Having failed to achieve its objectives in Gaza, Israel has extended the war to Lebanon and Yemen
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s the war in Gaza approaches the one-year mark, the elimination of Hamas sought by Israel remains elusive. Its battle preparedness and technological superiority backed by the military might of United States and Europe notwithstanding, Israel has failed to achieve the ‘total victory’ goal set by its prime minister. Attempts by the United States, Egypt, Qatar and other countries for a ceasefire in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages have stalled. An end to violence and destruction does not appear to be in sight. Desperation has forced the Israeli government to start bombing Lebanon and start another war.
It seems that the power politics has overshadowed the already complex issue involving illegal occupation, fight for freedom, terrorism, religion and personal agendas.
Israeli forces have destroyed or seized control of crucial supply routes from Egypt to Gaza, including the crucial Philadelphi Corridor, a 300 feet wide and eight mile long strip from Israel’s border to the Mediterranean Sea. This corridor has Gaza to its northeast and Egypt to the southwest, and was a key supply route for Hamas. Israeli government claims that 14,000 combatants in Gaza have been killed or captured. It says half the leadership of Al-Qassam Brigade, the military wing of Hamas, including Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa, has been eliminated. Israeli Defence Forces have said they can now move freely throughout Gaza and that Hamas has grown so weak that its officials have told international negotiators it is willing to give up civilian control of Gaza to an independent group once a cease-fire is in place.
Israeli government says if its forces withdraw Gaza now, Hamas will regain its strength within a year. It says 2-3 months of high-intensity fighting in central and southern Gaza is still needed before it can transition to intelligence-based raids and strikes to take out the remaining Hamas fighters and infrastructure, before allowing another party to take over the administration of Gaza. It has suggested that this could take another year. According to the US assessment, Hamas is no longer capable of planning and executing an attack on the October 7 scale. It even doubts its ability to launch small terrorist attacks on Israel. However, US officials believe that in the absence of follow-on plans for security and governance in Gaza, Hamas will continue to regroup and pop up after Israel forces have ‘cleared’ an area.
There is a realisation in Israel as well as the United States that the return of around 115 hostages can only be secured through negotiation.
A solution to the brutal violence in Gaza and the larger problem of Palestine is more complex than the developments in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. A vast array of competing interests beyond the Middle East will have to stretch and balance before any hope for lasting peace in the region and the world can be entertained.
Hamas’s strategy, on the other hand, has been “survival is victory.” It has urged its fighters to lie low in its vast tunnel network and blend among civilians. While Israel has tried to destroy the tunnels in Gaza, the task has not been completed. Some of the tunnel complexes Hamas had used as command posts have been rendered inoperable. However, the network has proved much larger than Israeli forces had anticipated and remains an effective way for Hamas to hide its leaders and move the fighters around. Hamas is also holding Israeli hostages in the tunnel network. It claims that Israeli forces are exhausted and most of its soldiers want the war to end. There is a view that the growing number of civilian casualties are resulting in greater resentment against Israel and potential support for the Palestinian cause.
Meanwhile, the US is expanding its security and economic coalitions to contain Russia in Europe, China in Pacific and to isolate Iran in the Middle East. These coalitions spread from Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in Asia Pacific to India in the Persian Gulf and NATO in Europe. Saudi Arabia is a key component in the chain.
To get the US Congress to vote for pass an alliance with Saudi Arabia requires a ‘normalisation’ of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. For such a normalisartion, Saudis have been asking for a ceasefire in Gaza and a path to a two-state solution. A ceasefire deal with Hamas in Gaza and release of hostages can also lead to ceasefire with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel can then agree to open talks with the Palestinian Authority. This could allow Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco to send peacekeeping troops in Gaza. Such a coalition could counteract Iran’s allies: Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and some Iraqi militias.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Netanyahu, indicted in 2019 on charges of fraud, bribery and breach of trust, wants to stay in power to stay out of prison. His government holds power through a delicate coalition with extreme right-wing Jewish supremacists. A two-state solution runs in contravention to their vision. Insisting on permanent Israeli control over the West Bank, they have threatened to leave Netanyahu’s government if there is a ceasefire in Gaza or a deal with the Saudis.
Netanyahu has consistently sought to discredit the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Instead, Qatar was allowed to donate $1 billion to Hamas for humanitarian aid, fuel and government salaries.
An alliance with Saudi Arabia and some other countries in the Middle East can be a great diplomatic achievement from the Israeli perspective. It can create an Israeli-Arab partnership against Iran.
A solution to the war in Gaza and the larger problem of Israel and Palestine is more complex than just what happens in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. The vast array of competing interests beyond the Middle East will have to stretch and balance before we see any hope of lasting peace in the region and the world.
The writer is a former advisor to the prime minister and the Punjab chief minister. hkhil@usa.net