In the final analysis, the PTI appears closer to the military’s narrative which presupposes the political class as inept and corrupt, and democracy as an imperfect solution to this country’s problems
The only insight one has gained in the last two months, ever since the beginning of that famed ‘Long March to Freedom’, is that of hindsight. To use it to one’s benefit in order to assess PTI’s gains as a political party is still not an easy exercise. A lot depends on whether the compass you are holding is of moral/idealist kind, or realist one.
Meanwhile, the analysts acting as moral compass-wielders have tired and sat back because that, they realise, is the sole prerogative of the party in question. Besides, in Pakistan, it is only the government which is supposed to be answerable. Being in opposition is its own reward; everything is justified, even the death of seven people in a stampede. No questions asked.
Of the two active strategies adopted by the PTI since August, on balance, the dharna turned out to be a flop story but only in terms of the physical presence of supporters; it was certainly one that was best watched on televisions in the comfort of one’s homes and watch they did, day after day, week after week. On the other hand, the public meetings the dharna has morphed into have been a lot easier for the supporter who could attend these, declare his allegiance and go back home, all in a matter of a few hours.
If the October 2011 public meeting in Lahore kick-started Imran Khan’s political career, the recent September rally at the same venue has forced the analysts to consider the PTI as a serious challenger to the PML-N in its stronghold province Punjab. People who claim to be on the side of constitutionalism, democracy, and parliament now think of the ‘anti-politics’ PTI as a bona fide political party on the basis of their own belief in democracy -- it has after all the support of people of this country.
But that is the benefit of hindsight, as earlier said. That’s not how it all began.
In the last two months or so, questions have been asked of the PTI by the moralists and realists alike. Goalposts have been stated and changed with a frequency and speed to an extent that it is equally possible to make a case for PTI emerging both strong and weak.
It started off rather recklessly, even a PTI supporter would admit. The convergence with another long march on the morning of August 14 in Lahore was too obvious to be missed. The message was clear: it may have taken a year for the revelation of a ‘rigged’ election to sink in but since it finally did the ‘illegitimate’ government would not be allowed to continue in power. The "umpire’s finger" was not yet uttered, only felt in the old and tested faces of the Sheikh Rasheeds, Chaudhrys of Gujrat, and Tahirul Qadris all patting Khan’s back. The killings in Model Town provided an apt backdrop to a movement in the making.
How exactly was the ‘illegitimate’ government going to be removed once the long march landed in the capital was a question that was equally ignored by the leader and his heady enthusiastic followers. But this very question sent shivers down the spine of those who had a faint sense of history amid their feeble cries of ‘system’ and ‘stability’.
Also read: The search for true democracy
It appeared as if the larger issue of electoral reform was being ignored in the face of a narrow understanding of one, just one, election that was ‘rigged’. The systematic rigging of all previous elections since 1988, done at the behest of the establishment was forgotten.
But, of course, it was. There was a political context to this involuntary ‘movement’ which was aimed to cut the one-year-old prime minister to size. Here is what the context was: A civilian leader aiming for trial of a former army chief; a prime minister foreseeing better ties with India; a chief executive trying to sideline the military in forging relations with the US, and siding with a media group that insulted the ISI chief. The rest was easy to follow.
Once in the capital, the tone changed along with the venue. The leitmotif of rigging was punctuated by demands for prime minister’s resignation, mid-term polls, a government of technocrats, civil disobedience movement against the government, resignation of PTI MNAs, corruption, umpire’s finger, and naming and shaming of all institutions except one.
The KP government was to be retained and the PTI MNAs were still a part of the electoral reforms committee within the parliament.
And then came the Javed Hashmi moment. With hindsight again, it seems the moment came and went, without in any way impacting the situation on ground. It has not affected the fortunes of the party he quit in short term, though history may judge him differently. If anything, those who suspected foulplay behind these ‘freedom’ and ‘revolutionary’ movements felt vindicated by Hashmi’s claims.
So, what did the PTI gain out of this entire exercise? Has it been able to achieve the targets it set out to achieve?
One is not sure about the expectations it started out with but what it has not gained are resignation of the prime minister and a likely date for mid-term election. But it has certainly been successful in weakening the writ of the government and mobilising the PTI workers at an otherwise lull time.
Meanwhile, the parliament has asserted itself and put its weight behind the elected prime minister despite all differences and in the interest of saving the system. In the eternal war of narratives, the PTI appears closer to the military’s narrative which presupposes the political class as inept and corrupt, and democracy as an imperfect solution to this country’s problems.
A big chunk of the educated middle class supports the PTI and is too invested in the personal qualities of its leader. A counter narrative within the party, in favour of system, democracy, civilian supremacy and the larger goal of electoral reforms could bode well for the polity. Ends must not always justify the means.