Punjab, Pakistan’s most developed province, is also at the heart of what is arguably its biggest problem -- extremism and militancy. It has often been painted as a cosy, safe-haven for militant organisations from where they operate with impunity.

When Zarb-e-Azb was initiated, in the backdrop of all praise and optimism, the need to take a look at Punjab and dismantle the militant network in the province was often iterated. Later, when the attention was focused on Sindh and Karachi in particular, the issue of inaction and complacency against militancy in Punjab came up again.

Militancy and extremism in Punjab can be traced back to Pakistan’s early years -- the anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore in 1953 that resulted in massive violence and bloodshed provided a glimpse into the rot that had begun just a few years after the partition. It also gave an idea about the kind of role Punjab would play in the degeneration process.

"The Anti-Ahmadi riots in 1953 serve as a starting point when we talk about religious extremism post-partition and are important in this regard because by that time, people had been psychologically prepared. The mindset created by Ahrar was such that even after this, whenever Ahmadis have been the target of any movement, the masses have never condemned it. They have always shown support," notes historian Dr Mubarak Ali.

He adds that the Deobandi political party, Majlis-e-Ahrar (which was later called Ahrar), and was at the forefront of the anti-Ahmadi movement in Pakistan, "had already started preparing people for militancy and extremism even before the partition of the subcontinent. Since it was a largely lower middle class movement, there was strength in numbers."

Historians like Dr Tahir Kamran have also asserted that for the Punjabi middle class, Tehrik-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwat was able to strike a chord in a way that no other social or political movement did. Armed with exceptional oratorical abilities, the leadership of the movement which included the likes of Ataullah Shah Bokhari and Mohammad Ali Jullundhri was able to attract and captivate audiences.

Religious fundamentalism and extremism increased over the years as the state engaged in efforts to appease the right -- even a liberal Prime Minister like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto submitted to the pressure, when his popularity was waning, by passing laws banning alcohol, gambling and even declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.

The largely Punjab-centric right-wing political alliance, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) gave the PPP a tough time and also had a role to play in Bhutto’s downfall. Irreversible changes were made which would not only put Pakistan’s future in great jeopardy but make it nearly impossible for policymakers to figure a way out of this mess.

Then came the Zia years, when the Islamisation process was in full swing. Zia subscribed to the beliefs of Deobandi school of Islam and came from a religious background. As huge amounts of money began to flow into Pakistan’s madrassas from the Gulf during his rule and initiatives such as giving madrassa degrees the same status as that of regular educational institutions as well as accommodating madrassa students in civil services were taken, madrassas began to gain strength.

With Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in efforts to counter each other’s dominance, madrassas in Pakistan also played an important role vis-à-vis spreading propaganda and influence. Militarisation of these madrassas which had experienced mushroom growth also emerged as a huge problem.

As religious extremism increased in Punjab, the country found itself deeper in the quandary of violence and militancy. Both Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Ahle-e-Sunnat Wal Jamat now) which was founded in the 1980s in Jhang and Tahafuz-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jaferia (Tehrik-e-Jafria now) founded in 1979 have had a dominating presence in the province.

It may be interesting to note that there are more Barelvi madrassas in the country than Deobandi ones; yet the latter have had greater influence. Up until the Mumtaz Qadri episode, this sect was thought to be more peaceful and flexible in its interpretation of Islam.

"Terrorism or militancy is not just about numbers. There are still more Barelvi madrassas in Pakistan but they got overpowered mainly because Barelvi madrassas did not get state patronage for years. This means they were unable to fine-tune and emphasise their ideology," says Dr Ayesha Siddiqa.

"Later, Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas defined Barelvi ideology rather than Barelvis dominating due to numbers. This means that feeling threatened by Deobandi madrassas and ideology that was over-powering, Barelvis also looked at more extremist approaches," she explains, adding, "There is an entire period of the 2000s when Barelvi madrassas, which were not very powerful in building a base, were dominating. The Deobandis would forcibly occupy Barelvi madrassas and there was little support from the state. The Barelvis then responded by becoming more extreme. It changed the Barelvi ideology."

"The state has never patronised Barelvi madrassas because these were considered less helpful in fulfilling state objectives. So, Barelvi madrassas were never an effective counterweight," she says.

Dr Mubarak Ali also agrees with her observation. "The two sects are now becoming increasingly similar because the Barelvis are afraid that the Deobandis will overshadow them because of greater strength. This is causing them to become more violent. The literature published on both sides bears testimony to this change, which of course is gradual and stems out of fear of getting pushed to the sidelines," he states. It will be a long, hard battle in Punjab which he likens to a bubbling volcano.

In her work titled, New Frontiers of Militancy and Radicalism in Punjab, Dr Siddiqa has outlined various other contours of the problem, such as the linkages of militants with businessmen in Punjab and a quid pro quo arrangement where one party provides funding and the other protection against adversaries which provides insight into how religious fundamentalists have permeated society and have gained legitimacy.

It will be a trying task to achieve a consensus against militancy for the government in the wake of various ground realities that have caused a fair degree of hesitation in terms of launching an operation in Punjab but one that is the need of the hour.