The rising political temperature in Pakistan in recent days is a predictable part of a larger pattern. Pakistan has experienced an unenviable history of alternation between democratic and military regimes. Worse still, the political regimes have also oscillated from periods of relatively genuine public representation to a quasi-democracy and sham democracy, and many shades of grey. No Pakistani prime minister has ever completed his or her term in office.

The opposition parties have been crying foul since the 2018 elections. Ever since the incumbent government took office, national economy has suffered many setbacks. Even before Covid-19 struck the economy had not looked good. A combination of issues of misgovernance, skyrocketing prices of essential commodities, inflated utility bills, and, most importantly, the selective accountability have brought the opposition parties together.

A Multi-Party Conference (MPC) on September 20 gave birth to Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). The high water mark of the MPC was the speech of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif who clearly said that removing the incumbent government was not the only objective of the PDM. The PML-N supremo said that the real fight to be fought was against the military backers of the current government. In some ways, the speech was the beginning of bare-knuckles politics in Pakistan. The opposition has thrown down the gauntlet and said that the PDM’s objective was to purge the political landscape of the ‘machinations of the establishment’.

There has been a flurry of activity ever since. On September 28, Shahbaz Sharif, the leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, was arrested by the National Accountability Bureau. On the same day, an accountability court indicted former president Asif Ali Zardari and his sister in a money laundering cases. More recently, Nawaz Sharif has been named in an FIR on sedition charges.

The PTI government has said it has no role in the registration of the sedition case against the former PM. A PTI spokesperson claimed that a “private person” had filed the complaint. Among the 40 other people named in the FIR, Raja Farooq Haider, the Azad Kashmir prime minister, figured prominently. This caused a near-universal outcry. Fearing diplomatic fallout, the Punjab government has decided to remove his name from the FIR at the investigation stage. Against others nominated in the case, the proceedings will take their course.

The cacophony of unreserved allegations and counter-allegations of treachery, treason and betrayal is just the most recent episode of the ongoing saga of Pakistani politics. Fatima Jinnah was called a traitor by Ayub Khan when she challenged the military dictator’s illegitimate rule. Before her, former prime minister Huseyn Suhrawardy was declared a traitor. The list of alleged traitors is as long as it is preposterous. It includes GM Syed, Wali Khan, Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo Nawaz Sharif is only the latest addition to it.

Patterns of political and military rule in Pakistan point to an inescapable conclusion: while military rules stick, often for decades, elected regimes always teeter over the edge. Political regimes are always struggling for survival.

The core question, in Shakespeare’s words, is whehther there is something particularly wrong with the stars, or are the Pakistanis underlings? Who benefits from the perennial political mayhem that regularly takes the country many steps back? Who stands to lose if Pakistan achieves political stability, vibrant socioeconomic institutions and rule of law? What is the cost of the political instability that has always haunted Pakistan?

Elementary textbooks on Pakistan studies hardly emphasise anything more than Pakistan’s centrality in world affairs. Pakistanis routinely listen to the refrain of Pakistan’s role in global developments, such as the Afghan peace process and regional matters like the CPEC. Nuclear weapons are frequently mentioned to establish Pakistan’s leading role in the Islamic world. Is this narrative justified? An objective analysis of Pakistan’s performance on some fundamental indicators looks much less flattering.

At least 36 countries had smaller per capita income than Pakistan, but they spent more on health than Pakistan. Pakistan’s expenditure on the education sector was also around 2.9 percent.

According to the data collected by the World Bank, Pakistan’s per capita gross national income was around $1,530 in 2019. In a sample of around 200 countries, only 38 countries had smaller per capita income than Pakistan’s. Most of these economies were concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Pakistan has one of the highest child mortality rates in the world. Pakistan’s under-5 child mortality rate is around 70 per 1,000 live births. In a sample of 193 countries, only 21 countries performed worse than Pakistan on this count. Pakistan’s average life span is 67 years. Out of 203 countries, 155 countries had longer life expectancy.

A nation’s priorities are reflected in the quality of two basic service structures: health and education. Health and education sectors require considerable resources to achieve a minimum level of efficiency. Consequently, expenditure on health and education is considered a stable indicator of a government’s commitment to the wellbeing of the masses. According to recent data, Pakistan spent 2.9 percent of GDP on health. There were only ten countries in the world which spent less than Pakistan on health.

One may be tempted to say that Pakistan’s low per capita income doe not allow a significant increase in health expenditure. However, at least 36 countries had smaller per capita income than Pakistan but spent more on health. Pakistan’s expenditure on the education sector was also around 2.9 percent. There were only 32 countries that spent less than Pakistan on education. Out of these 32 countries, at least 16 countries had smaller per capita income than Pakistan’s.

A comparison of Pakistan’s military expenditure with other countries provides another perspective. There can be no denying that Pakistan faces an existential threat from its eastern neighbour governed by a fascist ruling party. However, a comparison of Pakistan’s military expenditure with other countries is not without some interesting takeaways.

Pakistan’s military expenditure was over 4.05 percent of the GDP in 2018. Only nine countries spent more than Pakistan on their military capability. Most of these nine economies were oil-rich Gulf states and Israel. India spent 2.38 percent of its GDP in 2018. Among the high military spenders globally, the per capita income of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait were 21,600, 21,900, and 34,290 dollars, respectively.

As against the per capita income of these countries, the per capita income of Pakistan was $1,590, which is just 5 pecent of Kuwait’s per capita income. No country in the world had per capita income as low as $1,500, and spent more than Pakistan on its military capability.

Even if it is hard to suggest that Pakistan’s abject situation is the exclusive result of political instability, there is massive evidence to suggest that the underdevelopment of a country is inextricably linked with and rooted in its political instability.

When there is political instability, the chances that other state institutions may be manipulated increase phenomenally. In the absence of effective institutions with a clearly defined division of responsibilities, the state’s judicial arm is often twisted to achieve illegitimate goals. The culture of genuine political accountability does not flourish and sham accountability practices replace real accountability. Political vendetta and victimisation of the political opponents are often thinly veneered behind the facade of accountability. In this situation, the most significant loss is the loss of credibility of the state institutions. The credibility of the superior judiciary is arguably the most important predictor of a nation’s wellbeing.

In countries affected by political instability, there is a lack of continuity in critical public policies. Political governments are haunted by uncertainties about the completion of their stints. Succeeding governments rarely own flagship projects of the predecessor government.

The bottom line is that Pakistan needs political stability more than any other thing because economic wellbeing and external security are the outcome of political stability.

The writer is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at COMSATS University Islamabad,  Lahore Campus