The political leadership of the country has approved a comprehensive counter-terrorism plan of action, a week after the tragic Peshawar school attack. The 20-point National Action Plan, announced by the prime minister on December 24, envisages the establishment of military courts for speedy trial of terror suspects and a crackdown on jihadi and sectarian outfits. He described the move as a ‘defining moment’ in the fight against terrorism.

The 18-point agenda declared by the prime minister also includes strengthening of Nacta and making hate speech culpable. Significantly enough, he talked about showing "zero tolerance for militancy in parts of Punjab".

Of all the stated objectives, the establishment of military courts in this manner is being looked at with some suspicion.

"The question worth asking here is if the military is going in the right direction -- because it is the military that calls the shots on counter-terrorism policy. And on this count, I fear the military is going nowhere. I am sure the status quo will remain in place until Pakistan reaches a peace deal with India and that certainly won’t be happening any time soon," says Michael Kugelman, senior program associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC.

An uneasy question that haunts Pakistan is its ambivalence regarding good and bad Taliban. It is not easy to answer the question as it took Pakistan over a decade of violence and more than 50,000 casualties to understand the ‘defining moment’ in the fight against terrorism.

Who dare ask the military and political leadership the reason for this delay in reaching a consensus on national security? Thousands of those who died in terrorist attacks, including the children at the Army Public School in Peshawar, might have been saved if it had reached a consensus on counter-terrorism policy earlier.

Security expert Dr Ayesha Siddiqa argues that the images of 135 dead bodies of children are so gruesome and overpowering that it is enough to silence us for a long time. "Why ask bothersome and embarrassing questions about how the national security was conducted; how different groups worked as proxies, or who is more to blame when ultimately what we want the most is our own physical security," she asks.

The 20-point counter-terrorism action plan can be a good ‘starting point’ but the leadership needs to answer some basic questions. In 2009, the government set up the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) with the aim to overcome the governance deficit in Pakistan’s security framework left by the abolition of the National Security Council. The Nacta Act was passed by the parliament in 2013, and the Authority was placed under the prime minister’s guard for administration. It is mandated to formulate and monitor the implementation of the counter-terrorism strategy and to coordinate among different counter-terrorism departments including the intelligence agencies at the federal and provincial level.

In February 2014, the present government launched its first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) which designated the Nacta as the focal organisation for national security. NISP envisaged setting up a Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) under Nacta to create coordination among all 33 civilian and military intelligence agencies with a clear command and control, integrating all grids of tactical and operational functions under one roof. The policy also promised to establish a Civil Armed Forces Headquarters and a Rapid Response Force. The implementation of NISP required an estimated cost of Rs32 billion and was to be implemented by December 31, 2014.

"The authority needed only Rs2.0 billion and a building to make it a functional institution but the government allocated only Rs90 million to it in the 2014-15 budget," say a senior official of Nacta on condition of anonymity. "The head of the authority is a loyalist and on technical extension; he has no experience in counter-terrorism."

He asks what is new in the plan of action announced by the prime minister. "NISP had addressed all the issues mentioned in it. The difference this time is that the army wants to do it."

Officials at the ministry of interior and Nacta say that key spy agencies had declined to come under the command-control system of Nacta. "Intelligence information-sharing was like a dream before the Peshawar school attack. I am not sure that intelligence agencies would coordinate in the real sense even after this attack."

One official says that leave alone the dearth of funds for implementation of NISP, PM Nawaz Sharif has not chaired a single meeting of Nacta board of governors. "The Nacta board of governors is bound under the law to meet at least once a quarter every year. The board is headed by the PM with chief ministers of all provinces, interior minister, DG ISI, DG IB, DG MI, police chiefs of all provinces and many others as members. The meeting would mean a lot."

He says there are chances the Nacta board would meet after the Peshawar attack. "Many of the terrorist attacks could have been prevented just by activating Nacta."

Experts say there is hardly a counter-terrorism policy in place in country. "The national security policy of the country is based on a fire-fighting approach. The threat perception of the state was very simple -- that military operation in FATA would curb terrorism," says Amir Rana, director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies. "After the Peshawar attack there is realisation in the country about the problem. The counter-terrorism framework can be a good starting point."

Kugelman thinks the most fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy -- and it is a very vague policy indeed -- is that it is extremely limited. "The problem is that the negotiations have failed, and the operations have done little to address the problem of militancy. The operations have targeted only anti-state militants such as the TTP. These operations ignore the fact that militancy in Pakistan extends well beyond the tribal areas and they do nothing about the legal, financial, and ideological drivers of militancy in Pakistan."

Pakistan must go after the sources of financing for militants, he says. "The best way to go after militants is not by killing them, but by depriving them of the ideology and funding that sustains them."

Dr Siddiqa believes the current counter-terrorism policy creates a necessary structure but it needs to focus on the effect and not necessarily the cause. "You cannot have counter-terrorism without counter-radicalisation. A totally new narrative ought to be built to clean up the minds of people."

The military cannot be engaged in counter-terrorism, she says. "It has to be the work of police and intelligence together," she says, adding that Pakistan has almost become a military state. "The civilian government will now remain confined to the backseat, taking ownership of a state policy of which it may not be the author."