oreign Minister S Jaishankar ruled out discussing bilateral relations with Pakistan as he embarked on his first trip to the neighbouring country in nearly a decade to attend the 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. The visit and the refusal reflect emerging dilemmas, inherent tensions and some interesting possibilities.

As the high-profile Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting was being held in Islamabad, the focus seemed to have shifted to India’s participation. For several years now, India’s engagement with the SCO has been marked by significant diplomatic manoeuvring, as it balances its regional and global ambitions. However, this particular meeting underscores a complex dynamic rife with broader implications. The event highlights not only India’s growing stake in the SCO but also the broader competition for influence and power within Asia.

Initially conceived as a forum for fostering security cooperation and resolving regional issues like terrorism and separatism, the SCO has evolved into a platform that also discusses economic and strategic interests. After a long and protracted series of overtures to its initial founders India was admitted as a full member in 2017, reflecting the organisation’s growing regional relevance.

Let’s look at why India chose to attend this event in a country presumed hostile. For India, the SCO provides a key platform to engage with Central Asia, a region critical for its energy security and economic diversification. It also allows India to engage with both China and Russia, particularly at a time when its relationship with the West has been evolving under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue framework. India’s participation in the SCO, therefore, is not just symbolic; it serves multiple geopolitical goals ranging from security cooperation to economic diplomacy.

The central tension surrounding this particular SCO meeting was the strained relationship between India and Pakistan. For decades, the two nations have been locked in a conflict that spans military, political and ideological domains. Border skirmishes, accusations of terrorism and deep-rooted mistrust continue to sour relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. These have only exacerbated in the last decade due to a Hindu majoritarian government in power in India, which believes in staying in power through constant Pakistan bashing.

Given this backdrop, the SCO meeting presented a unique diplomatic challenge for India. New Delhi has often refused to engage with Islamabad on bilateral platforms citing its dissatisfaction over Pakistan’s handling of terrorism, particularly cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. However, the SCO’s multilateral setting meant that India could not avoid Pakistan entirely without creating a diplomatic vacuum that could weaken its standing in the group. This placed India in a delicate position, where it had to navigate the meeting diplomatically while minimising direct engagement with Pakistan.

India’s decision to attend the SCO meeting, despite the deep-seated animosity between the two nations, signals New Delhi’s commitment to multilateralism and the interests embedded in that framework. It highlights India’s recognition of the SCO as a crucial platform for geopolitical engagement; perhaps, more importantly, space that cannot be ceded to China or Pakistan without consequence. However, the decision also raises questions about how far India is willing to go to engage within this setting and whether this engagement will bring about any thaw in bilateral relations.

India’s participation in the SCO meeting is driven by the complex interplay of its regional and global aspirations. First and foremost, the SCO is dominated by two of India’s most important strategic competitors: China and Pakistan. China, in particular, has been using the SCO as a platform to project its influence in Central Asia and further its Belt and Road Initiative. India, which has consistently refused to endorse the BRI due to concerns over sovereignty (the BRI passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir), remains wary of Chinese dominance in the SCO.

In this context, India’s presence at the SCO meetings is not just about participation; it is about ensuring that the organisation does not turn into a forum that promotes only Chinese and Pakistani interests. By attending, India signals its intent to counterbalance Chinese influence while promoting its own vision for regional connectivity and development. This balancing act, however, comes with its own set of risks. India’s growing closeness to the US and the West, symbolised by its participation in the Quad, puts it in a precarious position in the SCO, where Russia and China are increasingly aligned against Western powers.

Russia’s role in the SCO also complicates matters. Traditionally, Moscow has maintained strong ties with both New Delhi and Islamabad, often playing the role of mediator. However, with the war in Ukraine drawing Moscow closer to Beijing, India faces a more difficult task in aligning its interests with Russia within the SCO framework. The challenge for India is to maintain its strategic autonomy while engaging with an organisation where the power dynamics are shifting rapidly in favour of its rivals.

Security cooperation and counterterrorism efforts have been the traditional pillars of the SCO. However, economic cooperation has emerged as an important aspect of the organisation’s agenda. For India, Central Asia offers tremendous potential in terms of energy security and trade. The region’s vast reserves of oil and natural gas make it a crucial part of India’s energy diversification strategy, especially as it seeks to reduce dependence on Middle Eastern energy supplies.

India’s participation in the SCO is also tied to its efforts to develop connectivity infrastructure in the region, particularly through the International North-South Transport Corridor. The INSTC, which seeks to link India with Central Asia and Europe via Iran and Russia, is seen as a counter to China’s BRI. For India, the SCO meeting in Pakistan provided an opportunity to push for greater connectivity and infrastructure cooperation, even as it remains cautious about projects that directly or indirectly bolster Chinese influence.

Beyond regional concerns, India’s involvement in the SCO is also shaped by its global strategy. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the centrepiece of India’s foreign policy, New Delhi seeks to balance its engagement with various multilateral groupings. While the Quad provides India with a platform to engage with the US, Japan and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, the SCO allows it to maintain its ties with Russia, Central Asia and Iran.

This balancing act is not without contradictions. India’s strategic partnerships with the US and other Western powers have led to concerns in Moscow and Beijing about New Delhi’s commitment to the SCO. By participating in SCO meetings, India seeks to demonstrate its ability to engage with multiple power centres, thus reaffirming its strategic autonomy.

India’s participation in the SCO meeting in Pakistan underscores the complexity of its foreign policy. On one hand, New Delhi must contend with the hostile relationship it shares with Islamabad, a relationship that shows no signs of improving in the near future. On the other hand, India must also balance its rivalry with China and its evolving ties with Russia in an organisation where these two powers hold significant sway.

Predictably, the road ahead is fraught with challenges, as India seeks to navigate a geopolitical landscape where old rivalries, new alliances and shifting power dynamics collide. This is a framework where diplomacy is seen mainly through the security lens and not necessarily with people at the centre.

The writer has been in the development sector for more than a decade. He currently works with an international non-governmental organisation based in Delhi. He may be reached at avinashcold@gmail.com