The News on Sunday: Do you think the Saudi ‘gift’ of 3 billion dollars to Pakistan has come with no strings attached? What does the term ‘friendly country’ mean in foreign policy terms?

HAR: At times, foreign economic assistance is not linked to specific or itemised strings. The donor country outlines its foreign policy agenda and political preferences and expects the aid-receiving country to be helpful in achieving these goals or it should not take steps that adversely affect the donor’s agenda. The Saudis know about Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities, especially the paucity of hard international currency. They have offered a concrete relief to Pakistan as well as to the Nawaz Sharif government and they would expect Pakistan government to respect Saudi concerns and interests in the region.

It is quite possible that concrete demands might come later after Pakistan has used some part of the donation and indicates the desire to continue with such a helpful relationship. The much-needed financial support also provides an increased access to Saudi official and semi-official circles to the government of Pakistan. It would also be easy for them to increase their interaction with societal groups that share Saudi Islamic denominational orientations.

The term "friendly country" is a broad and open-ended term in diplomacy. Its meaning ranges from "having no problems in the relations" to a "supportive and helpful country."

TNS: Should we accept the government word that this grant is not linked to any policy shift on Syria or supply of weapons to the rebels?

HAR: Official statements have to be compared with what the government is actually doing. If one detects a shift in the policy at the operational level, the official statement of "no change" cannot be accepted. Two actions by the Pakistan government created doubts about the policy. First, the joint statement at the end of the visit of Saudi Crown Prince endorsed Saudi stand of regime change in Syria.

Pakistan never made such a demand in the past. Even after the inconclusive Geneva One Talks on Syria, Pakistan did not support the replacement of the Asad regime with a transitional government with full authority. The record of the statements on Syria by Pakistan’s Foreign Office since February 2011, when the trouble erupted in Syria, shows that Pakistan maintained a non-partisan stand on the future of Syrian government. Second, the government’s refusal to disclose the source of foreign donation to the development fund created the impression that the government was hiding something.

Later, when the media found out the source of funding to be Saudi Arabia, the official circles also acknowledged it. This was an ill-advised strategy. However, due to repeated criticism in Pakistan of what was said in the joint statement, Pakistan’s Foreign Office is not expected to repeat that statement. However, the Saudi government would expect Pakistan to show more understanding of and sympathy for Saudi position on Syria, Bahrain, and Iran.

Pakistan sells some arms and weapons at the international level. Therefore, it will like to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Some of these arms can be quietly transferred to Syrian rebels, if needed. Pakistan will not supply any arms directly to Syrian rebels.

TNS: Given the recent history of our country, people have concerns how money from abroad was used to fund madrassas of various sects and to fight sectarian wars on the Pakistani soil. Are their concerns justified in the present context?

HAR: It is a well-known fact that, in the past, official and non-official sources of some Middle Eastern states provided funding to religious segments of Pakistani society based on Islamic denominational identity sharing. The methods included financial support to madrassas, funding for special events, purchasing of books of some religious scholar in large quantity, and scholarship for religious education. These practices have been reduced to the minimum at the official level after September 2001. However, non-official channels continue to operate, albeit cautiously. As regional rivalries and intra-state conflicts get revived in the Middle East, the moneyed states are expected to use their financial clout to win support for the perspectives. Pakistan is a multi-sect Islamic society and a lot of weapons are flowing around. Further, religious and cultural intolerance as well as religious-sectarian conflict has already intensified. The government must make sure that the Middle Eastern states do not play a proxy war on Pakistan soil. This will further fragment and degenerate Pakistan society and state.

If a state wants to help some religious institution, it should be processed through the government of Pakistan.

TNS: What is the economic aspect of the loan? Is there going to be a trickle down effect of this ‘development fund’ or is it going to be used just for debt-servicing or to funds energy projects?

HAR: Loans and grants are meant to provide some help and give some breathing space to the economy. These are never meant to underwrite the budget. At times, new loans are secured to payback the old loans. This hardly helps the economy. The ordinary folks can benefit from foreign assistance if it is used in the social development sectors for the projects that benefit the people, i.e., for improving education, healthcare, poverty eradication, job creation, and infra-structure development. Pakistan needs to use international aid, loans, and technological help in the energy/power generation and social development sectors. Therefore, how foreign aid or loans are used by the government of Pakistan will determine if the economy will improve and the people will benefit.

TNS: If Pakistan is, indeed, pursuing a multilateral foreign policy, do you think the government has any plans of balancing this tilt towards Saudi Arabia by engaging with Iran, too, in any meaningful way? There certainly is no headway on the gas pipeline project.

HAR: The present government lacks intellectual capacity and political determination to balance the relationship between conservative monarchical regimes and non-monarchical, somewhat radical, regimes. Pakistan is already tilting towards conservative Arab states because these states have "money" and "jobs" to dish out. Pakistan is in dire need of these two commodities. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the only leader who maintained a balance between pro-US, conservative Arab kingdoms and radical states in the Middle East in the early 1970s. This balance was lost in favour of conservative Arab kingdoms, especially Saudi Arabia during the General Zia rule. Benazir Bhutto made an unsuccessful bid to restore the balance. Nawaz Sharif leaned towards conservative Arab states. Now, once again, Pakistan under Nawaz Sharif is gradually shifting towards conservative Arab kingdoms. There has been a cooling-off in Pakistan-Iran relations during the last six months.

TNS: Where does the US figure in this discussion? Can you throw some light on the US-Saudi Arabia relations; is it now a distant player in the Middle East?

HAR: There are strains in the US-Saudi relations because of American reluctance to support the knocking out of the Bashar-al-Asad regime in Syria and its efforts to rehabilitate its relations with Iran by negotiating an arrangement to limit Iran’s nuclear programme to peaceful and civilian use. Saudi leadership feels that while maintaining "friendly and working" relations with the US it should pursue a foreign and security policy in the neighbourhood autonomous of the US. It wants to reduce its dependence on the US. That is why it is strengthening its ties with states in the Middle East and around it. Pakistan is important for Saudi Arabia because it is an important non-Arab Muslim country with professional military, nuclear arsenal and an already existing goodwill. These strains are temporary because if Iran becomes more active in challenging monarchical regimes, the US is bound to go with the conservative Arab states. Saudi Arabia is re-articulating its regional profile but not going for a total break from the US.

TNS: Considering the assumption that foreign policy is still the army’s domain and looking at the meetings of the Saudi officials with people in the GHQ, it seems as if the elected government and the army are on the same page. Who stands to benefit more out of this economic bounty injected in our national kitty?

HAR: The military and civilian leadership consult each other on a regular basis for foreign and security policy making. However, civilian leadership cannot unilaterally decide about key foreign policy and security issues. Both the civilian government and military benefit from an active relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan’s security interaction with Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the years of Ayub Khan rule. From time to time, Pakistan’s regular troops have done assignments in Saudi Arabia in advisory capacity and on active duty within the kingdom’s territorial boundaries. Retired military personnel have also served in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms. Pakistan may not send its regular troops to Saudi Arabia. Retired personnel can go there or some can seek retirement to do a security related job there, if and when Saudi Arabia seeks these personnel.

Bahrain directly recruits Pakistanis to its Police and paramilitary. This process can continue. At one time, the kingdom of Oman used to recruit Baloch youth to its Army by sending its recruiting teams to Balochistan.

The military cannot be averse to financial support from Saudi Arabia, sale of arms and weapons to the states of Middle East, especially the Gulf States, and job opportunities for serving and retired personnel there.