olitical alliances are like arranged marriages. In both, central characters do not need to agree on everything before their union can be consecrated. An agreement on the bare minimum should do. Also, in each case, several important factors and actors must work diligently together — often behind the scene — to help central characters come together.

Going by this analogy, any political alliance in Pakistan should come about as long as it fulfils three basic conditions: 1) the parties concerned are able to find a minimum common agenda; 2) objective (read obvious) political and social realities favour their joining hands; and 3) at least two of the three interested outsiders — generals, judges and powerful foreign capitals — have sufficient reasons of their own to back the opposition’s agenda.

From the anti-Bhutto protests of 1977 to the coup that dethroned Imran Khan in 2022, the constituent parts of opposition alliances have always been driven towards each other by a successful combination of the three factors mentioned above. Could it be different this time round? The short answer is no.

The most remarkable fact — or feat — in the two historical instances cited above was that the parties that constituted the opposition alliance were as different from each other as chalk is from cheese or green is from red — quite literally.

Left-leaning secular nationalists, such as Wali Khan and Ataullah Mengal were happy to share stage with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and the Jamaat-i-IslamiI, pan-Islamist religious parties. Various factions of the conservative Muslim League and centrist Tehreek-i-Istiqlal were thrown in for good measure. Their common hatred of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the glue that bound them together, helping them overlook the contradictions in their rainbow alliance.

The 2022 alliance similarly included Maulana Fazl-ur Rehman and Pakhtun nationalist Mehmood Khan Achakzai — along with the Muslim League faction of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. The object of their shared hatred in this case was Imran Khan. They were later joined, among others, by Pakistan Peoples Party and Balochistan National Party headed by Akhtar Mengal.

As these examples illustrate, the parties now in opposition do not need to agree on everything. All they need is a common antipathy towards Shahbaz Sharif’s government. Do Fazl-ur Rehman, Imran Khan, Akhtar Mengal and Mehmood Khan Achakzai share the objective to overthrow him?

Perhaps not —their repeated public protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. Their political trajectories and interests, for the time being, diverge so widely that it is almost impossible for them to agree to even a minimal common agenda.

Fazl-ur Rehman may want to keep his base mobilised with his oppositional and agitational rhetoric but he has sufficient political expertise and experience to realise that objective realities and interested outsiders do not favour his cause. He knows that if the government is removed tomorrow and elections are held the day after, his electoral fortunes will not improve dramatically. Given that his electoral base overlaps vastly with that of Imran Khan, it should be obvious to him that Imran Khan — and not he — will benefit if and when interested outsiders decide that Shahbaz Sharif and his niece, Maryam, must relinquish power in Islamabad and Lahore, respectively.

Akhtar Mengal, too, has little to no interest in the government’s removal. After several failed attempts to gain a meaningful foothold in power (either in Quetta or Islamabad) through electoral politics over the last two decades, he has embarked on a new phase in his political career. He, finally, seems to realise that he has lost so much support among Baloch voters that he cannot regain it merely by projecting himself as a future chief minister of Balochistan. He, therefore, is trying to position himself as close to the separatist Baloch groups as he possibly can without being seen as a separatist himself. He knows fully well that he will lose even more support if he joins an opposition alliance that, to curry favour with the interested outsiders, cannot raise its voice, loud and clear, against state repression in Balochistan. His interest lies in bolstering his sagging support base. He cannot achieve that by facilitating a change of guards in Islamabad.

Mehmood Khan Achakzai seems to have reached the fag end of his politics due to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. His party was routed in 2024 election and, barring a miracle, does not seem to be making an electoral comeback anytime soon. His presence in a future opposition alliance will be more nominal than effectual.

This leaves Imran Khan, admittedly Pakistan’s most popular politician alive. In the 2024 election, candidates enjoying his endorsement received the highest number of votes although he was in jail and his party was denied its election symbol. He also has strong personal and political reasons, a trained cadre and sufficient financial heft to run a sustained agitation for the ouster of the government. He will also gain the most if and when an opposition alliance succeeds in ousting the incumbent rulers.

The question is: can he overthrow the government? His party’s botched protest in November last year has left his supporters dejected. The seemingly unceasing infighting among his lieutenants is making another round of protests for his release — let alone for the toppling of the government — a distant possibility.

Here arises another important point. If and when Imran Khan gets out of prison — whether as a result of protests by his party or due to a collective campaign by a yet-to-be-united opposition — he will pose as big an electoral threat to Fazl-ur Rehman in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as he will to Nawaz Sharif and his party in the Punjab. Will Fazl-ur Rehman willingly join an alliance that demands and attains Imran Khan’s release from jail? Notwithstanding some friendly overtures made by their parties towards each other in recent times, the possibility of the former’s participation in such an alliance does not make objective political sense. If that happens at all, it, of course, will be made possible by the not so invisible factors and forces which often like to make, unmake and remake Pakistan’s politics in the image of their own whims and fancies.

Are these factors propitious and these forces ready for another round of unmaking and remaking politics? Seems highly unlikely for now.

Take the judges. Since 2007, superior courts have been more active and relevant politically than even some politicians — shaking and shaping governments. However, for the first time in a couple of decades, they are in complete disarray. While playing to the gallery throughout 2010s, they came to be seen first politically partisan and then blatantly self-seeking and self-serving. Having attracted so much limelight, it was only inevitable that they start showing their internal rifts more publicly than ever before. Quick to take advantage of their mutual recriminations, their rival institutions have forced such a deafening silence upon them that their righteous thundering from their exalted pulpits no longer bothers anyone.

Pakistan’s foreign friends, particularly, the United States and Saudi Arabia, are badly caught up either in their own problems or conflicts in their own backyard. They cannot care less about who should rule Pakistan as long as our disputes do not drag them in. So, even as some of Imran Khan’s supporters continue to claim that the US President Donald Trump will soon secure his release, the Americans do not seem to have any incentive for or interest in bringing the opposition together for his release.

The same is true for the most powerful interested outsiders. They have no reason to believe that a united opposition will serve them better than the incumbent government. Imran Khan’s unguided (or misguided) populism is a major reason not to engage with him in the foreseeable future. An opposition alliance that might increase both his popularity and populism is not something that they should bet on for ensuring the preservation of their interests.

Too many moving parts have to start moving in the same direction and at the same speed before a marriage of convenience can be arranged between the otherwise disparate parts of the opposition. The chances of that happening are remote.

The writer is a former magazine editor