That Pakistan is a country constantly projected under real or imaginary threats is no secret. Since its inception, not only neighbouring countries but also some faraway lands have been reported as conspiring against the national integrity of Pakistan. One example was the discovery of arms and ammunitions at the embassy of Iraq in the 1970 during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s rule. Interestingly, these threats and their implications have never been investigated thoroughly; any reviews done by the security agencies were never made public. Even the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report about the fall of Dhaka, submitted to Bhutto, remained folded for over 30 years before being leaked to the media during General Musharraf’s period.

One reason for this lack of insight and analysis has been the absence of independent think-tanks in the country. Of late, some positive changes have taken place in the field of social analysis in Pakistan; there emerged non-government outfits that collect data about relevant social issues and publish reports and reviews for public consumption. One such independent think-tank is Pak Institute for Peace Studies that regularly brings out a research journal, Conflict and Peace Studies, edited by Amir Rana.

The latest issue of autumn 2015 presents a comprehensive review of National Action Plan (NAP) by putting together 20 articles written by social scientists and journalists of repute. Each article discusses a distinct aspect of NAP and puts forward a set of recommendations for policy makers and implementers. Though almost all articles are worth reading, some stand out for their insight and cogency. Marvi Sirmad’s article, Hate speech and restricted speech: striking a balance, highlights the fact that much of the news about NAP revolves around military operation and special courts that have short-term significance, whereas issues having far-reaching impact are missed out. Her article tries to detangle NAP’s provision 5, i.e. countering hate speech and extremist materials.

Supported with academic references, the article defines hate speech as ‘any speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of attributes such as gender, ethnic origin, religion, race, disability, sexual orientation etc’. The article praises Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) Sections 153-A as rigorous cover against hate speech. The Section criminalises anyone who by word or signs promotes disharmony, enmity, hatred, or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups, or castes and communities.

In Marvi Sirmad’s opinion, the existing legal framework gives the state enough space to go after the miscreants. But the subcommittee formed two days after NAP was announced for ‘countering hate speech and extremist material’ repeatedly failed to furnish recommendations despite having high-flying designations within its fold, such as ministers for religious affairs, planning and development, information and broadcasting; directors generals of the ISI, IB; and national coordinator of Nacta (National Counter-Terrorism Authority).

Though the government circles claim to have arrested around 2000 hate speakers, most of them were arrested under a 1965 law regulating the use of loudspeakers rather than for hate speech. Under the same law, dozens of human rights activists were also arrested who were protesting against the demolition of an informal settlement in I-11 sector of Islamabad.

It is disappointing to note that there isn’t any proper platform to which people can file complaints and seek redress. Marvi Sirmad suggests three broad measures to resist hate speech: first, reforming educational system focusing on critical thinking and healthy scepticism; second, enabling the populace to empathise for the vulnerable communities, and propagating pluralistic values; third, encouraging and inspiring the citizens to speak out on injustices and voice dissent whenever they have to.

In another brilliant article on terrorism financing, Safiya Aftab says that terrorism in Pakistan is often believed to be financed through the proceeds of crimes such as robberies, kidnappings, smuggling, narcotics-trade, and extortion. But a major contributor that is normally overlooked is in the name of charity. Then there is transfer of funds through Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) or non-bank based transactions that are illegal but difficult to control because in Pakistan only 14 per cent adults have access to a formal financial institution. Safiya Aftab laments the fact that there have been few convictions for money laundering, and none for terror financing in Pakistan, and NAP has not changed much in this area.

Ismail Khan discusses ‘Fata’s ill-fate’ in his article and underscores Pakistan’s traditional response to be an all-out operation in the tribal agencies considered as trouble makers. He says that prior to Zarb-e-Azb more than ten major military operations had been launched in Fata and KP, starting from 2002. None of these operations provided any long-lasting solution to the problem of militancy stemming from Fata. After most operations, militants staged their comeback after some time, expanding their network with time. He worries about the long-term sustainability of the current operation too.

One of the causes of continued troubles in Fata is its administrative structure that keeps distance from the rest of the country. Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) denies the people several fundamental rights and, even now, any person can be arrested for the crime committed by someone of his tribe. The PPP government made some efforts at reforming Fata by allowing political parties to contest from there and amending the FCR off its most draconian clauses, but the articles of collective responsibility are invoked even now. The writer suggests that to normalise the post-operation situation in Fata, local government elections could be held at least in those agencies which are considered terror-free now.

Aoun Sahi, promoting zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab, rues the fact that the number of organisations actively engaged in terrorism is touching a century -- 95, according to the admission by Nisar Ali Khan. Sahi reminds us that Punjabi militants did not emerge recently; rather, they first fought during the Afghan war in the 1980s and later shifted their focus to Kashmir in 1990s, and at least 72 jihadi organisations were active in Punjab at that time, and many later merged into bigger groups -- and some splintered. One wonders what our premium intelligence agencies were doing all along -- probably their cross-border preferences overshadowed internal threats.

Apparently, police was not sleeping; as according to Sahi, in mid-2014 the special branches of Rawalpindi and Islamabad police reported that Taliban were receiving full support from religious seminaries and some 20 Deobandi seminaries served as bases for terrorists to launch attacks in the twin cities. But, hardly any action has been taken against the 20 or so seminaries that special branches have identified, or many other across Punjab, despite the announcement of NAP.

Across Punjab, over 16,000 seminaries are working of which nearly 6,000 are unregistered. According to Shuja Khanzada, the then Punjab home minister, ‘some seminaries’ in Punjab were funded by ‘brotherly Muslim countries’. Khanzada was killed in an attack in August 2015.

Sahi quotes some officials admitting that initially there was a lot of pressure to implement NAP, but gradually pressure subsided, and most detainees were released because they were irrelevant people. Nacta’s national coordinator revealed in Parliament that of the 49,000 suspects arrested from all over the country, after December 2014, only 129 belonged to the TTP; even banned organisations are working under the guise of charity work.

This review of NAP is a useful document as it outlines key findings from the expert analyses. For example, it finds that there is no direct relation between the decline in terror attacks and resumption of death penalty. Of around 200 people executed, only 10 per cent were terrorists and the rest were common criminals. The proceedings of the military courts are shrouded in secrecy, marking a dark spot on the country’s nascent democracy; and there is lack of clarity on dealing with certain groups. Confusion continues to mar the functioning of Nacta which is supposed to be the country’s central counter-terror body, but, has hardly held any board meeting and lacks strategic guidance. There has been zero conviction in terror financing, and the government is not even releasing the list of banned organisations.

The review concludes with some useful recommendations that ought to be taken seriously by the powers that be. The report carries a couple of maps that are poorly reproduced and are hardly readable. Some editing and typographical errors could also be avoided.