There is a new Code of Conduct (CoC) for the electronic media in Pakistan. For better or worse, it has been notified into enforcement. Does it address the challenges in the way of an ethical media?

There are certainly best-practice provisions in it that make it an improvement on previous versions but it also boasts shortcomings and mutations that make it problematic.

In places it is draconian and distorts its stated objective of promoting an ethical and more professional media.

Will the media be better off with this code or not? Will the code strengthen media or weaken it? Let’s take a look at its good and bad sides.

The good

Code ownership: Considering that it was felt that key principals charged with its implementation -- representative bodies of media owners, such as PBA and media managers, such as CPNE -- helped produce is a good omen. These bodies are usually the last ones to get on board the terrifying idea of additional frameworks of regulation that can hold them accountable. Also, the fact that the CoC is a result of government facilitation means that, theoretically speaking, the authorities and media industry are finally on the same page on a subject which has vexed them since the airwaves were opened up for private ownership in Pakistan in 2002. This should hopefully result in negotiated settlement on disputes between the two sides in future rather than resort to coercion and protests.

Hate speech: Since the staple of Pakistan’s current affairs media is politics and religion, most content related to these topics revolves around statements, opinions and discussions with politicians and persons with strong religious identities. This, more often than not, ends up with accusations, slander and libel. For the first time, a code of ethics now mandates tv channels and radio stations to ensure that there be no extremities in views broadcast.

Clause 23 (1) says, "Licensee shall ensure that hate speech by any of its employees or any guest in a programme is not aired." Sub clause (2) is more specific: "The licensee shall not relay allegations that fall within the spectrum of hate speech, including calling someone anti- Pakistan, traitor, or anti-Islam." Sub-clause (3) specifies remedial measures if hate speech happens: "Where hate speech is resorted to by any guest, the channel and its representative must stop the participant and remind him and the audience that no one has the authority to declare any other citizen as a kafir or enemy of Pakistan, Islam or any other religion. Hate speech includes any expression that may incite violence, hatred, or discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, colour, race, gender, origin, caste, mental or physical disability."

Fact vs opinion: Pakistani media is characterised by its nonchalant blurring of lines between fact and opinion and between opinion and analysis. It is refreshing to see the CoC making an attempt to addresses this specifically. Clause 19 (1) says: "If during a talk show or news show a guest makes or asserts an opinion that is presented as a fact, on a serious issue, the channel and or its representative must intervene and protect the audience by clarifying this is an opinion and not a fact." Sub-clause (2) further asserts: "If the host/moderator is giving his or her own opinion, he or she must clarify also that this is a personal opinion and not a fact."

Read also: State regulation or code

Slander and libel: Accusations and allegations without the need for proof form the bedrock of political discussions on Pakistani media. Slander is spoken defamation and libel is its written form. Even beyond discussion of event-based issues, such as court proceedings and press statements, which serve as triggers for discussions, guests and anchor-persons on tv channels often speak of exaggerated alleged corruption and misdemeanors about specific people without backing them with evidence.

Sometimes, they also flash unverified documents that are not sourced. All this may generate hype and sensation designed to enlist as many eyeballs as possible (conflict makes for good drama) but also often ends up indicting those who may be more sinned against than sinning.

The CoC makes a gallant effort to prevent this. Clause 22(1) says: "The licensee shall not air any allegation against any person or organisation unless the licensee has credible information justifying such allegation and a fair opportunity to defend such allegation has been provided to the person or organisation against whom allegation is being levelled."

Sub-clause (2) strengthens this guideline further: "Where a serious allegation has been made by a guest and the accused is not available despite reasonable effort, the licensee shall adhere to the principle of "innocent unless proven guilty" and the channel’s representatives will, to the best of their ability, represent the accused’s point of view and defence." Sub-clause (4) adds: "With regard to serious accusations, the licensee shall not allow any deceptive or misleading mode or manner to portray any material as evidence of wrongdoing or that which is otherwise not evidence at all."

The bad

Holy cows: It is universally understood that media is supposed to be the guardian of public interest not undue protection of ‘priviligentsia’ that is confused with national interest. Pakistan’s Constitution (Article 19) and laws relating to freedom of expression offer strong protection to the military, judiciary, and Islam (only one religion, not others). Considering that the military has ruled the country for over half of its existence and the judiciary has stamped approval of this constitutional violation, it is surprising that strong exemptions to criticism of military and judiciary are imposed on both media and judiciary.

The CoC strengthens the ‘holy cow’ status for these two institutions. This will only encourage censorship at a time when both these institutions in recent years have been asserting themselves rather controversially on the body polity in defiance of constitutional restraints. However, the CoC apparently tries to add another holy cow to the list of institutions that cannot be criticised strongly. Clause 3(1)(b) states: "The license shall ensure that no content is aired which incites or condones dislodgement of democratic setup against the command of the constitution of Pakistan, provided that discussions on improvement of democracy shall constitute a fair comment."

On the face of it, this seems a reasonable restraint on criticism of democracy and constitution -- and offers a relief in view of the same privilege enjoyed by generals and judges -- but ultimately affects the media’s primary role of being the public interest on whose behalf it has to hold all governing classes accountable, be it military or civilian.

Code ownership: Perhaps the biggest drawback of the CoC is the fact that neither the representatives of working journalists (such as PFUJ) nor the regulator (Pemra) were formally or directly evolved in its drafting. This is tragic and enhances the likelihood of the ineffectiveness of the CoC because both the enforcer (regulator) and the enforced (reporters, editors, camerapersons and producers) are left managing someone else’s baby with the thankless burden of its welfare.

Implementation: Despite its drawbacks, the CoC has several things that can only generate support -- in addition to some of those described above -- such as disallowing revealing the identity of sexual victims and child victims, intervening in process of rescue and services (such as medical and humanitarian), disclosure of conflict of interest of the media house and businesses.

However, all of these serve as merely guidelines or rules. The CoC does not have an attendant implementation guideline that can pre-empt disputes about interpretation of clauses, definitions of transgressions, documentation and filing of complaints, identifying duty bearers to precisely determine transgression and principal responsible. Without this, the CoC will likely remain a list of wishes that will at best only be implemented arbitrarily and, therefore, lose both credibility and relevance.