According to FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), the number of registered IDPs from North Waziristan have nearly touched 1 million mark out of which 0.74 million (or 75 per cent) are children and women. Interestingly, only 395 individuals (61 families) have opted to stay in IDPs camp at Baka Khel, Bannu.

That raises a number of questions. Where are the rest of them and why did they not opt to stay in camps? How relief is being managed for such huge number of people who are scattered from Peshawer to Karachi? How the host communities are coping with the additional stress on basic services, such as housing, water, sanitation, health and livelihoods?

Which humanitarian agency is doing what? Are all the government agencies on the same page? What is the role of banned militant outfits in providing relief to displaced persons? And, finally, are the relief operations as transparent as they are being claimed to be? These are some of the questions which need to be answered to assess the whole series of incredible challenges accompanying the IDP crisis.

The crisis of internally displaced people (IDPs) is not something new for Pakistan. In fact, one of the very first challenges that the nascent state of Pakistan had to face in 1947 was to accommodate the displaced families who had migrated from India to their "new homeland".

Lately, the country managed the IDPs of earthquake, IDPs of Swat, IDPs of floods, and now the IDPs from North Waziristan who had been leaving their homes due to military action.

This is in addition to the registered and non-registered Afghan refugees, which Pakistan has been hosting for the last many decades. In fact, there were 1.2 million displaced people in KPK before the start of current exodus from North Waziristan after the start of operation Zarb-e-Azb.

Let us start with the issue of registration of one million individuals; humanitarian aid delivery and coordination. The enormous number of IDPs and the short time within which they are not only to be provided relief but also to be scanned for being a "potential security threat" and to be provided a safe exit from the war zone create almost insurmountable challenges.

Unlike the 2008 Swat IDP crisis, a majority of NW IDPs are out of camps but they still require shelter, food, medicine (especially polio vaccination), feed and veterinary care for remaining livestock, and most importantly, alternative livelihood strategies. How all of it is being managed?

Initially, the site of the IDP camp was selected at Kashoo Bridge on Bannu-Indus Highway Link Road at a distance of 15 Km from Bannu City. Therefore, the activity was required to be managed by the PDMA having their administrative jurisdiction. However, on the insistence of law enforcing agencies, the site was shifted to Baka Khel (Frontier Region Bannu) near Baran Dam.

FR Bannu falls under FDMA so FDMA is now handling the camp, but then there is hardly anyone living in these camps so a number of other federal and provincial institutions are also managing the IDPs.

The army, the state and frontier region ministry (SAFRON), the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the FDMA, the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), and NADRA have engaged themselves in relief activities. However, one cannot help noting the lack of coordination among these agencies.

Apparently, the institutions which have nothing to do with the humanitarian operation, are in the driving seat and have taken over the entire operation.

The KPK chief minister and the PTI are accusing the federal government of keeping them in dark about the timing of operation. To them, they had never anticipated the relief requirements and were never ready to manage the influx of hundreds of thousands IDPs in their province. Whereas, the federal government maintains that due to confidentiality and as part of security strategy it was not possible to inform the KPK government about the operation Zarb-e-Azab in advance.

Both have a valid point but it shows both the parties don’t trust each other. They can have political differences but should not politicise the IDP crisis which may turn into a human crisis if not managed properly.

The KPK chief minister has launched an appeal through an advertisement on behalf of the provincial government requesting international humanitarian organisations and NGOs to immediately collaborate with his government to start relief programme for the IDPs.

It said that the federal government’s cash support programme being provided to the IDPs was insufficient and it should be increased to meet immediate expenses of the affected people and families. Besides aid, the CM also urged support for health facilities.

However, it became clear that not only the federal and provincial governments but CM KPK and PDMA, too, are not on the same page. The PDMA immediately clarified that the government never launched such appeal and everything was under control.

In the absence of a local government that could deliver, the coordination among aid agencies is a big issue. As the IDPs have opted out from relief camp, thus relief in the form of cash transfer through a mobile phone SIM card is being introduced. However, the system has not fully taken off and, thus, increasing desperation among the displaced families.

The confusion over relief provision is also evident. On the very same day when the Chairman NDMA was claiming that no "humanitarian wing" of banned organisation was allowed to engage in relief operations, the minister of SAFRON at a seminar in SDPI said that banned outfits cannot and should not be stopped from providing relief to IDPs, after all it is a noble cause.

In other words, debate of "good" and "bad" Taliban is still not over. Due to this confusion we may lose on the ideological front what our armed forces are conquering on the battle front.

It seems that we have not learnt much from the previous crisis and are repeating the same mistake which earlier governments made during previous crises. People will not stay in the camp which is installed in security sensitive area (FR Bannu). Moreover, the tents are also weather unfriendly and don’t suit the socio-cultural values of the IDPs.

One aspects that seems to be ignored is how this crisis has affected the food and livelihood security situation. We are talking of the IDP crisis in a context where half of the population of Pakistan is already food insecure, i.e., it is not able "to secure nutritious food, for all times for everyone". FATA and KPK are facing chronic food insecurity. Massive displacement has not only affected the livelihood security of IDPs but also of the host communities, thus further eroding the already bleak situation of access to food in those areas.

The plight of IDPs reflects the poor state of governance. Coordinating the delivery of relief measures; having plans ready beforehand; bringing all the involved stakeholders on board; creating, operating and maintaining organisations for disaster preparedness, ensuring proper operation and maintenance of social service delivery structures, -- all these are facets of governance.

While the word government refers to planning and decision-making by the state and its institutions, the notion of "governance" takes a societal look. How are decisions made within a certain society or nation? Who is involved in these decision-making processes and who has which powers to decide; on which evidence is planning based and which planning is taken as basis for decision-making? How are conflicting views dealt with ? (Geiser and Suleri, 2010)

To me, apart from many other challenges, the current IDP crisis has yet again challenged the whole governance (as defined above) process. One of the many dimensions of this governance crisis is not only the absence of local governments and decentralisation, but also the fact that there is simply no discussion on how relief would have been managed differently if there were local governments during current or some of the previous crises.

The real challenge ahead is to take these insights as starting points, and to develop, propose, and discuss feasible alternatives that help to ensure an effective governance system suitable for the conditions of Pakistan.

A little improvement in governance and better coordination among relief providers may enable us to avail many opportunities that this crisis has offered. This is the best opportunity for eradication of polio in NW through organised vaccination. We may also use this opportunity to bring FATA in the mainstream national development planning.

Improving the marginalised status of FATA and bringing it at par with other parts of Pakistan will not only provide an incentive for the IDPs to return to their homes once the military operation is over, but will also win their hearts and minds -- thus filling in the void which otherwise is captured by ‘good’ Talibans.