he Lahore Resolution is one of the most intensely discussed topics in the history of the Indian subcontinent, particularly concerning Pakistan. Several intriguing controversies surround it. For instance, some argue that the resolution was presented on March 22, 1940, and approved on March 24. Nevertheless, Resolution Day has traditionally been observed on March 23, likely to appease the British and to overshadow the memorialisation of Bhagat Singh’s execution. In the years following independence, it was first acknowledged as Pakistan Republic Day until Gen Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler, renamed it Pakistan Day. Additionally, the original text of the resolution was buried at the foundation of the Minar-i-Pakistan, as directed by Gen Ayub Khan. Lastly, there is an ongoing discussion about the resolution providing a blueprint for organising the Pakistani state, especially concerning power allocation between the federation and the provinces.

Let us examine the differing opinions surrounding the debate on provincial autonomy in the Pakistan Resolution. A group of social scientists and political analysts argues that some nationalist leaders in Sindh and Balochistan have referenced the resolution to advocate for greater autonomy for their provinces. They believe that Pakistan’s federal model should be based on this resolution. However, this interpretation is overly literal and misguided. The resolution did not provide a comprehensive framework for organising the Pakistani state, particularly regarding sharing of powers between the federation and the federating units. Instead, it focused on constitutional issues in the broader context of India and aimed to achieve a lasting solution to the Hindu-Muslim conflict.

The argument centres on the resolution’s key points, which propose that “geographically contiguous units should be demarcated into regions” for creating independent states, where Muslims are in the majority, specifically in northwestern and eastern India. The debate highlights two aspects: a) the grouping of Muslim-majority areas into independent states; and b) the autonomy and sovereignty of these constituent units. Understanding these points requires analysing the resolution in the political context of British India in 1940 and the historical political experience of Muslims. In a federal system, sovereignty rests with the federal government, meaning constituent units cannot be both “autonomous and sovereign” simultaneously.

Conversely, the opposing faction asserts that provincial autonomy has been a feature of our political discourse since the British Raj brought about elected central and provincial legislatures in 1937. While the All-India Muslim League initially called for provincial autonomy to shield Muslim-majority provinces from excessive interference by a Hindu-dominated central government, the demand for a federal system gained popularity. This demand became highly sought after in the post-independence political framework due to the geographical vastness and immense diversity of the subcontinent.

The argument emphasises on the critical component of the resolution, which called for the areas with Muslim majorities—specifically in the north western and eastern zones of India—to be consolidated into independent states. These states were to comprise autonomous and sovereign constituent units. The pivotal phrases here are “independent states” and “autonomous and sovereign,” which embody the political consensus regarding the configuration of the future homeland. Consequently, the resolution endorsed a federal system with provincial autonomy, hoping that Muslims would be able to exercise governance effectively in these Muslim-majority regions. This strategy aimed to empower the Muslim community and create more significant opportunities for promoting Muslim rights and interests.

The resolution endorsed a federal system that promised provincial autonomy, hoping that Muslims would be able to exercise governance effectively in these Muslim-majority regions.

The former argument somehow overshadowed the latter, and the hope for provincial autonomy faced considerable obstacles shortly after independence in 1947. One of the early challenges was the expanded authority of the central government as established in the Government of India Act of 1935, which bestowed the governor-general with substantial powers over provincial administrations, including the ability to appoint or dismiss provincial ministers. Exercising these discretionary powers, the governor-general removed the Congress-led provincial government in the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) on August 22, 1947, despite their majority, resulting in the appointment of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan as chief minister. Likewise, on April 26, 1948, the chief minister of Sindh, Muhammad Ayub Khuhro, was ousted by the provincial governor under directives from the governor-general. The decision to declare Urdu as the exclusive official language provoked protests in East Pakistan, where Bengali was predominantly spoken.

This was followed by the establishment of One Unit in 1955, the declaration of martial law in 1958, the general elections held in 1970, the refusal to transfer power to Sheikh Mujib-ur Rehman’s Awami League, and the eventual secession of East Pakistan in 1971.

Following the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, the first directly elected National Assembly, representing the remaining four provinces, drafted and unanimously approved the 1973 Constitution. One of the most significant aspects of the 1973 constitution, particularly regarding Centre-province relations, was the establishment of a Council of Common Interests. This council was responsible for formulating water, power, railways and industrial development policies and overseeing the relevant institutions.

Thus, the contours of provincial autonomy were reshaped under the 1973 constitution. However, this scheme struggled to take root due to frequent amendments to Article 112, which expanded federal authority over provinces. Discretionary actions by the federal executive often undermined provincial governance, exemplified by the dismissal of the provincial government in Balochistan and forced resignations in NWFP shortly after the promulgation of the constitution.

The 18th Amendment marked a significant shift toward greater provincial autonomy by abolishing the Concurrent List and retaining a Federal List divided into two parts, increasing subjects under federal jurisdiction. While Pakistan’s journey to balance Centre-province relations has been tumultuous, implementing constitutional provisions is vital.

The 1940 resolution envisioned maximum autonomy for the provinces and proposed either a confederation of states or a loosely bound federation, with most powers allocated to the states. However, Pakistan moved towards a more centralised and authoritarian governance model, undermining the sovereign status of the regions, which became mere components of the state. Although the 18th Amendment theoretically transferred some administrative and financial powers to the provinces, we are still far from realising the commitments outlined in the Lahore Resolution.

The writer, author of The Aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971: Enduring Impact (Routledge, 2024), has a PhD in history from Shanghai University. He is a lecturer at GCU, Faisalabad, and a research fellow at PIDE, Islamabad. He can be reached at mazharabbasgondal87@gmail.com. His X handle: @MazharGondal87