akistan was established not merely as a country. It was an idea. Famously, the idea found its first official articulation in the Lahore Resolution. However, it was a couple of weeks prior to March 23, 1940, that Muhammad Ali Jinnah wrote about the rationale for a separate Muslim homeland in the London-based publication Time and Tide: “Democratic systems based on the concept of homogeneous nations such as England are very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India… Experience has proved that whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu, as a general rule, will vote for his caste-fellow, the Muslim for his coreligionist.”

Although Jinnah’s desire to protect Muslim interests in the Indian subcontinent through the establishment of a Muslim majority polity appears straight forward, the contours of the idea of Pakistan remained vague. The lack of clarity, before the establishment of Pakistan, primarily surrounded the question of whether Pakistan was the only intended goal of Muslim League’s political struggle. For instance, acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946), which would postpone the creation of a Muslim state, indicates Jinnah’s willingness to soften his stance. Historian Ayesha Jalal has attributed such ambiguity to a level of strategic thinking by Pakistan’s founding father. In this reasoning, the ambiguity lends itself to adaptability while negotiating on behalf of the Indian Muslims. The use of the idea of Pakistan as a “bargaining chip,” as described by Ayesha Jalal and misunderstood by many, remains a point of historical and academic contention.

The more pertinent confusion surrounding the idea of Pakistan, however, has been regarding the nature of the state of Pakistan, in particular regarding the relationship between state and religion. In Pakistan, we recoil from serious inquiry into assessing the idea of the state in relation with religion that Jinnah had envisioned – or the ambiguity associated with the notion. For instance, in a speech in Aligarh in 1941, whereas Jinnah clearly dismissed that the Indian National Congress’ characterisation of Pakistan as a state where minorities would be untouchable, he did not refrain from admitting that Islam would play a fundamental role in shaping the identity and the politics of the state.

In 1943, for example, Jinnah told a Muslim League conference in Karachi: “What is it that keeps the Muslims united as one man and what is the bedrock and sheet-anchor of the community. It is Islam. It is the great book – the Quran – it is the sheet anchor of Muslim India. I am sure that as we go on and on, there will be more of oneness – one God, one Book, one Prophet and one Nation.” At least on the face of it, such an idea of Pakistan contrasts with Jinnah’s famous August 11, 1947, speech that many have taken a more or less clear statement of Jinnah’s desire to institute a secular polity.

In itself, the gulf between Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s various statements on the subject is not wide. The idea of an Islamic polity in a state that views its citizens as political equals is not entirely irreconcilable. One can also argue that the apparent lack of clarity was intentionally designed to take advantage of the principle of politics as the art of the possible. However, in the long run, the gulf widened as ideological positions, political expediency and competing interests kept focusing on aspects of the idea of Pakistan that best suited their positions. In other words, the lack of clarity opened the idea to various interpretations.

The state of Pakistan played by far the most imprudent and short-sighted role in promoting versions of the idea of Pakistan that have come back to haunt the country. Farzana Sheikh, in her book Making Sense of Pakistan, points to the contradictions in Jinnah’s approach to the question of religion. However, she notes despite the debates in the Constituent Assembly and the passage of the Objectives Resolution (1949), Islam in Pakistan remained, for most part, a marker of national identity – a role that it had played before the Partition as well.

Sheikh believes that the state, particularly under Gen Zia-ul Haq, initiated Islamisation of politics and society beyond what was arguably the vision of the founding fathers. The desire to seek domestic legitimacy in Islam aligned perfectly with the opportunity to capitalise on America’s support in the Cold War’s decisive battle in Afghanistan. I have recently argued that Pakistan’s most consequential war is neither one that the country fought with India, not even the unfortunate 1971 calamity; it is the Afghan war (1979-1989) that has had the deepest and most enduring impact on the country’s state and society.

The Zia regime’s and American objectives were realised. However, the romance of global religious aspirations, at least among a section of the population, was the genie that would refuse to be put back into the bottle. Driven by short-term political expediency, the country’s elite stoked the romance of religion without actual commitment to meaningful Islamic governance. Whereas the idea of Pakistan during the Afghan war was that of the fortress of Islam, those high on the romance wanted the idea of the country to be something more than that. Those who drank too deep from the well wanted the country to be truly the utopia they had been asked to believe in.

At the moment, the country is faced with an ideational crisis that no one wishes to confront. On the one hand, for all intents and practical purposes, Pakistan remains a parliamentary democracy, with a largely secular notion of relationship between the citizens and state. On the other hand, many people have been convinced that the only way the country will ever meet its optimal ideal would be through instituting “real Islamic government” – be that khilafat, emirate or another form of the same. As democracy loses ground due to shenanigans of the recent past, the case for a religious takeover, even if through violent means, has strengthened.

In the service of inculcating this idea of Pakistan, we sacrificed half the country and have alienated much of the remaining. Our unwillingness to define the idea of Pakistan in ways that would represent the country’s diversity has sidelined natural allies of the country’s current constitutional order. The zealots, however, are not satisfied. In the contestation for the idea of Pakistan, it is the zealots who know what they want.

The writer teaches political science at the University of Peshawar. He can be reached at aameraza@uop.edu.pk.