What is the future of Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) in Pakistani politics? If history is a guide, to nationally govern a pluralistic but fractious and militarily ambitious but economically-emaciated Pakistan, political parties need to be constituency-minded, have a strong dynastic identity and have a loyal, active party cadre. PML-N boasts all these. Being a parliamentary democracy, Pakistan also rewards parties based in the most populous two of its provinces - Punjab and Sindh, which between them represent about three-fourths of National Assembly.

No wonder that of the 10 general elections held in Pakistan’s 70-year history -- except for two held under military rule, General Zia’s party-less polls of 1985 and General Musharraf’s King’s Party polls of 2002 -- eight brought either Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) or PML-N to power. PPP led and formed the federal government in 1970, 1977, 1988, 1993 and 2008 and PML-N in 1990, 1997 and 2013.

And, whether someone likes it or not, parties and their principal leaders in Pakistan are synonymous. Bhuttos have dominated PPP and the Sharifs PML-N. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto became prime minister twice each and Yousaf Raza Gilani and Raja Pervez Ashraf once each for PPP (but only because there was no Bhutto at the helm, Benazir having been assassinated) while Nawaz Sharif is Pakistan’s most prolific prime minister after being elected a third time in 2013.

There have been two other parties that have shown impressive performances but have been limited in scope of governance for being essentially provincially focused: Muttahidda Qaumi Movement in Sindh and Awami National Party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). To a smaller extent, Jamiat Ulema Islam has also found itself an important player to varying degrees at various times in KP and Balochistan.

Pakistan Tehrik Insaf (PTI) is the closest a party has come to challenging the hegemony of PPP and PML-N on a national level - in 2013 they got the votes but not the seats to make a difference. They, however, found enough support to find themselves ruling KP.

However, for someone to become prime minister it is inevitable for their party to secure 172 seats in the National Assembly, either on their own or through an alliance. For this is the magical number of the simple majority in the lower house of parliament. The National Assembly has a total of 342 seats, including 272 general seats, 80 women’s reserved seats and 10 minorities’ reserved seats. Of these total seats, Punjab alone sends 183 MNAs to the National Assembly, while Sindh sends 75, KP 43, Balochistan 12, Tribal Areas 12 and Islamabad 2.

This means parties with their core base in Punjab stand the strongest chance of getting 172 seats (PML-N secured this simple majority on their own in 2013) while a party based in Sindh that scores a strong showing there (such as PPP) but which can perform somewhat well in Punjab and/or KP (like PPP did in 2008), can form a government, too.

As far as electoral politics go, this calculus all but ensures that even if they are unpopular as portrayed by media, it is a tall order to dislodge PML-N or PPP from the power perch. As long as there is the first-past-the-post system in place and as long as either party manages to mop up a majority of seats in their respective provinces, the likes of PTI will only be wannabes.

However, electoral politics is only part of the story. For a party with national ambitions, dynastic identity however much railed against by the likes of PTI, the voters have a historic tendency to express comfort with both continuity and familiarity. In a country where the military dominates the polity and which expresses no love lost for politicos and has, therefore, historically vilified them, the people have never stopped hating the rejection of their choices.

The voters, like any other segment in society, love survivors and champions of resistance. The Pakistani voters have always rejected state and institutional propaganda against pluralistic and dynastic politics. The general sense of disillusionment at poor governance and non-people centric policies notwithstanding, the narratives of resistance against non-representative forces still manage to sway voters in the climate of elections. Both PPP and PML-N do this well.

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Pakistan also has a well-documented history of the military establishment, attempting to infiltrate and break up parties. Both PPP and PML-N have mostly seen off several attempts over the past four decades to break and discredit them but at times suffered heavily. PPP even lost Bhutto and Benazir to conspiracies. Arguably, what helped these parties survive are their dynastic character, allowing the loyal and allies to stick to the ruling families through their persecutions.

The Sharifs are the better survivors than Bhuttos for having not suffered personal casualties but also having built core constituencies like the trading and religious classes with other linkages to the Establishment that prevented more overt and debilitating personal and party reversals.

But electoral politics and narratives of people’s interests, even if successful, can only bring a party to power and not necessarily keep it popular. No party in Pakistan, except PPP in 1977, has been re-elected in succession. In fact, in 2013, it was the first time a non-military supported government completed its tenure and the first time a peaceful transfer of power was effected between two popularly-elected governments. It’s hard to see Nawaz Sharif not becoming Pakistan’s first consecutively elected prime minister in 2018.

After being elected to power, arguably the most critical step the Pakistani prime minister makes is selecting the army chief. This can be a definitive make-or-break, as Bhutto, Benazir and Nawaz can attest to, having been shown the door by army chiefs they appointed. Sharif is now on the verge of choosing a fourth chief, the most by any Pakistani leader. He has already -- in advance no less! -- survived perhaps the most powerful and most popular army chief ever. This reinforces his credentials as not just a survivor but a winner in the political stakes. The ability to survive and neutralise assaults by the pro-activity or downright bias of senior provincial and national judiciary on elected governments is also one that Sharif has historically demonstrated well. This is not lost on voters.

Despite all this, the PML-N led by the Sharifs seem to have evolved beyond their profitably safe central rhetoric of religious nationalism and political populism characterised by gleaming motorways and trade corridors -- promises that have a habit of materialising. Unlike the by-now thoroughly tired PPP rhetoric of victimhood, this third re-incarnation of Sharifs is principally underpinned by a more proactive narrative of development and positivity through deft -- and extensive -- media management. Unlike the past two iterations of both the PML-N and Sharifs which were characterised by whimsy and overstretch, the margins of focus and priority carved out by Sharifs have a distinct hue of future about it.

PPP smell of the past, in contrast. The PML-N led by the Sharifs have survived and prospered, in political contrast to PPP with their sadly dead Bhuttos, through adroit sharing of the spoils -- they’ve given PPP their Sindh, PTI their KP, and even smaller parties their Balochistan even in a PML-N dominated provincial legislature -- and kept to themselves the best prize of all: Punjab, or Home.

So that’s the secret of PML-N’s success -- the Sharifs’ idea of Pakistan has come to Punjab being enough politically. Even if PPP can’t be content with Sindh uninterrupted in 2018 and covet a claw-back of electoral influence in south Punjab, PML-N will be the 100-pound gorilla on the floor in the National Assembly that year without whom no government will be formed.

The only way to stop PML-N is to ditch the first-past-the-post electoral system and switch to proportional representation arrangement which can combine PPP and PTI votes to give them a coalition government. But the switch, requiring a constitutional amendment, is not possible without current PML-N majority in parliament. The PML-N is near invincible with 2018 seeming a mere milestone-formality, not a destination.