The Pakistani Army chief’s “extending the hand of peace in all directions” and saying that “Pakistan and India must resolve the long standing issue of Jammu and Kashmir in a dignified and peaceful manner as per the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir” reportedly encouraged the Modi government to agree to an LoC ceasefire. This impression has been widely carried by Indian political analysts. It seems implausible as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) merely restated the known Kashmir policy and Pakistan’s consistent focus on dialogue to resolve differences with India.

For the last four years, the same stance failed miserably at convincing the recalcitrant Modi to halt his anti-Pakistan policy. Even when Imran Khan addressed the Sri Lanka-Pakistan Trade and Investment Conference on February 24, he underlined that “Our [India-Pakistan] only dispute is Kashmir and it can only be resolved through dialogue.” After coming into power, he had explained to Prime Minister Narendra Modi that the “way forward for the subcontinent is to resolve our differences through dialogue”.

Anurag Srivastava, the MEA spokesperson, had responded, “Our position is well-known. India desires normal neighborly relations with Pakistan in an environment free of terror, hostility and violence.”

Who, or what factors nudged Modi to soften his stance against Pakistan?

Since its inception, Pakistan has faced an existential threat from India. Its security driven foreign policy largely aims at countering this dangerous trend. Pakistan always tries to resist the unrelenting Indian efforts to project it as a big brother, expecting other regional countries to buttress this image. Whether Pakistan materially afforded the policy, it did not matter. It has continued to defy the Indian dominance even after losing East Pakistan in 1971. This consistent resolve has generated unabated tension, if not active conflicts between them. It is no wonder that the on-and-off switch, sanctioning hybrid warfare against each other, has never stopped clicking.

Since Modi became prime minister, the fifth-generation hybrid warfare has been in full bloom against Pakistan, with India publicly committing to not only diplomatically isolating Pakistan but also weakening it internally by fuelling insurgency in Balochistan and hitting its economy. The prospect of India carrying out a false flag operations to project Pakistan as a terrorism sponsoring state has always been there. This was never beyond the Modi government. In the wake of its unilateral decision of abrogating the special status of IHK and annexing it as part of Indian Union territory, India increased the frequency of firing on LoC to deflect global attention from massive human right violations in IHK. Pakistan’s response has been measured and focussed more on exposing Indian brutality and ethnic cleansing attempts in IHK rather than tit-for-tat across the LoC. Pakistan’s civilian population residing close to the LoC has suffered mortalities due to massive Indian artillery hits. Pakistan has avoided retaliation in the same manner, as the population likely to be hit mostly on the Indian side is also Kashmiri Muslims. Pakistan therefore has to choose its targets carefully. Tranquility and disengagement along the LoC is needed to make living conditions better on both sides of LoC. The recent ceasefire agreement can onlt be welcomed as a positive development.

Against the backdrop of continuing hostility, the announcement of the LoC ceasefire came as a surprise development. The interesting turn is that the mainstream IOK political parties including Hurriyet Conference, have welcomed the joint statement, calling it a “move in the right direction”. The statement iterated the agreement to “address each other’s core issues and concerns, which have propensity to disturb the peace and lead to violence”.

The disturbing and intriguing aspect is the timing of the ceasefire agreement and how it has been welcomed in India without abandoning brutal and oppressive measures in IHK or lowering public hostility towards Pakistan. One wonders how this ceasefire agreement would lead to peaceful co-existence between these two countries without a meaningful and result-oriented dialogue on the Kashmir dispute. How will Hindutva-driven Modi government soften its anti-Muslim attitude? Is it a propaganda ploy, a clever tactical move to influence US administration as was the de-escalation and ceasefire understanding of 2003-2008 to discredit our position on Kashmir with the Arab bloc within the OIC?

India did not conclude a formal written ceasefire agreement as was suggested by Pakistan after the 2003 understanding which broke down in 2008. Now the two sides have announced that they have agreed to “strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the LoC and all other sectors”. This seems somewhat incomprehensible or misplaced as India violated all the existing Kashmir-related understandings and agreements in unilaterally changing the status of IHK in complete violation of the UN resolutions.

Now the two sides have announced that they have agreed to “strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the LoC and all other sectors”. 

Until the joint statement leads to dramatic and bold departure from the current anti-Pakistan RSS mindset and politics on “core issues” bedeviling relations, in all probability the said agreement will turn out to be either an eyewash or a time-gaining antic. It cannot be lasting or lead to profound changes by ignoring immediate concerns of Kashmiri Muslims in IHK. Desperate India, as in 2008, may resume regular firing across LoC, after a long or a short pause, on some pretext. In the meanwhile, it will definitely exploit the intervening period to: i) consolidate its position with pro-India Kashmiri leaders, ii) project normalcy in IOK and iii) try to deflect global pressure over human right violations, thus creating a situation where Pakistan would not have any other choice but reconcile with the “new normal” in IHK.

How can we ignore Kashmiris in a Kashmir solution? Have we fallen to an Indian trap, is a point to ponder.

Diplomacy and disengagement at LoC are a welcome development. Conflicts cannot be put to rest through wars. But, diplomacy should not be allowed to pursue a zero-sum game. It requires negotiations in good faith, and this element is missing here. The jammed door of genuine dialogue is not even half-open yet. Indian ulterior motives for agreeing to LoC ceasefire may aim at creating misunderstanding among Kashmiri leaders that Pakistan may not mind shifting its Kashmir policy. The statement of Syed Ali Geelani, issued by his special representative, is the first pointer to this situation. The questions he raised are serious and damaging to Pakistan’s credibility with the Kashmiri people. Will it stop bloodshed in Kashmir; why the shift from no engagement with India until it rolls back what it did on August 5, 2019, and why this ceasefire agreement without any reference to August 5 are critical and may haunt civil and military leadership if the agreement fails to provide some comfort zone by reducing brutalities and brazen acts against Kashmiris?

Ned Price, the US State Department spokesperson, has welcomed the joint statement by India and Pakistan to maintain strict observance of a ceasefire along the LoC. Such an innocuous pronouncement is meaningless if not accompanied by a firm commentary on serious violations of human rights in IJK. Pakistan needs to realise the futility of such statements. It is a page from the old book; on February 26, 2019 Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, had said that they encourage India and Pakistan to exercise restraint, and avoid escalation at any cost. “I also encouraged both ministers to prioritise direct communication and avoid further military activity,” he said.

No doubt, the US wants peace and stability in the region but it seems least bothered about the final solution of Kashmir. The looming instability and the spectre of an active war threaten its interests. Fortunately, South Asia is not the key zone for US-China rivalry or competition. The reality is that US cannot, and will not, change the fault lines of power competition in South Asia profoundly. But, at the same time, it will be naive to visualise that the US is not concerned about protracted rivalry between nuclear India and Pakistan. It does not want the rivalry to aggravate the existing insecurity and potent dangers. The new administration will further deepen its strategic partnership with India through synergy in their diplomatic and security efforts. The policy of strengthening Indian capacity to serve as a regional counterweight to curb China in Southeast Asia, and to a lesser degree in South Asia will gain traction. Conversely, the US will continue to struggle vis-à-vis how to scuttle Pakistan’s growing military and economic tight embrace of China. American interests in Afghanistan where Pakistan has influence with crucial Taliban factions would be taken care of by offering some carrots.

Let’s not read too much into the unsaid concerns while reviewing a text negotiated by military officers whose basic responsibility includes persevering tranquility, and peace along LoC and the joint border of the two countries. The support of the two armies may not be good enough to create an enabling supportive environment to resolve the Kashmir dispute in “a dignified manner”. It is impossible to expect the flexibility essential to starting meaningful dialogue in the Indian position. For its part, there is no change in Pakistan’s principled position on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute which calls for a “free and impartial plebiscite under the UN auspices”. Restoration of diplomatic ties at high commissioners’ level is desirable, as the process may prove helpful in injecting positivity in the decaying veins of bilateral relations.

The writer is a former ambassador and advisor to CRSS, an Islamabad-based think tank. He can be reached at mian.sana@gmail.com