Talking to BBC Urdu on the ninth anniversary of the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, Brahumdagh Bugti, the grandson of the slain leader, and leader of the Baloch Republic Party, and currently in self-imposed exile in Switzerland, indicated that he was ready for dialogue with the government. Keeping in mind the history of the Baloch insurgency, this is a very welcome -- and sensible -- move, and if handled carefully can lead towards a more peaceful and development-oriented Balochistan.

The Baloch insurgency is as old as Pakistan itself. It sprang up in the aftermath of the accession of the state of Kalat (about 70 per cent of present day Balochistan), when the younger brother of the Khan of Kalat, Prince Abdul Karim, raised the banner of revolt with a coterie of his followers. Since then there have been several revolts in the region, in 1958-9, 1963-9, 1973-77, and now since 2005. There are important reasons why all these insurgencies -- both with and without foreign help -- have failed, and therefore the fact that the young Bugti is open to talks is most welcome and should be taken seriously.

While there are several reasons for the failure of the Baloch revolts, let me focus on three in this article.

First, the Baloch insurgency is based on disputed (at best) historical memory. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, the last ruling Khan of Kalat, claimed since his assumption of the title of Kalat in 1933 that his state was of a different status than the other princely states of India. While this argument was repeatedly refuted by the British Government of India, Ahmed Yar Khan stuck to his claim and the argument of Baloch ‘separateness’ began to be fanned in the region. In fact, as I show in my book, the British, using their powers under the doctrine of paramountcy, routinely changed the status of states which had signed a subsidiary treaty with them. Hence, states could be created and abolished, gun salutes increased or decreased, and international status altered.

These changes were clearly exhibited in the case of Afghanistan which was recognised as a separate state only in 1919, and Nepal which was separated from the other Indian princely states in 1922. Using the same powers given to it under the treaties of 1854 and 1876, the British included Kalat as an Indian state -- a claim not challenged by any Kalat ruler till the time of Ahmed Yar Khan.

Further, the saga of accession, again discussed in detail in my book, clearly shows that while it seemed that all the tribal leaders of the Kalat State were against accession to Pakistan initially, the manoeuvrings of the Pakistani Foreign Office had ensured that by March 1948 the major sardars had stopped backing the Khan.

The accession of the Kalat feudatories -- Kharan and Las Bela and the district of Mekran -- to Pakistan ten days before the accession of Kalat itself showed how much power the Khan had lost. In fact when the Khan wanted to stand up against Pakistan, hardly any of the sardars came to the meeting Ahmed Yar Khan had called, and hence the Khan had no choice but to accede to Pakistan on March 27, 1948.

Secondly, the Baloch insurgency has mostly been tribal elder led with a leftist bent -- a severe contradiction. Even in the 1970s when a number of Western educated leftists joined the rebellious bands, the main leaders were tribal elders. Hence it was and is always unclear what kind of a system they want to create -- a tribal oppressive regime or a leftist liberal one? The party Mr Brahumdagh Bugti leads is called the Baloch Republican Party, but is it really striving for a true ‘republic’ with equal right and an end to the sardari system in Balochistan? Such a system would certainly undermine the leadership claims of Brahumdagh Bugti himself!

This contradiction of terms automatically undermines the movement and prevents the emergence of concrete and thought out proposals for the ‘liberation’ of Balochistan beyond strong anti-Punjabi rhetoric, and a vague idea of a nation-state. In fact, most Baloch insurgencies have largely been elite-led with tribal elders and their close friends as the main protagonists, with little depth among the common people. More recently, it has even harkened back to British times where the region was controlled by either London or someone holidaying in the Swiss Alps.

Thirdly, there is hardly any social change component to the insurgency. There is no focus on the Baloch getting educated, their access to basic health facilities, and the provision of jobs etc. Obviously, these initiatives will be harder to achieve and their results only visible years into the future, yet these are the very things through which the Baloch can be truly free.

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For example, (and this is just one experience, but yet a significant one), I once went to the Barakhan region of Balochistan where the locals were quick to point out strong FC presence and the construction of an FC fort near the entry point to a small town. However, when I asked who was stopping them from sending their girls to the local primary school -- which was being used as cow shed and for the storage of grain -- everyone went silent. I further enquired if there were any teachers etc appointed for the school and the locals pointed out to the house of the headmistress nearby and some of the teachers, who were getting paid by the provincial government, but had no girls to teach as the locals would not permit their girls to come to school. Hence the disproportionate focus on the working of the FC and the intelligence agencies -- and their actions are lamentable mostly -- the real drivers of social change are being completely ignored -- now and earlier -- by the insurgents.

As it is the Baloch insurgency has no chances of success -- it has no clear aim, no dedicated support, and to most looks like a collection of disgruntled sardars who are ready to go back to their areas if given enough money and autonomy. Hence, it is no surprise that Brahumdagh Bugti wants to talk. He sees the writing on the wall, and wants to begin negotiations before someone else does and steals his thunder.

When there are negotiations with the Baloch they need to be development focused and the government needs to bring these insurgents -- then former insurgents -- to work for the betterment of their people. So let the Bugtis become incharge of schools across the province, with financial support from the federal government, and the Marris overseeing the provision of clean drinking water and health facilities to their province. It is with their involvement that Balochistan will shed it medieval character and enter the 21st century; let us make this opening for talks an opportunity for this change to materialise.