The News on Sunday (TNS): The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is known for its well-defined ideological markers -- pro-poor, pro-secular and non-sectarian, among many other things. Do these ideological pointers still hold true for the party? Does it continue to lure its diverse constituencies of working classes and ethnic and religious minorities to its slogans and stances?

Haris Gazdar: It has always been a ‘broad church’ party with different strands coexisting and sometimes competing. The fact that it is seen as having well-defined markers is really a statement on the spectrum of Pakistani politics today. Markers like ‘pro-poor’, ‘pro-secular’ and ‘non-sectarian’ are seen as conspicuous. When the PPP first arose virtually all mass parties (then those included NAP and Awami League) could claim to be all those three things -- and in fact the PPP with its ‘Islamic socialism’ would have been the least ‘pro-secular’ of the three. But having said that, yes, I agree that the PPP will remain, at least in terms of rhetoric, pro-poor, pro-secular and non-sectarian.

The party’s ability to attract working classes and ethnic and religious minorities would have depended on three things in principle, but in fact, it depends on two. The one thing it probably does not have to worry about is competition from rivals who would espouse these values, even nominally. You just have to see the PTI’s position on these issues to know that the political spectrum is crowded on the right, with not much on offer for social-democratic alternatives. So the two things that will determine whether the party can attract the working classes and ethnic and religious minorities are: first, whether there is political articulation along these lines, and second, whether the PPP positions itself to ‘capture’ that articulation.

I think that ethnic politics are already well-articulated and the PPP can (and already does) benefit from it in some ethnic segments of the country. In other segments, it is not a convincing lightning rod for ethnic articulation. The ‘pro-secular’ or more specifically, the ‘anti-extremist’ position too will see articulation in society and we already see this from time to time. And interestingly, this will not translate into votes for minority religious or sectarian parties. So here too, the PPP is well-positioned to ‘capture’ the momentum. 

Class, however, is the tricky issue. Pakistan is not the only place in the world, where working class movements have weakened, and the PPP is not the only social-democratic-type party to be without a clear policy or programme on this front. Even the Latin American left and social-democrats no longer bank on working class mobilisation -- rather they have become champions of universal or pro-poor social programmes. To some extent, the PPP did this with the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). But, in general, the social sector is too small and badly managed in Pakistan for it to have become a factor in electoral support. The problem with class and electoral politics is that in the absence of a working class movement, class divisions become blurred. Individuals begin to self-define as middle class. Kinship group and local patronage systems become easier means for mobilising voters, and on this score the PPP works much like any Muslim League.

Political parties do not usually lead class struggles even if they sometimes try to capture them. And social-democratic parties clearly don’t have the temperament for doing so. So, it would be too much to ask for the PPP to lead a working-class movement where none existed. Consequently, the main route of remaining relevant to its poor constituency is to focus on social programmes. The BISP was a good start and you see the PPP leaders using it as an example of what they did right in the 2008-2013 period. But that is just one programme. There is precious little else to show. What is needed is a clearer vision about developing and delivering redistributive social programmes in order to put some clear blue water between itself and PML-N and PTI which essentially represent higher income groups.

TNS: Based on the party’s performance in the May 2013 elections where it lost to the PML-N and PTI, and in the case of more recent local bodies elections in Balochistan, is the party still relevant to the politics of Pakistan. What are the reasons of what you call its ‘political collapse’?

HG: The party would remain relevant as long as there is social and economic inequality, and no new party emerges to take up the social-democratic mantle. The PTI is basically a challenge to the PML-N from the right. It’s caricature view of ‘ordinary people’ is mostly based on a mainstream middle income family. Pakistan is far more diverse with a huge underclass which is represented at times by the PPP but mostly goes unrepresented. So, given that Pakistan’s political space does not throw up a serious social-democratic challenger, the PPP remains relevant because someone has to represent the underclass, particularly in Punjab.

The PPP suffered a collapse in Punjab but not in Sindh. They were always going to lose Punjab in 2013, but the new factor is that they were replaced by the PTI as the main challenger to the PML-N over much of north-central Punjab. Better informed observers than myself have already discussed many of the possible reasons for this collapse, and I would not want to speculate on these. What is more interesting is to ask what happens next.

TNS: The party seems to have vanished from the political scene of Punjab. You wrote once that it is not healthy for a large and vibrant society like Punjab to be without a viable centre-left or centrist political voice. Do you think it can rebuild itself in the province and how?

HG: I can’t say if it can or can’t. But, obviously, the PPP cannot ignore Punjab, and Punjab cannot be left without an even nominally social-democratic option. So, the PPP will certainly try to rebuild in Punjab, and it will find some success too, because it is unimaginable that the Punjabi soil is barren for social-democracy.

TNS: Would you agree that the PPP has failed to pursue an aggressive anti-jihadi, anti-militancy policy; in fact even when in power it became or was portrayed as a victim of militancy itself?

HG: I think the situation is more complex. Take the PPP leadership’s analysis, as articulated by Benazir Bhutto in her writings and speeches in 2006-2007, and then also in some of the more candid statements emanating from Asif Ali Zardari after her assassination. They have been saying that there is an extremist mindset, but also an infrastructure, linked to elements within the state. Once you occupy office, it is impossible to take this position publicly -- because you have to work with the very same organisations and institutions. This is the paradox all reformists face. They have to work within a system they want to change. On top of that, there was great nervousness in the security apparatus about any civilian-led reform, or about any reform at all, and this apparatus showed its willingness to undermine civilian authority time and again. So staying in office, and seeing off various attempts at derailing the system could be counted as a success, ultimately, in the fight against extremism. With a bit of luck, we might look back on the fact that elections brought in parties which had a soft corner for the extremists as part of the longer process of delegitimising extremism. The great twists the PML-N and PTI are having to make have vindicated Zardari’s position. He may not have reaped the reward for having been right, but then he might be in for a longer play.

TNS: In an article published in recently, Bilawal Bhutto has criticised the privatisation policy of the PML-N government, referring to the plan as "the creation of a permanent oligarchy that can exploit the state, and the poor people of Pakistan at will" and pledged his party will "democratically resist anyone attempting to impose their version of imported economics on Pakistan for personal gain". As an economist, do you agree with the PPP’s policy of resisting privatisation?

HG: There are many issues with privatisation including the creation of private monopolies, continued government handouts, crony capitalism, and the absence of protective regulation. I am generally cautious about a style of governance which goes from inaction to a breathlessness designed to avoid consultation, to be followed by a U-turn. So, yes, I am concerned at the way in which privatisation might play out.

TNS: Since the PML-N took charge of the country more than six months ago, we have not seen the PPP get into the strong opposition mode - on militancy, economic reforms, youth policy etc. What do you think could be the reason - are they in any way cohabitating with the PML-N, to sustain democracy?

HG: Of course they are co-habiting, and thankfully, so is the PTI. And time will lead to greater confidence in the democratic system and hence room for more coherent opposition.

TNS: How resilient is the PPP? Can it still make a comeback?

HG: It’s resilience, historically, has been based, I believe, on three things. One, deep social and economic inequalities in Pakistan which exclude large segments of the population from access to a benevolent state -- on grounds of class, gender, caste, ethnicity, race, region, and religion. Two, mistakes of their enemies. And three, hubris backed by charisma in the leadership. So, no matter what we think about the third factor, the first two are guaranteed to remain. Let’s see if it will be three out of three, or if not, then if two out of three will be enough. This will reveal something not just about the PPP but about Pakistan.