Examining the validity of some political expectations in Pakistan associated with Trump administration
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s Donald Trump’s victory in the United States good news for Imran Khan, the former prime minister? Many Pakistanis believe that Imran Khan maintained a cordial relationship with Trump during his first term. Even if that is true, can one assert that the rapport remains as strong and will persist in the future? In June, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution urging a comprehensive investigation into the alleged irregularities surrounding the elections held on February 8 in Pakistan. For many of Khan’s supporters, this resolution represented an important development.
The resolution and associated developments should be analysed in a broader context. Significant events in Pakistan-US relations that have occurred this year may offer key insights into the likely future direction of these relations. Despite the numerous challenges facing the Pakistan-US relationship, several positive developments in 2024 suggest that it will continue to follow a similar trajectory. For instance, the trade framework was renewed in April. In May, the United States expressed support for Pakistan’s efforts to secure an IMF bailout. In September, President Biden stated that US relations with Pakistan were of vital importance. This statement was made following the adoption of Resolution HR901.
So why is President Trump unlikely to pressure the government of Pakistan for Imran Khan’s release? First, in the final months of Trump’s presidency, Khan, then prime minister, referred to Osama bin Laden as a martyr. The comment was later characterised by the Foreign Office as a slip of tongue. Second, in June 2021, when asked by a member of the media whether his government would grant military bases to the US if requested, Imran Khan famously said “absolutely not.”
Third, the situation with respect to the embassy cipher controversy further complicated relations between Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf and the US. Following PTI’s accusations against the US after its loss of the no-confidence vote in April 2022, anti-American sentiments in Pakistan reached unprecedented levels. Most of these developments occurred after the Trump administration. Given the context, Imran Khan’s immediate release from prison does not look like a critical American concern. The US leadership is unlikely therefore to jeopardise its relations with the current government of Pakistan.
Fourth, the government has likely been making efforts to counter the lobbying efforts of the PTI in the US. In April, Finance Minister Aurangzeb met with Donald Lu, a key figure in the so-called cipher controversy. US Ambassador Donald Blome has recently held meetings with Maryam Nawaz, Nawaz Sharif and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif is expected to visit the United States over the coming weeks, where he might engage in activities aimed at mitigating the PTI influence.
Fifth, American policy towards Pakistan has traditionally been influenced by considerations of power and security, often referred to as “high politics.” In comparison, democracy and human rights concerns are viewed as “low politics.”
Even if Trump were to apply pressure on Pakistan for Imran Khan’s release from prison, it is unlikely that the government will yield easily. Historically, Pakistani governments have resisted and rejected such pressures. Nevertheless, PTI leaders and supporters may continue to retain hopes of a US intervention.
What accounts for the demands by certain American circles, though not the White House, in support of the PTI?
In May, a PTI delegation including the party chairman Gohar Khan, former National Assembly speaker Asad Qaiser and central information secretary Raoof Hasan, met Ambassador Blome. The following day, the State Department, called on Pakistan to ensure the former prime minister’s safety and security. In PTI circles, this meeting was seen as a significant achievement. However, State Department spokesperson Mathew Miller reaffirmed the US position of political neutrality, stating, “We take no position on elections in Pakistan.” In the following month, the US House of Representatives passed Resolution HR901. Why did the House choose to overlook the State Department’s declared stance of political neutrality?
Some observers have mistakenly concluded that the passage of HR901 was a sign of increasing influence of Pakistani Americans. It is unlikely, however, that in such a short period, Pakistani Americans have gained sufficient influence to sway nearly the entire House of Representatives. If they were capable of doing so, one might expect that the longstanding conflicts in Palestine and Kashmir would have also been resolved in a matter of weeks or months, according to the ‘wishes’ of Pakistani Americans.
The passage of the resolution marked a minor turning point in Pakistan-US relations. A similar turn occurred on July 1, four days after the resolution was adopted, when Vedant Patel, the deputy spokesperson for the State Department, stated that Imran’s case was Pakistan’s “internal matter.”
The non-binding resolution was for the consumption mostly of the Pakistani-American voters. No wonder, some observers, including Touqir Hussain, a former ambassador, have characterised Pakistan’s response to HR901 as an “overreaction.”
The previous patterns in US-Pakistan relations suggest that issues classified as “low politics” are unlikely to result in any significant changes in the US policy.
The writer has a PhD in politics and international relations and is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sargodha. He may be reached at writetoazam@hotmail.com