The end of this year will bring about the much-awaited dissolution of the grand coalition that was assembled more than a decade ago to fight the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan. During all these years, there was never one consistent or coherent strategy that was followed by coalition leaders.

The Afghanistan-centered policies were fluid over time. Initially, the goal of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, as the mission was dubbed, was to stamp out Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, which had aided and abetted al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Two years after the commencement of hostilities, ISAF was taken over by Nato to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security, reconstruction, training of the national police and army, and providing an environment for free and fair elections, et al.

Half way through, and before the American presidential elections, the Democrats announced that they favoured a pull out of Afghanistan owing to the increasing number of attacks on US soldiers and American deaths. Contrary to this claim, the Obama administration drastically increased the number of troops on the ground.

As the American media pointed out, this decision forced the new president to take ownership of the continuously failing war begun under his predecessor. The decision also necessitated broader cooperation from other countries in the region.

Pakistan had already signed various deals with the US in which it allowed surveillance, joint military actions, establishment of bases and intelligence sharing. The covert operations, however, created mistrust between the two countries which slowly devolved to outright distrust.

American intelligence hired private contractors and slipped its ‘fringe characters’ into Pakistan’s troubled areas to gather information on militant-related activities. Pulitzer prize-winner, Mark Mazzetti, described these characters in his book, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth. Among them was Raymond Davis, who put the two states at odds later in the coming months.

Mazzetti also disclosed that the Pakistani government had agreed to allow drone attacks in return for the CIA’s assassination of al Qaeda facilitator, Nek Muhammad. Drone strikes became, and still remain, a bone of contention -- merely on the outside. Experts blamed General Musharraf’s ‘double game’ with the US.

The then newly-introduced broader regional policy got a new moniker: Af-Pak strategy. This revised approach represented a substantive change in the US policy towards Afghanistan and its impatience with Pakistan. It subscribed to the view that one could not solve the problems of Afghanistan without addressing what was occurring across the Durand Line.

In one of his first speeches about the issue, President Obama declared: "we need a strategic partnership with all the parties in the region -- Pakistan and India and the Afghan government -- to stamp out the kind of militant, violent, terrorist extremists that have set up base camps and that are operating in ways that threaten the security of everybody in the international community." Obama had said that the US could not continue to look at Afghanistan in isolation.

The new strategy brought more focus on Pakistan and built pressure to take action against the notorious Quetta shura and Haqqani network. From General Mullen to General McCrystal, and Robert Gates to Leon Panetta, the American military higher-ups remained sceptical of Pakistan’s efforts in helping the US in this regard.

The military side of Af-Pak was different for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The focus in Afghanistan was now to strengthen the American and NATO presence, train the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army, and drive out the Taliban.

In line with the ‘carrot and stick’ approach of dealing with Pakistan, the US also passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, that otherwise came to be known as the Kerry-Lugar bill. It provided Pakistan with 1.5 billion dollars per year of non-military financial aid to assist it in combating terrorism within its borders and outside. President Obama called the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region "the most dangerous place in the world," and, in another address, "the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda."

US expectations regarding the elimination of supposed militant safe havens in Pakistan could not be met. The relationship turned toxic and the Americans started eyeing Pakistan as not its friend but a "frenemy". The conflicts escalated with the Salala incident, the shutting down of ‘Ground Lines of Communication’, and the closing of the Shamsi air base.

The daring US mission to kill al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, provided what may have been the biggest blow to the fragile relationship. The major success of the OBL mission provided some relief to US forces, which were already exhausted and brutally engaged in combating extremism in other countries as well.

In June 2011, one month after the bin Laden raid, Af-Pak strategy took another immediate shift. President Obama said: "our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead. Our mission will change from combat to support. By 2014, this process of transition will be complete and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security." Note that he did not announce any withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

It was actually at the Nato conference in Chicago in 2012 that President Obama declared: "our forces broke the Taliban’s momentum." Announcing the exit option he said: "We’re now unified behind a plan to responsibly wind down the war in Afghanistan." Obama acknowledged that "real challenges" remained in dealing with the problems across the border in Pakistan. "We think that Pakistan has to be part of the solution in Afghanistan," he said, adding "neither country is going to have the kind of security, stability, and prosperity that it needs unless they can resolve some of these outstanding issues." The strategy still needed a close end, but the only uniform factor was the involvement of Pakistan in finding the right solution.

Meanwhile, the US Senate adopted a measure by voice vote in favour of an accelerated US military withdrawal from Afghanistan. In May 2012, 90 members had called upon President Obama to expedite the withdrawal, citing that al Qaeda has been "dismantled and destroyed". The Senate voted 62-33 in favour of a steady return of combat forces. Major polls -- including Gallup and Pew -- found a majority of Americans were in favour of the withdrawal. The polls also showed a general confusion over the withdrawal.

According to an independent countdown to drawdown watch website, the Pew poll reported that 73 per cent of Democrats supported a quick withdrawal instead of waiting, yet 66 per cent of Democrats favoured the suggested drawdown. On the other hand, 25 per cent of Republicans called it a slow process.

To achieve the target, the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was struck between the United States and Afghanistan in 2012, provided for a US military presence after 2014. The same year, another detailed agreement was negotiated for a bilateral security agreement, which highlighted the US military presence in Afghanistan post-2014.

The military presence in Afghanistan, according to experts, is necessary to stabilise the situation on the ground and prevent militant groups from re-establishing themselves in Afghanistan or Pakistan, and, more importantly, to train the Afghan forces so that militant groups, especially the Taliban, could not infiltrate. "There already has been so much blood and treasure invested no one wants to see this turn into what is happening in Iraq right now," said Nato’s former supreme allied commander, retired Adm. James Stavridis while talking to an American news agency. "I think people realise we need to continue to advise and mentor the security forces for several more years," he was quoted saying.

The post 2014 Afghan-Pak strategy still remains open ended -- precisely to allow room for amends depending on the circumstances. When the war started, the US aimed to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, and was seeking the Taliban’s help to do so.

After the killing of Osama bin Laden, most of the al Qaeda members -- as reported by the US officials in the media -- deserted the region and moved to strengthen AQAP (al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula). The US’s previous plan was to negotiate with the Taliban before leaving the region for a peaceful transition, as they feared retaliation and still dreaded a civilian war that could break out in Afghanistan.

The political dispensation, electoral transition, commitment of the new Ghani government, and the hopes to establish a sustainable system have certainly raised hopes, helping to take talks with the Taliban off the table.

"The good news is that the Taliban is just as challenged with strategy, leadership and resources, which causes them to be less effective as well," said Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, the departing commander of the ISAF Joint command in Afghanistan.

The US is ready to step back but certainly not to dis-engage. The observer role will be resumed with the remaining non-combatant soldiers. Nato has proposed a new mission called Operation Resolute Support, according to which the American military will largely advise the Afghan military at the highest levels.

Just to be on the safe side, President Obama has also authorised the use of combat forces to target leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban who pose a threat to remaining coalition troops. "The job is not done yet…and challenges remain ahead," said US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in his talk this week.

These challenges also include favourable cooperation with Pakistan. The relationship between Pakistan and the US is not as troubled as it was after the OBL operation, but the status quo is still contentious and not as harmonious as it should be. The bad blood between the two countries has alienated both to the level of keeping a security-centric strategic partnership that perseveres with its peculiar and unusual nature.

America’s longest war witnessed twists and turns in this bilateral relationship on both the civilian as well as military front. A few weeks before the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff visited the US and held numerous talks with American policy makers, the US Defense department released a report titled, "Progress towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan." The report noted that Pakistan continues to serve as a safe haven for the Taliban and other jihadist groups.

Among other allegations, the report stated that "the Haqqani network remained the most potent strain of the insurgency and the greatest risk to US and coalition forces due to its focus on high-profile attacks. The Haqqani network and affiliated groups likely remain the most significant threat to coalition forces in the post 2014 non-combat mission."

However, the US also acknowledged the sacrifices Pakistan endured during the war. The US might be drawing down but the war continues in the region, and the US officially appreciated the North Waziristan operation started by Pakistan’s military earlier this year.

The ongoing financial compensations have come to an end, but the US Congress has announced the extension of support for another year, limiting it to $1 billion and linking it to commitment that the region doesn’t become safe haven for al Qaeda-affiliated militant groups, especially the Haqqani network.

US officials also encouraged Pak-Afghan mutual relations, sharing of intelligence and establishment of a joint border monitoring system to end cross border infiltration. The US will keep helping the two cooperate.

South Asia experts believe Pakistan has a real choice to make. The role that the US has adopted for itself in the region after 2014 extends to Iran, India, China, and particularly to Pakistan. The time has almost run out, and Pakistan still has to do more.