There may be no immediate tension at the Torkham border and a presumption of normalcy on both sides for the moment, but the relations between the two neighbours are at their lowest ebb. The response on either side remains incident-focused, leading to short-term damage control if and when required.

Broadly, the relations between the two neighbours remain tense and there is no real forward movement in normalising the course.

As things are, the world appears to stand with Afghanistan. The questions being put to Pakistan can at least partially be answered by a retrospective look at the historical baggage it carries. This baggage should be understood in terms of the foreign policy choices it made, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. These choices came to be defined as the iconic ‘strategic depth’ doctrine; a doctrine that was associated with Pakistan’s ambitions about Afghanistan.

Whatever it signified for Pakistan, the ‘strategic depth’ that it sought in Afghanistan meant almost similar things for the outside world -- Talibanisation of Afghanistan, increasing Pakistan’s influence and thus minimising India’s influence. Pakistan may have taken an about-turn after 9/11, the world isn’t convinced that it has left behind its earlier foreign policy goals in Afghanistan.

Professor Ijaz Khan, chairman department of International Relations, Peshawar University, traces the post-1979 history thus: "Even before 1979, the Pak-Afghan relations weren’t that great. Afghanistan had closeness with India. At the time of Soviet invasion, Pakistan found an opportunity to increase its influence."

Among the refugees who came to Pakistan were nationalists, religious people, communists, Khan goes on to say. "Pakistan could choose from among them. It had its own mistrust of Pakhtun nationalists, so it picked the religious ones. It thought there is little chance these people will have good relations with India."

Afrasiab Khattak, former Senator and a member of Awami National Party (ANP), says "strategic depth in Afghanistan is still a determining factor of our Afghan policy, with its aim to Talibanise Afghanistan, to make it an appendage." Unlike the 1980s or 90s, "the entire world is standing with Afghanistan today. But in our country, some people think they can still sublet Afghanistan".

The Soviet invasion almost coincided with the Iranian Revolution. Pakistan’s geographical advantage was that all international support had to go through Pakistan. Prof. Khan recalls how then "the mujahideen were created and Saudi Arabia’s religious sectarian inclinations were exploited".

Ahmed Rashid, analyst and author of the bestselling book Taliban, agrees that Pakistan has sought influence in Afghanistan ever since the Soviet invasion of the country. "It has been supporting mujahideen, Pashtun groups including Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, and then Taliban. These were all attempts by Pakistan to use its influence with certain factions -- to the extent that it has become a bad habit and turns out to be a negative factor for Pakistan."

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Prof. Ijaz Khan tries to understand Pakistan’s stance. "The problem is that Pakistani state cannot take a democratic view of things; it looks at things from a military’s viewpoint. This centralised unitary state perspective has no room for pluralism even within the country; thus it has always wanted to control Afghanistan".

Following the Geneva Accords, in the 1990s, the American influence slackened and other regional powers like Iran, China and Saudi Arabia gained inroads into Afghanistan. When the Taliban formed a government (with or without Pakistan’s support), Khan says, "Pakistan saw in them a relatively ideal opportunity for itself because being religious and belonging to one sect, they would have no relations with Iran and India. They were accepted by the United States which was strongly opposed to Iran and Shia Islam at that time."

At one point, it was only Pakistan that stood with the Taliban, forcing them both into isolation.

"It was then that 9/11 happened. Pakistan was given a choice to stay with the Taliban or leave them. Pakistan decided to side with the allies in their war on Taliban-led Afghanistan; it seemed the only doable policy. It got economic aid and weapons in return. In the aftermath, India and Iran and other powers also got space in Afghanistan," says Ijaz Khan.

As stated above, the world saw and still sees Pakistan as pursuing a dual policy. "With the Haqqani network being based here, the Quetta Shoora being based here, Mulla Mansoor and Mullah Omar found here, and these are no secrets, a lot of people are unhappy with Pakistan. Whenever there is a terrorist attack, the sentiment against Pakistan gets stronger," says Khan.

Khattak couldn’t agree more. "With the Taliban leadership said to be based here, with its government in Quetta, the Afghans do feel that they can defeat them [Taliban] in Afghanistan, but they can’t defeat them in Pakistan."

Rashid sees in this a constant contradiction between Pakistan wanting its influence [with the Taliban] and the international community wanting Pakistan to use this influence for achieving peace. "As the Taliban influence and their fighting abilities intensify in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s influence is correspondingly weakened. We have no strategy, neither military nor civilian. The world expected that Gen. Raheel Shareef would clean up [all Taliban], so there is now international disappointment and frustration with Pakistan. We are facing the hostile attitude of US, Iran, India."

Khattak thinks that when Ashraf Ghani came to Pakistan in 2014, "that was a great opportunity. He had no political baggage and he met everybody, all the political leadership. He tried to address all of Pakistan’s concerns. He wanted economic cooperation and talked of hydel power, industrial estates, export zones so that Pakistan would have access to Central Asian states.

"In return we promised reconciliation. It was decided that Taliban would be brought to the negotiating table, and there will be coordinated war against those [factions] who don’t. But when the Taliban did not join the negotiations, we lost that political capital."

For Ahmed Rashid, that’s "a big tragedy. If we had pursued the policy of bringing Taliban to the negotiating table two three years back, that would have been better."

Prof. Ijaz Khan thinks Pakistan’s recent stance on Torkham or on refugees may be legally correct but is "politically costly". There appeared an unsaid rule that there could be drone attacks in Fata but a drone attack in Balochistan would be unacceptable. "Pakistan is trying to express its annoyance with the US. But the US has deliberately killed Mulla Mansoor in Balochistan, just to tell Pakistan how serious it is."

Khan says the US is concerned that Pakistan should not be destabilised, it’s a big country with nuclear arms; "it will be difficult to handle an unstable Pakistan. And Pakistan is banking on this fear of theirs, using it as a bargaining chip."