So far two Gulf states — Bahrain and the UAE — have recognised Israel while a recent not-so-clandestine visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Saudi city of Neom points towards winds of change in the Middle East. Of all the states in the Middle East, a normalisation of the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia is believed to be the most crucial development in the region.

Saudi Arabia is the wealthiest Arab country with the largest oil reserves and the largest consumer market in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia also represents the majority Sunni Islam because of its historical role as a custodian of the holy mosques in Makkah and Madina. Saudi Arabia also has a significant say in the policies of not only the Arab world but also the rest of the Islamic world.

The process of normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab world has coincided with more Palestinian deaths, more Israeli settlements in the West Bank and a continuous displacement of Palestinians. In a visible show of impunity, Israel has renewed settlement activity in eastern Jerusalem in late November 2020 which, once, angered Joe Biden during his visit to Israel in 2010.

A vast majority of Muslims does not see the relationship with Israel as an ordinary political issue. Seen through the prism of prophetic reports about the events leading up to the Day of Judgment, hostility between the Muslims and Jews is eternal.

Any effort aimed at normalisation of relations between the Jewish state and the Muslims in the Middle East may have a colossal political cost for the rulers of Gulf states. Why are the Gulf states so eager to normalise ties with Israel despite all this?

There is no doubt that the push for normal relations came from the Trump administration. Trump’s famous “deal of the century” boast promised that his Middle East peace plan would be a rare opportunity for peace in the region. The problem with Trump’s peace plan was that it promised Israel all it wanted and offered Palestinians very little: a truncated state surrounded by Israel and shredded by Jewish settlements, with a façade of sovereignty.

Despite the asymmetry in Trump’s peace plan, a series of developments in the Middle East provided a strong basis for normalisation of relations. Israel and the Gulf states were equally alarmed at the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran and his explicit support for the overthrow of Arab autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia in the wake of the Arab Spring. Trump, who had anti-Iranian and pro-autocratic tendencies, provided a rallying ground for the cooperation between the Gulf states and Israel.

That Benjamin Netanyahu should visit Saudi Arabia clandestinely after the election that put Joe Biden in the driving seat, however, suggests that the Trump’s Middle East peace plan was more than a foreign policy boost for Trump’s election campaign. It means that the confluence of interests of Israel and Middle Eastern countries has outlived Trump’s immediate election gamble. According to some analysts, the Gulf regimes want Israeli protection against the threat posed by Iran. These regimes also want Israeli protection against Arab Spring-type potential uprisings in the future. Saudi Arabia might have weighed its options in favouring Trump’s peace plan in return for access to defence technology.

What does Israel expect from this normalisation of relation with the Gulf states? Through normalisation with the Gulf states, Israel is effectively stripping the Palestinians of their traditional and historical support base. Most of the donations that flowed into Palestinian coffers during the First Intifada and the Second Intifada came from the Gulf states. Once the funding resources dry up, Palestinians will be under an increased pressure to make more concessions to the Israeli incursions.

Jordan has been the custodian of Jerusalem’s holy sites, such as Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock for decades. Israel wants to bypass the Palestinians and Jordanians regarding the issue of holy sites in Jerusalem. Who can be a better choice than Saudi Arabia for a transfer of the custody of holy sites in Jerusalem as it is also the custodian of Makkah and Madina?

For domestic consumption, Pakistan’s only justification for recognising Israel would be counteracting India. Will such a potential benefit justify jettisoning the ideological baggage of seven decades?

Some other benefits that can potentially accrue to Israel are the large Gulf markets. Currently, Israeli products reach the Gulf market through Jordan and Egypt. Once the normalisation of relations has taken place, Israel’s industrial sector will expand rapidly, supported by the large consumer market in the Middle East. The normalisation will also pave the way for large investments from the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Israel.

Saudi Arabia, apparently, showed willingness to normalise ties with Israel on the assumption that Trump would be in the White House for another four years. Now that it is clear that Joe Biden will be in the White House for the next four years, how will this affect the warming of hearts in the Middle East kingdoms towards Israel? The answer to this question largely depends on the United States policy towards the Middle East under Joe Biden.

Historically, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US under the Democratic Party has been uneasy. Under President Barack Obama, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US cooled off considerably because Obama supported the Arab Spring uprising, reached a rapprochement with Iran and criticised Saudi Arabia’s human rights record. President Trump, on the other hand, was seen by many as giving Saudi Arabia a pass following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi. Trump also downplayed human rights abuses by Saudi Arabia and signed a massive weapon sales deal with Saudi Arabia and the UAE despite congressional opposition.

Biden may restore support for the Palestinians in the form of economic and humanitarian assistance to Palestinian people.

As regards the question of Iran, Trump and Biden may have radically different views. While Trump withdrew from Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and pressured Teheran to renegotiate the deal, Biden saw it as a “dangerous failure” and pledged to reverse Trump’s withdrawal if Iran complies with its treaty obligations. Biden also seeks to make the Iranian government more predictable by reintegrating it into a dialogue. On the other hand, Biden has sent a strong message to Saudi Arabia on the second anniversary of Jamal Khashoggi’s death that it would review its relationship to Saudi Arabia and defend the rights of political dissidents and will not compromise the American values “to sell weapons or buy oil.”

The push for normalisation of relations between Israel and the Gulf states would most likely continue. President-elect Joe Biden has already stated that he would not move the American embassy back to Tel Aviv and will not reverse Trump’s recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. He has been disdainful of the suggestion by Bernie Sanders to demand concessions from Israel for the Palestinians. Biden has called the UAE-Israel deal as a “historic breakthrough” and promised to persuade more countries in the region to reach similar agreements with Israel.

Finally, will the normalisation of ties between Gulf states and Israel do irreversible damage to the cause of Palestine, and by extension, to the concept of a Muslim Ummah? If Saudi Arabia, as a custodian of the holy sites of Makkah and Madina, lends its support to normalising relations with Israel, the shift will fundamentally transform Arab attitudes towards Israel. The Arab consensus in support of Palestinians would likely break apart. The Arab states would then be free to decide individually about the nature of their relations with Israel.

Pakistan may be irrelevant to the developments in the Middle East unless it shows a willingness to share the vision of the bandwagon whose only common denominator is hostility towards Iran. It does not have a large consumer market or funds to invest in Israel, but a nuclear-armed ally in the anti-Iran grouping may be quite formidable.

For domestic consumption, Pakistan’s only justification for recognising Israel would be counteracting India. Will such a potential benefit justify jettisoning the ideological baggage of seven decades?

The writer is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at COMSATS University Islamabad,     Lahore Campus