and trade across LOC. If India withdraws its objections to holding the SAARC summit in Islamabad, there are some indications that the Indian premier’s visit to Islamabad will pave the way for talks.

There are tremendous obstacles on both sides. Modi, who owes his rise to hostility towards Pakistan and the Muslims, would find it difficult to sell this policy change domestically and to his parent organization, the RSS.

Pakistan has a declared stand of no talks without Kashmir. Add to this the demand for withdrawal of Article 370; the task gets uphill.

According to India’s Gen Hooda, “dealing with the contingency of war on two fronts will require more resources than the current state of the Indian economy can provide. It, therefore, makes eminent sense to calm the heated borders”. Calming the borders equally suits Pakistan and China.

The two allies will further strengthen their forces and achieve greater economic interdependence through the CPEC.

In 2003 the de-escalation was prompted by tremendous pressure on India by the USA and the UK. This time the pressure perceived by India is from China. To what extent India is sincere in its intentions and to what extent Pakistan and China are steadfast in their resolve will be seen in the coming months.

The writer is a former secretary of the Establishment and Information Divisions