The recent political developments in Afghanistan may cause crucial political changes or shape a new security situation in the region. The future contours of things greatly depend on the options and responses by the regional powers, particularly Pakistan.

The most important events are the formation of a unity government under Ashraf Ghani as president of Afghanistan and Abdullah Abdullah sharing power as chief executive. The arrangement helped the smoothest transfer of power that is unprecedented in the political history of Afghanistan.

The transfer of power on September 29, 2014 followed Ashraf Ghani’s signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States of America and the authorisation of military missions in Afghanistan by US President Barack Obama for another year. Though, the period of extended military mission seems short, its scope is broader than the previous missions in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the US World Trade Centre in New York on September 9, 2001.

The new order signed by President Obama last month, as reported by ‘The New York Times’ on November 21, 2014, says "the American forces are authorized to carry out combat missions against the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban as well as other militant groups including the Haqqani Network threatening American forces as well as the Afghan government." The Haqqani Network is an Islamist insurgent group carrying out militant activities in Afghanistan.

Against the backdrop of the recent report by Pentagon, this new measure on the security situation in Afghanistan makes it different from post 9/11. The clear inferences are that the United States of America now views Pakistan as part of the problem. This time it will not be easy for Pakistan to curry favour with the former without international backlash.

Notwithstanding, Pakistan turned down the opportunities presented by the 1990s and post 9/11 that provided negotiation edge that could save the country as well as the region from the current violence and instability. The security project designed by the Pakistan security establishment in the post Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s was a mixture of deterrence, regional and trans-regional ambitions fraught with exemplary miscalculations featuring day dreaming of some over-confident generals. The said ambitious security paradigm caused enough political and socio-economic damage to Pakistan.

Since the 1990s, much water had passed under the bridge and therefore neither the international nor the domestic environment is any more conducive to push through our strategic fantasies.

The signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the US and the Afghan government and the former’s long term security and economic commitment turned the table on those elements waiting in the wings for the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

More importantly, China is facing the threat of East Turkistan Islamic Movement struggling to set up a separate state called, East Turkistan, in its western Xinjiang region and is concerned that the security breakdown and political instability in Afghanistan can further fuel the separatist movement. On the eve of President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to China, in the last week of October, 2014, the Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang, emphasised on peace and stability in Afghanistan.

The establishment of a unity government and its subsequent signing of the BSA also deflated the narrative of foreign occupation of Afghanistan. State building is resulting in functional institutions which is gradually improving the state writ and consequently squeezing and denying space to militants.

What Pakistan calls its legitimate interests, Afghanistan interprets that as interference in its internal affairs, particularly its relationship with India. In his farewell address to the cabinet and officials on September 23, 2014, Afghanistan’s former president, Hamid Karzai stated, "Pakistan wants peace and improvement in relationship at the cost of controlling and dictating our foreign policy and relations with other states…"

Obviously, it was a reference to the Afghan-India relationship. Presently, India, unlike our limited access and clientele relationship with the peripheral elements particularly the degenerating Taliban, gained influence by reaching the broader Afghan society not through crude military power but by using her soft power and diplomacy. Moreover, it is the fear and threat perception by Pakistan that pushed Afghanistan closer to India.

Pakistan is well placed than India to carve out diplomatic influence and secure its interests in Afghanistan if it could align them with the Pakhtuns this side of the Durand Line as well as Afghanistan by shunning the mantra of strategic depth (employed as a camouflage in any form) to turn it into a backyard. This truncates Pakistan’s own arguments on international forums against Indian hegemony and behaviour toward small neighbouring states.

The Indo-Pak proxy war option in Afghanistan, as former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf warned in an interview with a foreign news agency on November 18, 2014, is touching rock bottom and will not be easy for any actor to use as a tool for long term given the exhaustion and increasing awareness among the people of the region. The proxy war option/threat was vehemently opposed by the present and former presidents, Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai, respectively.

People’s perceptions in Afghanistan are changing rapidly about the Taliban and their role. The Mashaal Radio reported, a 15-year-old boy, Sardar, helped his mother in killing 10 Taliban in retaliation to the killing of his elder brother by them on November 17, 2014.

Sardar stated: "The Taliban are foreigners, they are servants of Pakistan, if they attack 100 other times, I will continue to defend my country and will shed their blood to not let them dare enter my village. We will never let the Taliban win."

Similar perceptions and weariness, albeit missing in the mainstream media discourse, is also surfacing on this side of the Durand Line. On October 31, 2014, the Swat Qaumi Conference, organised by the Swat Qaumi Jirga in Swat and the Grand Tribal Jirga held on November 22, 2014 in Islamabad sponsored by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), provided platform to voices that also substantiated people’s depleting appetite against militancy.

Apart from others, the mainstream political parties, including the two major parliamentary Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), also now seem to be questioning the traditional security and foreign policy perceptions of the security establishment.

In the current scenario, Pakistan’s political and diplomatic options can ensure regional as well as domestic peace and stability. It is high time for Pakistan to be more introvert, focusing on domestic issues primarily economic by bringing a shift in its security paradigm, particularly architected in the 1990s.

The Peshawar carnage where 135 school children were brutally killed dissipated the patience of Pakistanis, now vehemently challenging the narratives of the good and the bad Taliban as well as the strategic assets mantra of the security establishment.

The Khakis instead of playing the victim by asking Afghanistan to hand over Fazlullah while tolerating the ‘Quetta Shura’ and the ‘Haqqani Network’ on Pakistan’s soil, should pull the plug on them and later take care of the sanctuaries out of borders.

A politically and economically integrated and satisfied Pakhtun population living on this side of the Durand Line can result in immense diplomatic influence in Afghanistan through easy interaction with the Afghans on that side as well.

By creating a conducive environment for peaceful co-existence based on mutual respect, no Afghan leader can think of riding on an Indian tank and run over the Pakhtuns on this side of the Durand Line.

The security establishment should also allow parliament to look into the constitutional and legal provision that legitimises the promotion of extreme and radical trends in the society.