hat is democracy? Is it a government of the people, by the people, for the people or a government of the elite, by the elite, for the elite? The former is largely practiced in the developed world where the people rule through their elected representatives; the latter in the developing countries where the elite rule through collaboration among themselves.

Despite several campaigns and persistent claims, the country has struggled to have stable democratic governments. For instance, in the first four decades of its existence i.e. between 1947 and 1988, an oligarchy ruled the country for almost 36 years. From 1988 to 2024, the establishment has ruled either directly or indirectly. Civilian regimes have frequently conspired with non-representative forces to block the development of democracy in Pakistan.

What went wrong with democracy in Pakistan?

The question can be answered in two ways: either by digging out causes of derailment of democracy – which may range from historical to political and indigenous/ national to international; or a detailed analysis of the historical events of the nearly eight decades of the country’s political history. Here, we try to answer the question theoretically. Our argument is premised on three theses/ concepts— the elite state, the overdeveloped state and the (colonial legacy of) authoritarian state.

Asaf Hussain, the author of Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan, holds that Pakistan is an elite created by the elite for the elite. The author categorises the elite in three distinct groups and each group into two subgroups: pre-colonial (religious elite and landed elite), colonial (military elite and bureaucratic elite), and post-colonial (industrial elite and professional elite). These distinct elite groups, he argues, compete with one another in order to dominate and influence political development in the country.

In other words, Pakistan’s political structure, which provides the basis of power in the society, is that of the elite-mass type—where governing elites operate centrally as direct “power holders of the body politic;” the non-governing elites wield extensive institutionalised influence; and non-elites are effectively prevented from having substantial impact on the political system.

Contrary to Hussain, Mohammad Waseem, the author of Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy, emphasises the persistent, perilous and devastating conflict between two elite groups in Pakistan: the state elite and the political elite. The former is generally identified as the establishment. The latter comprises political parties and the parliament. This situation has led to a bifocal nature of state authority. The two elite groups draw heavily on two power centres: the middle class and the political class, respectively. The state elite has been typically recruited from the middle class. The political elite, though divided along ideological and identity lines, has strong roots in the locality (district) and the region (province). As the constitutional tradition is upheld by the political elite as the gateway to power, the much-touted goals of good governance, elimination of corruption and moral uprightness are the manifest ambitions of the middle class.

Both Hussain and Waseem agree that the political structure of the country is dominated by elite groups. They compete with one another for the sake of dominating the power grid. They have been working in tandem—supporting and protecting one another on the one hand, and prohibiting the entry of non-elites to become shareholders on the other.

Second, Hamza Alavi, in his research journal article, The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, conceptualises the “overdeveloped” state as a top-down, centralised structure apexed by a triumvirate of feudal lords, the local bourgeoisie and metropolitan capital. This in turn is dominated by the establishment oligarchy. Explaining this concept of “overdeveloped” state structure in post-colonial non-European states, Alavi argues that developing countries have quite a few separate and diverse classes like the indigenous bourgeoisie (national industrial class), feudal lords and metropolitan bourgeoisie (foreign capital). The interests of these three “propertied classes” often converge. They also let the establishment oligarchy to mediate their interests, giving the state relative autonomy to impose its will and develop it into an “overdeveloped” state, which does not allow democracy strengthen its roots.

According to Alavi, Pakistan is an “overdeveloped” state. Its establishment oligarchy has the power of coercion. However, it often lacks legitimacy, as it does not have the state capacity. It can be “overdeveloped” in its coercive powers as has been witnessed since the 1950s in suppressing ethnic movements for the realisation of their aspirations and loss of half the country in the process in 1971. The “overdeveloped” state still practices coercion against dissenting voices.

Third, Ayesha Jalal, in her book Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective, holds that “Pakistan drew heavily on the colonial state’s methods of bureaucratic control and centralisation.” Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the nation, preferred to become governor-general to exercise central authority over the provinces of a nascent Pakistani state. This choice was a manifestation of carrying forward the colonial legacy of authoritarianism in the post-colonial Pakistan. He also appointed Chaudhary Muhammad Ali (who later became prime minister), a career bureaucrat, as secretary-general to the government. The administrative bureaucracy gained an edge over the political arm of the state and the latter was unable to stand its ground against the former, trained in the tradition of colonial bureaucratic authoritarianism.

In other words, Pakistan has been an authoritarian state that carries the legacy of authoritarianism of colonial days. It has been nearly eight decades since the British left the region yet Pakistan has not been able to rid itself of its colonial legacy of exploiting social divides and perpetuating extractive state institutions. As a result, challenges confronted by Pakistan, including that of a retarded democracy, can be attributed to non-representative, irresponsive and unaccountable national governments whose primary objective is holding onto power.

It has been a case of government of the elite, by the elite, for the elite, where the elite state, overdeveloped state and/ or authoritarian state has safeguarded and advanced the interests of the elite and prohibited entry of non-elites in the shareholding. This, has not let democracy strengthen its foothold. For democracy to flourish, there is a dire need to get rid of the elite, overdeveloped state and authoritarian state.

Mazhar Abbas, the author of The Aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971: Enduring Impact (Routledge, 2024), has a PhD in history from Shanghai University. He is a lecturer at GCU, Faisalabad, and a research fellow at PIDE, Islamabad. He can be reached at mazharabbasgondal87@gmail.com. His X handle: @MazharGondal87.

Hadaiqa Sardar is a PhD candidate in history at GCU, Faisalabad.