Muharram solemnised across sectarian divide seems as if never happened in Pakistan. That month (Muharram the first one in the Islamic calendar) tends to bring anxiety and exclusionist frenzy instead of bonhomie among the followers of different sects. Ashura and various rituals associated with it have, sadly, lost their eclectic connotation over a period of time.

From 1980s onwards, Muharram has become synonymous with violence, bloodshed and Shias being openly pronounced as kafirs. Sipah-i-Sahabah Pakistan, Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jaferia, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Muhammad emerged on the scene and Shia-Sunni conflict became a recurring feature.

Afghan Jihad and Iranian Revolution exacerbated intra-Muslim fissures. Saudi Arabia and Iran funnelled funds to their sectarian allies with Pakistan to face the fallout. Ziaul Haq’s own inclination towards the Deobandi Jamaat-i-Islami conflagrated sectarian frenzy. As Muhammad Waseem puts it, Zia ventured on to sunnify Pakistan in the name of Islamisation.

Many analysts like Waseem and Zahid Hussain say it with utmost certainty that Zia lent all possible support to Deobandi (read anti-Shia) elements in order to ward off the Iranian influence which, in fact, had soared with Khomeini’s ascendancy as a religio-political supremo there. Zia, in a bid to sunnify Pakistan, had put all his eggs into the Saudi basket. Mushrooming of religious seminaries dotted the length and breadth of Pakistan.

As a result of this heightened religiosity, some districts in the Punjab in particular became the loci of Shia-Sunni confrontation. Jhang, Layyiah and some districts of South Punjab like Rahim Yar Khan to name a few were the epicentre of sectarian violence. Subsequently, Karachi also fell prey to the lethality of intra-religious antagonism articulated through target killing of the rival sect. Relatively recently, the advent of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) along with other things has institutionalised sectarian hatred. That organisation with its myriad offshoots is the most feared operators during the first ten days of Muharram. Inability of the state institutions to effectively handle such elements acts as a shot in their arm.

Now that sectarian divide has run so deep, it will need more than a merely concerted effort to blunt the religious extremism and takfeeri practices. Sectarian violence wreaked disaster on the economy of these cities but socially they came to wear a look of strife-ridden, forlorn and dreary localities. Obviously, it was not always like that. Let us have a peek into the days when sectarian harmony and religious tolerance (acceptability of religious/sectarian difference) was widely practised.

Once, people adhering to all the sectarian persuasions used to reverentially participate in that occasion of commemorating the martyrdom of Holy Prophet’s grandson. Particularly in South Asian Muslim tradition, Ashura more often than not, acted as a glue not only among different sects but some Hindu sections of North India doggedly believed and practised the rituals associated with Ashura. Husaini Brahmins were one such group. Interestingly, they were revered not only by the Hindus but also by the Muslims. Like Khanzadas of Eastern Punjab, they were the perfect example of subcontinental syncretic tradition which subsequently was unhinged by the modern method of classification.

The figure of Ali, son of law of the Holy Prophet, was respected and revered by most of Sufi Orders because he was considered as the fountainhead. Similarly Ahl-i-Bayt were also held in very high esteem. More so, Cole and Justin Jones have in their respective works revealed that until 18th century, Shia and Sunni Ulema used to seek religious instruction in the same religious seminaries. Not only that, Sunnis and Shias used to offer Jumma (Friday) prayer together in the same mosque. Madrasa of Farangi Mahal in United Provinces was a very important site for training the scholars from both the major sects and so far no untoward incident could be brought to light, suggesting no antipathetic feelings between them.

However, it will be simplistic to say that in those times Shias and Sunnis never had any confrontation. But one can underscore the relative peaceful relationship between the two sects.

It was in the 18th century that the drive of conversion to Shiism got under way from Faizabad and Lucknow in UP at the behest of Nawab of Awadh. More crucial, however, were the influences from Qum and Najaf where young Shia scholars had started going for higher religious instruction. Mawlvi Dildar Ali Naseerabadi Ghafran-i-Maab was the first to have travelled to these centres of Shia learning and came back with the sanad of a Mujtahid from Najaf. On his return, he peddled his influence with the Nawab of Awadh and managed to get an Imambargah constructed. Besides, he organised a separate Jumma prayer for the Shias and this goes without saying that Nawab avidly supported him in all his endeavours to construct an autonomous Shia identity. His endeavours bore fruit and Shia-Sunni divide started becoming apparent.

Things took ominous turn when Shia quarters started criticising companions of the Prophet and also his wife Hazrat Ayesha. That is the most crucial point which is at the heart of the whole contention. One may argue that Sunnis too, by that time, had imbibed Arabian influences. Renowned Sufi and scholar Shah Walliullah Dehlvi travelled to Hijaz and learnt specifically Hadith. His was the same teacher who had taught Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. Thus puritanical religious edicts were imported from other countries which acted as a catalyst in pitting Sunnis against Shias and vice versa.

Walliullah’s thought, after shedding its Sufi content, was adopted by Deobandis from 1867. It was the puritanical, scriptural re-imagining of Islam. The denomination had its political articulation in such organisations which were inherently anti Shia like Majlis-Ahrar (1929), Majlis-i-Tehfuz-i-Khatam-i-Nubuwwat (1949) and Sipah-i-Sahabah (1985).

I will conclude this article by saying that the main irritant in the relationship between Shias and Sunnis has been their conflicting approaches to the figures of the first three Caliphs. Shias derided them whereas Sunnis adored them. Apparently, there is no possibility to sort this issue which is intrinsic in nature. However, the state must enhance its capacity to effectively mediate between these sects at times of tension before tempers soar and violence is perpetrated.