ivil disobedience, often employed as a method of protest to draw attention to perceived injustice or unconstitutional practices, fundamentally entails “requiring the individual to act against the law, accepting the law’s punishment, if he believes the law is morally wrong or politically unjust,” as articulated by William Safire (1929–2009), an author, columnist and speechwriter for President Richard Nixon. The ultimate aim of such actions is to bring about a change in the law.

Rosalind Ladd, a professor of philosophy at Wheaton College in Norton, Massachusetts, characterises civil disobedience as the deliberate violation of a law that is regarded as immoral to follow. For instance, trespassing on private property to liberate laboratory animals as a protest against their use in experiments exemplifies an act of civil disobedience.

In a 2004 study published in the Journal of Democracy, Russell Dalton, director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of California, Irvine; Susan Scarrow, an associate professor of political science at the University of Houston; and Bruce Cain, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, describe protests and demonstrations as “unconventional” forms of political action. Another study refers to protests as a form of “uninstitutionalised” political participation.

John Rawls, renowned for his influential book A Theory of Justice (1971), regards civil disobedience as a political act grounded in moral principles. According to Rawls, such actions are motivated by political conviction rather than the pursuit of personal or group interests.

The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf has issued a warning of initiating civil disobedience. In this instance, however, the focus is not on defying any specific law or set of laws. Instead, the disobedience is broadly against the government.

It is widely believed that the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz was prevented from securing a victory in the 2018 elections, and similar methods were employed in 2024 to obstruct the PTI. These instances of electoral interference, in a sense, undermine the moral authority that Imran Khan seeks to invoke.

Why did the PML-N refrain from undertaking a prolonged agitational movement or civil disobedience to topple the PTI government? Several reasons can be identified, including its past association with “undemocratic actors.” In 2018, those same influences shifted in favour of the PTI. Consequently, the PML-N may have recognised the ineffectiveness of such a strategy. However, Nawaz Sharif participated in the long march initiated by the Lawyers’ Movement to restore the independence of the higher judiciary. That march achieved success, primarily because it was rooted in strong moral conviction and a compelling ethical appeal.

How, then, can agitational politics and long marches of the 1990s be explained when the Pakistan Peoples Party and the PML-N did not allow each other to complete their tenures? The impatience can largely be attributed to the limited political experience of their leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Also, the opposition was never sure it could win the forthcoming elections.

The considerable experience accumulated during the 1990s and the imposition of unelected rule in 1999 fostered a measure of patience among the two parties. The PML-N permitted the PPP to complete its tenure from 2008 to 2013, and, the PPP allowed the PML-N to complete its tenure from 2013 to 2018. To this extent, the principles outlined in the Charter of Democracy were upheld.

Unlike 2018, Imran Khan now commands significant popular support. There is a perception that he no longer requires the backing of unelected quarters, if the PPP and the PML-N similarly refrain from seeking it. The question then arises: who stands to benefit the most if a fresh charter of democracy is signed by the PPP, the PML-N and the PTI? Clearly, once a level playing field is ensured – a prospect that the charter could facilitate – the party with the largest vote bank would emerge as the primary beneficiary. It is difficult therefore to understand why Imran Khan does not want this. It could offer a path for him to assume power once again albeit in a manner that is dignified, legitimate and democratic. This approach would conserve significant political energy and spare his supporters and political workers considerable hardship. Additionally, it would alleviate much of the current pressure and tension faced by the system.

Is this the right moment for the PTI to engage in negotiations? Yes. Opposition parties often refuse to engage in dialogue until they believe they hold a position of strength. Only a party in a position of strength can effectively secure its demands from its rivals. Despite claiming widespread popularity among the masses, the PTI is losing valuable time by not negotiating and establishing a new charter of democracy with those who it says have no legitimate right to govern.

If the party continues to insist on negotiating with the “real powers” only, what will this approach lead to? The “real powers” no longer appear willing to engage in direct negotiations with Imran Khan. Even if he manages to force such negotiations and returns to power, a similar episode will be much likelier to recur.

By signing a charter of democracy, the PTI would not only secure the best future for itself but also for the country that has endured a lot throughout its history due to agitational politics and long years of unelected rule. More advanced political systems have moved away from such disruptive politics, favouring structured, institutional mechanisms for addressing political grievances.

Patrick Bernhagen, a lecturer of politics and international relations at the University of Aberdeen, and Professor Michael Marsh, head of the School of Social Sciences and Philosophy at Trinity College, conducted a survey-based study. They reported that, in Western Europe, protest levels generally declined throughout the 1990s. In particular, the frequency of street demonstrations decreased by an average of nine percent. By the end of the decade, protest activity in the Baltic countries had been reduced to half of its 1990 levels.

Unlike Bangladesh, the idea of protests leading to regime change does not appear to be a viable option in Pakistan, due in part to the presence of a well-established system of political parties and interest groups.

The writer, an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sargodha, has a PhD in politics and international relations. He may be reached at writetoazam@hotmail.com