On December 10, US President Donald Trump announced that Morocco had become the latest Muslim country to establish diplomatic ties with Israel in exchange for the US recognition of its control over Western Sahara. Earlier, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan had made similar announcements to normalize ties with the Jewism state.

The state of Israel was established on May 14, 1948, through a United Nations Resolution which, technically speaking, also founded the state of Palestine on the territories of the (former) British Mandate which was enacted in the wake of World War I (1914-18).

The establishment of the Jewish state in the Middle East fulfilled the long-held political aim of several stakeholders from within the Jewish communities living within and outside the Middle East. Indeed, the Jewish migration to the ‘promised land’ from, for example, parts of Europe had begun since the Balfour Declaration (1917) which hinted at the establishment of a ‘national home’ for the Jews provided they supported the British war efforts. Though before and during the course of World War II, the British authorities had other priorities within the Middle East and the Jewish cause of having a nation-state seemed to have been somewhat compromised by the former.

Contextually, this encouraged certain super-nationalist Zionist groups to form paramilitary organisations such as Irgun to target the British interests, e.g. King David hotel bombing in 1946. Nonetheless, the United States of America emerged as a ‘new’ hegemon after the WWII was over. The US planned to govern the world in a manner that looked different from the old colonial way. It encouraged decolonisation and the formation of independent nation states in Africa and Asia. The replacement of the mandatory territories with nation states of Israel and Palestine was predicated on the processes of decolonisation. Moreover, the US initiated and encouraged the establishment of international organisations such as the UN and the IMF to influence global politics and economy in a way that could maximise American interests. The formation of the NATO in 1949 added the military component to the US grand strategy to counter the communist threat during the Cold War period. The US political, technological and military support to the nascent Israeli state aimed at securing its strategic interests in the Middle East a region divided along nationalistic, religious, ethnic, sectarian and ideological lines since 1945 if not before.

Thus, owing to nationalistic, religious and ethnic variables, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia along with the Palestinian Arabs not only refused to accept the formation of the Israeli state in May 1948 but also attempted to annihilate it through military means on the very eve of independence. The (Palestinians) Arabs wanted another Arab state established on what they claimed was Palestinian territory which the British, and before them the Ottomans, had conquered. However, the Arab states failed in their endeavor since Israel, as mentioned above, was backed by the Western powers particularly the US. After the humiliating defeat in the 1948 war, the Arabs had another spat with Israel in 1956 which is known as the Suez Canal Crisis. This, however, fell short of a war.

However, a war looked inevitable given the divergent interests. Major Arab states including Jordon had territorial claims over different territories that now formed Israel. For example, Jordon viewed West Bank as part of the former. These Arab states waged wars against Israel in 1967 and 1973 in pursuit of their territorial/national interests. In so doing, they invoked the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. After all, the Palestinian diaspora, that crossed over into these Arab states after having been displaced on account of wars, could only live at the margin of these states some of which have maintained cordial ties with the US, the principal backer of Israel, since the discovery of oil and gas. In addition, Egypt under Anwar Sadat made peace with Israel at Camp David in 1979. Egypt’s recognition of, and normalisation with, Israel reflected, on the one hand its economic and military weakness and on the other a desire to reap economic and military benefits. Little wonder, 1979 onwards, Egypt became the top recipient of American largess.

For similar reasons, Jordon made peace with Israel in 1994. However, other Arab states including Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia continued with their non-recognition policy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE started engaging Tel Aviv covertly in the late 1990s. Outside the Middle East, Pakistan, maintained its position of not recognizing Israel despite temptations during, for example, the Musharraf era. Since 1979, Iran has vociferously opposed the very existence of the state of Israel.

No Muslim or Arab country recognised Israel between 1994 and 2020. First it was the UAE (August) that recognised Israel, followed by Bahrain (September), Sudan (October) and now Morocco in December. Each of these countries acted in what the respective governments saw as its national interest rather than sticking with their conventional stance on Palestine. The UAE, a close partner of Saudi Arabia, needed Israel technology, weaponry and market along with Israeli-American strategic support vis-à-vis Iran. Sudan is facing economic hardships and Israeli and American assistane worked as an incentive. Morocco obtained American support to formalise its control over Western Sahara which had hitherto remained the last colony of the modern era.

The trend is likely to continue with more Muslim countries under the Saudi influence following the UAE’s example. Riyadh itself is opening up to Tel Avia though formal recognition of Israel might take time. The Saudi position will likely depend on Mohammad bin Salam’s survival in the saddle. While these Arab states are likely to get closer to Israel, the respective societies sound overwhelmingly anti-Israel. How these authoritarian states manage their restive populations remains to be seen. Another implication of this recognition spree could be ideological in terms of further fuelling of anti-Israel militant organisations some of which are backed by Iran. This has the potential to destabilise the region through proxies. However, strategically and, to and extent, militarily, the pro-Israel Arab states would feel more confident when it comes to countering Iran though the probability of attacking Tehran with Israeli support would be low in the foreseeable future. As far as Pakistan is concerned, the government has vowed not to recognise Israel. However, one may not rule out informal engagement to counter Indian influence. The developments are not likely to help the Palestinians cause. Israel is not likely to change its annexation policy.

The writer has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and a post-doc from UC Berkeley. He is a DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright fellow. He tweets @ejazbhatty