t is often said that all Pakistan’s problems can be traced back to the flawed policies and self-serving nature of its politicians. There is a popular belief that the downfall of the country is primarily the result of corrupt elected leaders interested only in personal gain rather than the nation’s well-being.

“Politicians come and go, but the problems remain,” many argue, invoking a sense of a never-ending cycle of failure and disappointment. This has become the default narrative, one that has been repeated so often that it has morphed into a widely accepted truth. However, a closer look reveals another story that challenges the conventional wisdom and calls for a rethinking of how responsibility should be assigned.

A careful examination of Pakistan’s history reveals that while elected leaders have their shortcomings, the trajectory of the country’s policy decisions, both foreign and domestic, was largely shaped by an unelected civil-military oligarchy. “The state is not the government, it is the deep state,” as some analysts would put it, suggesting that power has frequently rested outside the hands of those who win elections. This claim becomes particularly pertinent once one scrutinises key decisions that defined the direction of Pakistan’s growth and challenges.

Consider some key decisions made by the politically elected governments. There have been three major initiatives that had a lasting impact on the country. Each of these was initiated, debated and carried through by popular political leaders.

The first and most significant of these was the adoption of the 1973 constitution that set the foundational legal framework for Pakistan’s democracy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as leader of the Peoples Party, drove this historic initiative. “We will write our own destiny,” Bhutto declared, emphasising that this was not just a matter of political deal making but a chance to finally establish a legal and political system that belonged to the people of Pakistan.

The constitution, while imperfect and challenged throughout history, marked a major milestone in the country’s political evolution. This historic document was mauled and mutilated by the power elite, more than it was by the popularly elected politicians. The Eighth Amendment is a case in point.

The second major decision was the nationalisation programme. It included the nationalisation of key industries, banks, insurance companies and certain educational institutions. Bhutto’s vision was to create an egalitarian economy where resources were in the hands of the state. The purpose was to address the rampant economic disparities.

Critics of this initiative often say that nationalisation stifled growth and led to inefficiencies. However, the underlying intention was to tackle the deep-rooted socio-economic inequalities. “The idea was not just economic redistribution, but social justice,” his supporters argue. The policy was in line with Bhutto’s socialist leanings.

Fast forward to the 1990s: the Benazir Bhutto’s government took the bold step of introducing independent power producers (IPPs) to meet the growing demand for electric power. This was an attempt to address one of the country’s most pressing needs. “A nation without power is a nation without a future,” Benazir remarked, underscoring the significance of energy infrastructure in fostering development. The policy would eventually be expanded by successive governments.

One cannot claim that the politicians have been free from flaws or that their actions haven’t had significant repercussions. However, to blame them alone for all that has gone wrong is to ignore the role of those who operate from behind the scenes. 

Over time, these IPPs became a massive drain on resources, with long-term economic consequences. That a policy designed to meet Pakistan’s energy needs eventually became a source of significant economic burden, illustrates the complexity of political decision-making and the difficulty of long-term planning in a highly volatile environment.

A curious aspect of Pakistan’s political history is that while these key decisions were made by elected governments, much of the other policymaking—including in areas like foreign relations, security and political management—was influenced by the establishment. The so-called “deep state,” often at odds with the political leadership, had a dominant role in shaping the nation’s direction.

When one reflects on Pakistan’s foreign policy, for instance, it is clear that decisions regarding the country’s alliances, particularly with the United States, and relations with neighbouring India, were frequently made without a direct input from elected leaders. The same can be said about Afghan policy. The handling of major conflicts and the response to regional tensions were largely the purview of the establishment’s strategic planners.

While politicians have often been blamed for Pakistan’s economic and social stagnation, the establishment’s control over critical areas like defence and intelligence, and its ability to influence – even outright dictate - policy, is often overlooked in mainstream discussions. It has, at times, been free to pursue its objectives, with elected governments left to navigate through the consequences. There is a lingering sense that the political leadership, even when enjoying popular support, operates within a framework dictated by the establishment oligarchy.

Are we being too harsh on our politicians? Are they alone to blame for the situation we find ourselves in? It seems that much of the policymaking, especially in areas that have led to both successes and failures, was done by those with power beyond the ballot box.

The great political decisions—those that shaped Pakistan’s constitutional framework, its approach to nationalisation and its energy policies—came from popularly elected leaders. However, major shifts in foreign policy and domestic governance were, more often than not, engineered by the establishment elite. These two forces have operated in parallel, frequently pulling the country in divergent directions.

The role of the establishment, especially in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy, has been central in creating the country’s external image and determining its alliances, which in turn have shaped some of the internal policy challenges.

There are, of course, no easy answers. The political landscape has long been dominated by a power struggle between popular leaders and the establishment. Both have had their share of failures and successes. In the words of Benazir Bhutto, “Politics is the art of the possible.” It is in this ever-evolving space that we must acknowledge that the story is far more complex than it is often portrayed. When given the chance, the politicians have driven important reforms. Too often, their efforts have been opposed and undermined by forces beyond their control.

This is not to say that the politicians have been free from flaws or that their actions haven’t had significant repercussions. However, to blame them alone for all that has gone wrong is to ignore the influence of those who operate from behind the scenes.

The writer is a professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore