June 15, 2015 marked the completion of one year of the Zarb-e-Azb operation undertaken by the Pakistani military against the militants in North Waziristan, but there is no information as to when it would end.

The open-ended military action has been widely discussed and generally praised in the media. The military officials have termed Zarb-e-Azb a resounding success and the major reason for the significant drop in acts of terrorism in Pakistan. The figures put out by the military are impressive -- 2,763 terrorists killed, 837 militants’ hideouts destroyed and 253 tonnes of explosives recovered. Also, 347 army officers and soldiers were stated to have given the supreme sacrifice of their life during Zarb-e-Azb. There is no way to check the authenticity of the terrorists slain and their hideouts destroyed, but most of the seized explosives have been shown to the media and visiting dignitaries.

Defence analysts with a military background have heaped praise on Zarb-e-Azb and found no shortcoming in the way it has been conducted. The functionaries of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government have been taking credit for ordering the operation to strike a hard blow at the militants in their biggest stronghold. Politicians of different persuasion, including the Islamists, have refrained from criticising the operation or its fallout, as they could be labelled as unpatriotic and pro-Taliban.

Like the other meaningful names given to several military operations carried out since the past decade in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) and Malakand division, Zarb-e-Azb too was named thus to deliver a powerful message that the blow to the militants would be like the "Strike of the Prophet’s Sword". The name attempted to revive the memory of the sword named Azb used by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in his battles against the infidels.

At the time, the militants said they would launch Zarb-e-Momin operation to counter the military, but this didn’t happen. They couldn’t undertake any coordinated operation or resist the advancing Pakistan Army troops in North Waziristan. Instead, the militants continued to carry out roadside bombings and made use of suicide bombers to inflict losses on the government and its security forces.

Some of their biggest attacks included the failed attempts by 10 attackers to intrude into the two military airbases in Quetta on the night of August 14-15, 2014, the unsuccessful plan to hijack a naval ship at the Karachi seaport, the suicide bombing at Wagah border town, the attacks on churches and imambargahs in Lahore, and the high-profile bombings in Peshawar, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Shikarpur.

However, the militants were unable to maintain the momentum and intensity of their attacks. Rather, some of their attacks deprived them of whatever little public support they still enjoyed and led to a tougher response by the government against them. One such attack took place on December 16, 2014 on the Army Public School, Peshawar and resulted in the deaths of 145 persons, including 132 schoolchildren.

This particular assault forced a change in the government’s policy toward the militants and prompted the civil and military elite to come up with the 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) to combat extremism and terrorism.

Zarb-e-Azb’s beginning was similar to most of the previous military actions and its subsequent course was familiar. There were airstrikes by the Pakistan Air Force and the Pakistan Army Air Defence Command for two weeks before the massive ground offensive was launched. The troops moved swiftly as they occupied territory and dismantled the militants’ infrastructure. The militants preferred to escape instead of putting up a fight against the much larger and better-equipped force. In the later stages of the operation, the forward movement of soldiers slowed down in the mountainous and forested areas such as Shawal and Dattakhel.

There was the usual displacement of people who were instructed to leave their homes and villages at short notice and head for wherever they could find refuge. One major difference in the displacement in case of North Waziristan was the decision by thousands of tribespeople to migrate to neighbouring Afghanistan.  This was the first time in history that so many Pakistanis took refuge in Afghanistan.

The number of the migrating Pakistanis remained a matter of contention between Afghan and Pakistani officials but the total should be almost 100,000.

The North Waziristanis fleeing downcountry to Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Karak and beyond in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa did exactly what the displaced tribal people of South Waziristan had done in 2009 by refusing to stay in the relief camps set up by the government. Even in this hour of trial, following their customs and protecting the privacy of their women was more important for the tribal people than staying in a camp where they would be guaranteed regular supply of rations, drinking water and medical care.

Though the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from North Waziristan got more government assistance in cash and kind than others who were uprooted from their homes in previous military operations in other places in Fata and Malakand division, they kept insisting on going back to their homes in areas that the military was claiming to have cleared of militants. Their repatriation to North Waziristan finally began on March 16, but it has been slow and controversial as the tribal elders are complaining that they were being asked by the authorities to sign a tough code of conduct to bind them to confront the militants in case they tried to find refuge among the repatriated communities.

The IDPs’ return home is planned to be completed by December 2016 in North Waziristan, but this would depend on the security situation and the availability of resources.

A recent study by the Islamabad-based Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), which monitors militant activities in South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia, noted that attacks by the militants in the country dropped to six years low after one year of the Zarb-e-Azb operation. It recalled that the recorded average militant attacks had gone up to 154 per month before the start of the Zarb-e-Azb. The count dropped more than 50 per cent to 71 attacks per months on the completion of one year of Zarb-e-Azb. It added that average militant attacks were presently the lowest since 2008.

According to the PICSS report, Zarb-e-Azb not only improved overall security situation in Pakistan, but it also caused serious dents to the unity of the TTP which splintered into at least three major factions once this military action was launched. Though the TTP suffered splits initially, it is also true that the militants subsequently began coming close to each other by overcoming some of their disputes. The militants too tried to close ranks against a common threat just like the government, military, politicians, civil society and others coming together to tackle extremism and terrorism.

The PICSS study showed that the average militant attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Fata, the places most affected by the decade-long conflict, dropped significantly in the wake of Zarb-e-Azb. The attacks per month in KP went down by 75 per cent from 49 to 12. In adjoining Fata, the attacks were reduced from 31 to 16 per month.  The PICSS reported that Zarb-e-Azb also had a positive impact on the security situation in Punjab and Karachi, where the search operation by the Rangers and Sindh Police was expedited.

The military claimed its intelligence-based operations in urban areas were also having an impact due to improved security. It also launched the Khyber-1 operation in Bara area of Khyber Agency in October 2014 and later the Khyber-2 in the Tirah Valley to complement the Zarb-e-Azb and chase down the militants fleeing North Waziristan. The Khyber-1 has concluded and the IDPs from Bara are being repatriated to their villages. The Khyber-2 is continuing even though the military has reached almost all important areas of the once remote and unadministered Tirah Valley.

A number of conclusions could be drawn from the Zarb-e-Azb operation. One, it is true that most of North Waziristan, or more than 80 per cent as the military has been claiming is now under the control of the security forces. The campaign to clear the militants from the remaining largely mountainous and forested territory would take time and require further sacrifices in terms of lives and resources.

Two, the most significant achievement of Zarb-e-Azb is denial of space to the local and foreign militants to plan and organise terrorist attacks not only in North Waziristan but also in rest of Pakistan and other countries.

Three, the blowback to Zarb-e-Azb by the militants wasn’t as big and severe as was being feared before the launch of the operation.

Four, the care and support for the IDPs and now their repatriation and rehabilitation along with the reconstruction of the damaged public and private property in North Waziristan should have been essential components and part of the planning for Zarb-e-Azb. Shifting focus of attention from these issues would dilute the achievements made on the military front.

And five, it is now obvious that coordination and cooperation with the Afghan government is necessary to deny space to militants on either side of the Durand Line border between the two countries. If there are disagreements between Islamabad and Kabul, the militants would flee to the other side after every military operation and pose security threat to both countries. The Afghan Taliban and their allies too are an important factor in this equation and bringing them into the political mainstream in Afghanistan through talks should be the aim of both the Afghan and Pakistani rulers to effectively bring the conflict to an end.