In the early 1960s, a Baloch resistance movement began to take shape, primarily motivated by the aim of safeguarding the interests of Baloch populations and drawing inspiration from Marxist-Leninist liberation ideologies. This movement crystallised following a series of brief engagements in 1962. A group of several hundred ideologically committed individuals coalesced under the leadership of Sher Mohammed Marri and the militant Baloch People’s Liberation Front. This group laid the groundwork for what would become the insurgency of 1973.

Initially, this insurgent infrastructure was under the control of the Marri tribe. However, it later expanded beyond their traditional territory. By July 1963, 22 nationalist camps had been established across Balochistan, from the Mengal areas in central Balochistan to the Marri region in the northeast. Approximately 400 full-time volunteers managed these operations.

The call for independence emerged later, not directly from the Baloch People’s Liberation Front, but as a consequence of the growing alienation and radicalisation of Baloch youth during the conflict from 1973 to 1977. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite instituting a democratic constitution in Pakistan, failed to adhere to its principles. In 1973, he dissolved the provincial government led by the National Awami Party and accused its leaders of undermining the state.

This action intensified the insurgency. The most radical factions in the Baloch nationalist movement joined the guerrilla fighting initially launched by the Marris and Mengals. Despite the mobilisation of around 80,000 Pakistani troops, the insurgency persisted. It was only after General Zia’s military coup that negotiations commenced, leading to the withdrawal of the army from Balochistan and the release of Baloch leaders and activists. The province experienced a period of relative peace until 2005.

The Evolution of Baloch Nationalism

The contemporary form of Baloch nationalism has evolved through a protracted and intricate process, closely linked with the development of a Baloch middle class, which was often educated outside Balochistan. This middle-class nationalism emerged concurrently with, and frequently in dialogue with, the growing nationalism among Balochi tribes. Over time, the impact of military actions and changing socio-political dynamics began to erode traditional tribal identities, leading to a diffusion of Baloch nationalism beyond the tribal confines.

Understanding Baloch nationalism necessitates a consideration of both political and sociological factors. Balochistan is inhabited by 18 major tribes besides various smaller tribes and clans. Among these, the Marris and Bugtis have historically been more inclined towards military engagement and are thus politically significant. The complex interplay of tribal power dynamics, inter-tribal differences and sometimes contentious interactions underscore the tribal question as a critical component of discussions on Baloch nationalism. This complexity has historically been used by critics to question the cohesion and legitimacy of a unified Baloch national identity.

In one of his write-ups in 1999, Feroz Ahmad criticised the National Awami Party in Balochistan for its limited tribal representation compared to the cross-class Awami League in Bengal. Ahmad noted that Balochi and Brohi tribes have minimal linguistic and cultural overlap, similar to the differences between Tamils and Pashtuns. Balochi speakers are a majority in only four of Balochistan’s 30 districts. Brohi is predominant in the Khanate of Kalat, the heartland of Baloch nationalism. This fragmentation has fuelled scepticism among Pakistani intellectuals about the existence of a unified Baloch nation.

Gen Pervez Musharraf defended his repressive tactics in Balochistan as necessary to combat the alleged underdevelopment caused by a minority of tribal leaders. The military regime claimed that only 7 percent of the province was involved in the insurgency but failed to address the widespread underdevelopment in the remaining 93 percent. Musharraf claimed that among Balochistan’s 28 major tribal leaders, only three actively opposed the federal government. The Baloch Liberation Army lacks clear leadership from figures like Bugti, Marri or Mengal, though they support its activities. The deaths of prominent insurgent leaders, such as Balach Marri and Akbar Bugti, did not resolve the conflict between Balochistan and the central government.

The ongoing conflict is marked by a gradual “detribalisation,” where tribal identity has diminished in significance. Currently, the Baloch nationalist movement is primarily led by the educated middle class, who are underrepresented in high government and military positions. This class, originating from urbanised districts like Kech, Panjgur and Gwadar, has increasingly influenced the movement, shifting the focus from rural to urban resistance. State repression under Musharraf targeted the middle class to muzzle Baloch nationalism. This led to further destabilisation of the province. The strategy intensified opposition and radicalised moderate elements of the movement, as evidenced by Ataullah Mengal’s 2006 statement declaring the end of peaceful political efforts.

Throughout the 1990s, Balochistan had seen reduced ethnic tensions and increased nationalist party influence. However, the 2002 elections, marred by alleged rigging and manipulation favouring Islamist parties, marked a shift towards more violent conflict. The military’s interference in elections and subsequent policies led to a confrontation with nationalist leaders. Musharraf’s attempts at political reform, such as his devolution plan, were seen as centralisation rather than decentralisation, further alienating Baloch nationalists. His administration’s brutal crackdown in Dera Bugti and other areas and the killing of Akbar Bugti exacerbated the conflict.

Post-Musharraf, the political landscape in Balochistan remained tumultuous. Efforts by the PPP and Asif Ali Zardari to address popular grievances through the Balochistan Package were met with scepticism and ultimately rejected by nationalist leaders. Subsequent budget increases and aid did not alleviate the province’s economic woes, leading only to corruption and mismanagement.

Over the years repressive tactics used by governments in Balochistan have evolved. The province has witnessed numerous abductions, killings and abandoned bodies. These actions are apparently aimed at controlling the province and reinforcing state power.

One notably publicised case involved the abduction and murder of three political activists, including Ghulam Mohammed Baloch, on April 3, 2009. They were taken away from a courthouse and found dead six days later. This marked a brutal escalation. Victims of such operations have included rights activists, insurgents, their sympathisers, student activists, teachers and journalists. The violence has led many professionals to flee Balochistan and raised new concerns about the province’s future.

While state spokespersons deny such accusations, Frederic Grare notes in his analysis on Balochistan, the use of death squads composed of Baloch mercenaries. These squads allegedly aim to destabilise Baloch nationalist factions and replace tribal leaders with those more loyal to Islamabad. Militant tactics have also contributed to the violence. Initially targeting security forces, Baloch insurgents have increasingly attacked civilians, including ethnic Punjabis. In July 2012, 18 people were killed in Turbat, with the Baloch Liberation Tigers claiming responsibility.

The Islamisation of Balochistan, driven by military regimes to weaken ethnic identities and centralise power, has had profound effects. Under Zia-ul Haq, efforts to replace ethnic identities with a unified Muslim identity included incorporating Pashtun areas into Balochistan and promoting Islamic law. Despite these efforts, Baloch nationalism persisted. The policies largely failed in ethnic Baloch areas but influenced federal policy.

Zia’s successors like Pervez Musharraf continued these policies, emphasising madrassas over secular education and contributing to sectarian violence. This violence, often attributed to extremist groups like the Taliban and Lashkar-i-Janghvi, disproportionately affected the Hazara community and targeted Baloch nationalist leaders. Some of the sectarian groups operate with apparent impunity, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the Frontier Corps and exacerbating instability in Balochistan.

Baloch leaders suspect that intelligence agencies are using both radical religious groups and Baloch renegades to undermine Baloch nationalism and target the Hazara community. These agencies have also sought to promote the idea that the Baloch are responsible for violence against the Hazaras. If the allegations are true, this would indicate that security agencies have shifted from using established fundamentalist groups to more radical proxies. This shift could complicate their ability to control previously sponsored groups. The future of Balochistan remains uncertain. The ongoing instability suggests that the situation could worsen, but reversing it would likely take a long time. Several factors need to be considered in this regard:

Desire for Autonomy: A July 2012 survey showed that while only 37 percent of Baloch support independence, 67 percent want greater provincial autonomy. This suggests that there is room for negotiation and that Balochistan’s issues are not solely a matter of law and order.

Media and Public Opinion: The English-language media in Pakistan increasingly highlights the Balochistan crisis, focusing on rights abuses by security forces. This coverage suggests a growing awareness and empathy for Baloch grievances in the Pakistani society, despite some claims of media bias from provincial authorities.

Divided Nationalists: Baloch nationalist groups are fragmented and unable to unite. Hardline factions and moderates are at odds. While hardliners can challenge security forces, they lack significant foreign support or resources to shift the balance.

Ineffective Security Response: The security forces have struggled to control the insurgency. Their methods often exacerbate the situation. Despite eliminating some insurgent leaders, the conflict has continued unabated.

Role of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court has held numerous hearings on Balochistan and issued orders for legal and constitutional compliance. However, these orders have not led to tangible changes, exposing inefficiencies and a lack of accountability.

Potential for Political Dialogue

There is potential for political dialogue, particularly if moderate nationalist groups are willing to engage. Sardar Akhtar Mengal, the former chief minister and Balochistan National Party president, has shown interest in talks, suggesting a referendum for self-determination. The establishment has indicated support for a political solution.

Participation of nationalist parties in upcoming elections could be crucial for legitimacy and stability in Balochistan. However, such participation will depend on fair process. Boycotts could lead to further instability.

For any political solution to be viable, significant improvements in human rights protection and security are necessary. This includes ending extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. International attention and monitoring by bodies like the United Nations could help press for such changes. While there is room for dialogue and potential for change, meaningful progress requires addressing both human rights abuses and the underlying political issues.

Once establishment shifts its approach, UN monitoring could help bridge mistrust among parties by evaluating Pakistan’s Balochistan policies against international standards.

The September 2012 United Nations mission to Balochistan aimed to highlight the issue of enforced disappearances. The mission, which lasted ten days, included meetings with government officials and citizens but was met with refusal from the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Frontier Corps, accused of involvement in many disappearances. This mission, though limited, drew international attention to human rights abuses. The US and the UK raised concerns at the UN Human Rights Council.

Balochistan’s chaos is more than a regional issue; it risks exacerbating instability near Afghanistan’s fragile provinces. With traditional social structures dismantled, the area faces rising radicalism. The ongoing conflict suggests that simply addressing socioeconomic grievances is insufficient, as political forces willing to negotiate have been sidelined.

Despite a majority in Balochistan favouring greater autonomy within Pakistan, the push for independence remains significant. This indicates a slim but existing opportunity for negotiation, underscoring that Pakistan’s unity is not as tenuous as it might seem. However, political engagement, rather than repression, is necessary for resolution.

Efforts to undermine local structures have further weakened the state and bolstered hardline positions.

The writer is a professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore