Pakistan has a democratic federal parliamentary structure but an autocratic character that prevents a full celebration of a long cherished national aspiration that is not quite fulfilled. The fact that this duality has held its ground for the past 40 years since the 1973 constitution articulated a national mission statement can be viewed with skepticism at best and despair at worst.

Skepticism because the state’s autocratic streak underpinned by the powerful security establishment provides no guarantees that the tenure of an elected government will be completed and promises no certainty that an elected prime minister or prime ministerial candidate will not be hanged, exiled, shot or disqualified while in office. Despair because mechanisms to enforce the 1973 constitution have proven inadequate in translating ballot-based mandates to full maturity.

Those who see the glass half empty note with gloom that in this period one prime minister was hanged (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), another shot dead (Benazir Bhutto), two exiled (Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto), two forced out of office twice each by the military (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif), one disqualified in office (Yousaf Raza Gilani), four federal governments sacked (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif twice each) and only one government managing to complete its tenure (the PPP). By any measure this is a grim scoresheet for a democratic polity.

And yet for those who see the glass half full, the country has in the past four decades twice managed to force out military dictatorships (Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf), hold nine general elections despite belittling propaganda against participatory politics, completed the tenures of two parliaments (after 2002 and 2008 elections) and topped it off with the first democratic and successful transfer of power (after the 2013 election).

While the first 25 years of the country’s existence were spent finding a raison d’etre for itself and searching for a consensus on a national mission statement, the next 40 have been exhausted in trying to implement it. The mixed results more than amply demonstrate that the governance structure constructed in the early period aimed at a military-bureaucracy dominance of the polity and continues to outlive the later consensus at containing and eliminating it despite serious challenges mounted against it.

This is the reason why no government in the last four decades has started off its constitutionally guaranteed five-year tenure or even found solace mid-way through it that it will complete it. No wonder when the Pakistan People’s Party-led government completed its five-year tenure in 2013 -- the first time a government had done since General Ziaul Haq fell from the sky in 1988 -- it was touted as its biggest achievement as opposed to being judged governance performance in any advanced democracy.

If the civilian-military imbalance is the root cause for Pakistan still in search of statehood normalcy, then what can change to change the imbalance? Arguably three things happened to fill up the glass by half: (i) a Punjabi prime minister’s falling out with the military establishment in 1999, (ii) a Sindhi on the brink of prime ministership for a third time assassinated in 2007, and (iii) the two coming together in exile in between, in 2006, to set aside their rivalries in favour of a new compact that changed everything.

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif -- otherwise bitter political foes who even contributed significantly to the military-engineered deposition of each other’s governments in the 1990s -- sat down together in exile to learn the lessons from not just the successes of the establishment in holding sway but, more importantly, dissect the failures of the political forces in strategising a sustainable counter to this institutionalised harm to them. The result was the remarkable Charter of Democracy (CoD), a document so profound in its vision, mission and strategy that it rivals the import of the 1973 constitution.

The legitimacy of CoD lies in the fact that its principal authors and signatories are Bhutto’s PPP and Sharif’s PML-N that between them had, until then, won six of the seven general elections -- clearly their leadership had the backing of the majority of Pakistani voters from all provinces. This legitimacy, and the endorsement of the CoD, has since been further reinforced by the subsequent two elections which were, again, won by these parties, by PPP in 2008 and by PML-N in 2013. Some key emphasis of the CoD -- greater provincial autonomy and financial allocations, improved role of parliament in strengthening political system, and respecting the electoral mandates of federal and provincial governments -- was translated through the most effective attempt so far to implement the CoD: the 18th Amendment. This amendment, lest we forget is actually a set of 108 amendments to the constitution!

But with as heavily-mandated a government as Sharif’s current administration facing serious questions about its ability to survive the current calendar year only 13 months into its tenure means even the 18th Amendment is not enough to strengthen the political system. This is where the PPP’s call to renew the Charter of Democracy comes in. The key political parties, led by PPP and PML-N and with unambiguous support by Asfandyar Wali’s ANP (and stealthily wavering commitments from Fazlur Rehman’s JUI-F of Altaf Hussain’s MQM), has at least helped in the political game being played by rules reframed by the representative political forces.

The mechanics of the ‘policy of reconciliation’ devised by Benazir Bhutto (and remarkably well implemented by Asif Zardari) and the ‘policy of respecting the electoral mandates of rivals’ by Nawaz Sharif over the last six years are principally responsible for the PPP government completing its tenure. But are these policies -- through PPP’s unambiguous assurances to defend the Sharif government against any old-school machinations and the PML-N’s policy disavowal from endangering governments of other parties in the provinces -- in themselves enough? They are arguably not because the familiar footprints of the establishment are visible again behind the spate of uncertainties shaping into another question mark about the ability of an elected government completing its tenure.

What needs to happen to fill the remaining half glass up to the brim? A start would be reaffirming the CoD and finding a means to institutionalise it within the constitution. This has to, at a minimum, be through a comprehensive set of political reforms that seek to not just defend the political space enlarged in favour of representative electoral forces opened up by Bhutto and Sharif through the CoD but also seeking to enlarge them through a second generation of governance reforms accruing from the 18th Amendment, especially a secondary devolution from the provinces to the districts.

The political reforms have to address the gaps left from the 18th Amendment including electoral reforms that go further in assuring mechanisms that promote a broader-based ownership of the Election Commission and which leads to elimination of rigging, including both system-infused engineering and ballot-based tampering. More importantly they have to incorporate systems that promote in-house democracy, transparency and accountability within political parties.

The governance reforms, for starters, need to urgently remove the tensions between the federation and provinces accruing from the inadequacies of the 18th Amendment and deepen through devolving autonomy, powers and resources from the overblown, highly inept provincial bureaucracies to their constituent districts. Governance models should revolve around people’s priorities rather than conveniences of bureaucracies.

While the doctrine of conciliation embodied by the CoD has delivered on its primary promise of enlarging political spaces for people’s empowerment but giving in to blackmail that the political forces get browbeaten into by the non-representative powers will not be solved by surrendering their mandate piecemeal. The new political compact called for by the PPP and indirectly being supported by the PML-N needs greater inclusivity of political forces and needs to result in a system that strengthens the federation by administering the provinces as countries are run and districts to be managed as provinces should. The cost of inaction far outweighs the cost of action -- risks will have to be taken. Old wine in new bottles will not do and time is running out.