For some weeks talk about the ISIL and its possible inroads into Pakistan is making the round. Five arguments which I call as myths are generally presented that it will not make ‘dangerous inroads’. As this article demonstrates, minus intensity all the five factors which gave rise to ISIL in Iraq and its spread to Syria are present in Pakistan. As usual, the sheer bliss of deniability informs the thinking of those at the helm of affairs.

First is that the circumstances, the dismantling of Baathist regime, its army and the rise of Shiite government in Iraq, all in the wake of American invasion of the country or the Shia minority-led government in Syria, are absent in Pakistan. The gist of the argument is that Sunnis were marginalised in Iraq and Syria which led to the rise of ISIL there in the first place.

The targeting of Shia in Pakistan since 1985 only points out to the untenability of the above argument. Although Shia are a minority--being in between 15 to 25 per cent of population--in Pakistan, violence against them by Sunni militants of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the demand by ASWJ alternatively Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan to the effect of excommunicating Shia and declaring Pakistan a Sunni state are all instances of how siege mentality associated with majority can spell disaster.

Grievances either real or imagined are present against the Shia to provide breeding ground to the ISIL. Just look at Hazara butchery in Quetta, reality is out there. Besides, it is the ISIL’s slogan of global caliphate and not necessarily its virulently anti-Shia savagery that finds support among hardcore Sunnis.

The second argument is that since 60 per cent of Pakistanis subscribe to Sufi Islam, the ground is not fertile for ISIL in the country. The problem with this line of thinking is that it implies that 40 per cent of Pakistanis are amenable to the ISIL ideology. The point is if a few thousand Taliban are able to wreak havoc, why the ISIL would need a majority to unleash its reign of terror! Interestingly, Iraq where the ISIL, while apparently representing the 37 per cent Sunnis just to take for the sake of an argument, is up in arms against the 60 per cent Shia!

The third argument is that unlike Iraq and Syria, Pakistanis have their voices heard in a pluralist and multi-party democracy. Although that is true, the question is have Taliban and dozens of militant formations in Pakistan not been killing thousands of people in the country? In other words, the presence of democracy has not been a very useful antidote to the presence and operation of fringe groups [emphasis added] in Pakistan.

The fourth argument is that Pakistan’s army and its bureaucracy immersed in western values of modernity "enlightened moderation" and their tilt towards the west are obstacles to the ISIL’s takeover.

True the ISIL will not be able to takeover much like the Taliban have not been. Definitely it will be the army that will not allow the country drifting towards the ISIL’s seizure. Nevertheless, the army’s fight against Taliban for the last ten years is a constant reminder of the fact that victory against an unconventional enemy is elusive. In cahoots with Taliban and al Qaeda, the ISIL will leave the state more vulnerable to militant violence than ever before. Despite their differences, they all share takfiri ideology.

The fifth argument is that foreign direct military intervention played pivotal role in creating and/or provoking nationalistic and religious resistance in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The dismantling of state security apparatus in Afghanistan and Iraq left the space for insurgents to rise against the governments there.

The first portion of the argument is that foreign direct military intervention stoked religious and/or nationalistic resistance. As a matter of fact, it is denying the obvious: the taking place of drone attacks in FATA if one is to believe the government that it has not allowed the US to carry out drone strikes. The Angoor Adda raid of 2008 and the assassination of Osama Bin Laden by a US Navy Seal team back in May 2011 just add to the list. Let us not forget that Taliban and other militant groups have all been successfully selling victim narrative as to how Pakistani governments have been dancing to the American tune all along from the collapse of Taliban Shariah regime in Afghanistan to the launching of military operations in FATA and allowing America to kill the defenders of faith at their own turf. With no less than fifty thousand Pakistanis killed in hundreds of suicide attacks and thousands of militant attacks, bomb blasts and IEDs what is happening just demonstrates the fragility of the above argument.

The second portion argues that the collapse of security apparatus in Afghanistan and Iraq provided a vacuum for militants to rise. In FATA, the state has historically remained notoriously weak. This is as true today as it was during the colonial period. Post 9/11, it was primarily out of the weak state conditions that militants capitalized upon and held the sway.

In a nutshell, all the five factors, which gave rise to ISIL in Iraq and its spread to Syria, are present in Pakistan. Nevertheless, it is the lack of sheer intensity of these factors in Pakistan which makes it somehow a different story.

Future prognosis?

For sure, the ISIL-Taliban-al Qaeda troika will not be able to control a city beyond FATA. When it comes to ISIL significant inroads in Pakistan, two factors will be decisive, however. Inside Pakistan, the government victory against militant franchise in FATA and its effective measures against militant outfits elsewhere in the country. Outside Pakistan, the ISIL’s failures or victories in Iraq and Syria will determine its inroads in Pakistan.

In the long term, mainstreaming FATA by bringing it at par with rest of the country guarantees state writ. The purpose of government should be one of preventing the ISIL’s violence other than waiting to respond to the eventuality.