Charting the country’s journey from the Pakistan Resolution to the 18th Amendment
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he 1940 Pakistan Resolution is remembered for its promise of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Yet, there was a parallel message that has long shaped the political imagination of the people in Pakistan in the realm of provincial autonomy. Pakistan’s journey towards federalism began in March 1940.
Today, as Pakistan is facing a series of domestic and external challenges, it is pertinent to hark back to this resolution’s federalist message. A reading of the text of the Pakistan Resolution reveals that along with the ‘separatist’ message, there was a ‘federalist’ dimension to this document. The Muslim League demanded greater provincial autonomy in what was undivided India. This federalist vision presented the roadmap of a political system in which the Centre and provinces were to enjoy a partnership in various domains of intergovernmental relations. This vision has inspired generations of political leaders and workers throughout the post-independence history of Pakistan.
When the Pakistan Resolution was passed in 1940, the colonial state was willing to accept the agenda of provincial autonomy in its quest to dilute the demand for independence. Provinces were at the heart of the British legal and political imagination. This was reflected through the Government of India Act, 1935, that introduced the principle of federalism to the subcontinent. With the experience of the Congress ministries in retrospect, the Muslim League feared a Congress-Hindu dominated all-powerful central government. Hence, it raised the demand for a loose federation. From 1940 to 1947, the Muslim League leadership’s focus gradually shifted from the federalist to the centrist message.
After the creation of Pakistan, the mainstream discourse moved to Muslim separatism as the essence of the Pakistan Resolution. The federalist imaginings were put on the backburner. Yet, the vision of a loosely-structured federation with provinces enjoying substantive autonomy has been part of the imagination of various political parties in East Bengal, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa throughout Pakistan’s history. They considered federalism essential for Pakistan due to deep-rooted demographic, political, economic and ethnic differences inherent in the system.
The Muslim League was reminded of this federalist message when it lost the 1954 elections in East Bengal to the United Front. The latter contested these elections on the demand for provincial autonomy. Yet, the response at the Centre was greater centralisation introduced in the form of One Unit. One Unit was ushered in to create inter-wing parity between East and West Pakistan with both provinces enjoying equal representation in the legislature. During the late 1960s, the quest for a decentralised federation formed the core of the Awami League’s Six Points.
After the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, various ethnic parties continued to demand a re-structuring of the federation with a substantive increase in the powers of provincial governments. The 1973 constitution re-imagined the notion of a federation with the introduction of a federal ‘design’ that included a two-chamber parliament. The Senate was established to provide equal representation to all the four provinces. The constitution also created a platform where the federal and provincial executives could resolve their disputes through mutual consultation, i.e. the Council of Common Interests.
However, administrative and fiscal centralisation marked the affairs of the republic for more than three decades after the passage of the 1973 Constitution. It was only in 2006 that the first steps towards realisation of the federal spirit of the Pakistan Resolution were taken with the Charter of Democracy. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan Peoples Party were at the heart of this exercise. With their leadership in exile and the country under military-dominated rule, this charter was made to introduce political, administrative and financial reforms in the country.
The road to the 18th Amendment was paved by the end of the Musharraf tenure and rise of the PPP in power in Islamabad following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in December 2007. The 2008 elections led to the PPP forming a coalition government in Islamabad. Being a party centred outside the Punjab, it has been a long-time partner in the project of provincial autonomy. In fact, among the mainstream parties of Pakistan, it is the most vocal champion of provincial rights in Pakistan. In 2009, the PPP and its allies invited a range of ethnic parties to the table. Thus began the most comprehensive process of inter-ethnic consultation in the history of Pakistan.
The result was the 2010 18th Amendment, which is the most inclusive attempt at constitutional reform in the history of the country. The deliberations for this amendment were spread over 385 hours. It amended 102 articles, i.e. nearly a third of the constitution. It abolished the Concurrent List and transferred the residual powers to the provinces. The 18th Amendment sought to inject new life into the CCI by making it a substantive institution. One way of doing it was to make its meetings constitutionally mandatory under the provision of quarterly meetings. The long-running demand of the Awami National Party to re-name the North-West Frontier Province was accepted. The amendment also sought to make the process of selection of the chief election commissioner more consensual by linking it to an agreement between government and opposition.
The 18th Amendment followed in the footsteps of the 2009 NFC Award that expanded financial decentralisation in Pakistan. This had been a long-running agenda of provincial governments. The federal executive remains the biggest agent of revenue-generation in Pakistan. 93 percent of the national revenue is generated by Islamabad while provinces produce only 7 percent. In this situation of fiscal asymmetry, re-designing the NFC Award was a mammoth task. This award increased the provincial share of the divisible pool from 47 percent to 56 percent for the year 2010-2011 and to 57.5 percent for the subsequent years. The fiscal arrangement remains in effect till today. It also revised the provincial distribution ratios, allocating 51.74 percent to the Punjab, 24.55 percent to Sindh, 14.62 percent to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 9.09 percent to Balochistan.
The 18th Amendment marked an important milestone in Pakistan’s journey towards administrative, financial and political decentralisation. Much more needs to be done on this front to turn this legislative reform into practice. In almost a decade and half since its passage, the amendment has been challenged by various quarters. Despite these obstacles, the dream of a decentralised Pakistan is still revered by the smaller provinces.
Eighty-five years after the passage of the Pakistan Resolution, the federalist message of this document remains as relevant as ever. There is much discontent on this front outside the Punjab heartland. Sindh is deeply restive over the federal government’s plans to construct new canals. The issue has revived old anxieties over the issue of water distribution shared by the erstwhile political rivals such as the PPP, the MQM and the GDA in Sindh.
The federation-Khyber Pakhtunhwa relations have been marred by a bitter party competition as the latter has become a PTI citadel. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government has actively participated in the PTI’s numerous street agitations, including the November 24, 2024 march to Islamabad. The current wave of violence in Balochistan has pointed to the need for a fresh look at the intergovernmental relations between Islamabad and Quetta. The federal dimension of the 1940 Pakistan Resolution remains relevant as Pakistan navigates its way through the domestic turmoil.
The writer is the director of the political science programme at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. She is the author of In Search of Lost Glory: Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan (Hurst Publishers, 2021).