he recent Supreme Court verdict in the so-called reserved seats case has opened a Pandora’s Box, emerging as a potential destabiliser in an already fragile political system. Following a two-day meeting, the Election Commission of Pakistan has announced that it will implement the Supreme Court order and referred the matter to its legal team. However, same press release also raises a concern with the judgment. The government seems reluctant to implement the order and has filed a review petition against it that is likely to be heard after the summer break.

The majority opinion seems to be that the ECP has shown explicit bias against the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf and aligned with the powerful establishment in the backdrop of the May 9 violence. The government’s reluctance to implement the Supreme Court order has the potential to precipitate a constitutional crisis.

The poor track record of the ECP in terms of performing its constitutionally assigned responsibility is rooted in the history of the institution. An examination of record shows that with a few exceptions, the institution has mostly served the interests of the establishment since its creation in 1956. Yahya Khan’s ‘transitional’ regime in July 1969 had appointed Justice Abdul Sattar, a judge of the Supreme Court, as the chief election commissioner. The two other members of the commission were judges of the high courts. The ECP was credited with holding credible elections in 1970. However, the Yahya regime’s reluctance to transfer power to the elected leaders ultimately resulted in the tragic disintegration of the state.

Under the ZA Bhutto government, a permanent ECP was created under Article 218(2) of the 1973 constitution. The constitutionally independent body was mandated to hold free, fair and impartial elections. The ECP was led by Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan. In the last session of National Assembly in January 1977, his term was unanimously extended for the next three years. However, the elections held under its auspices were marred by allegations of massive rigging. The opposition alleged that the commission gave free rein to all kinds of irregularities and manipulation to the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party. Nineteen members of the National Assembly and 66 members of the Provincial Assemblies were elected unopposed from the ruling party’s platform. In the first round of polling, alleged electoral malpractices by the ruling party remained largely unchecked. The ECP announced some corrective measures later and initiated inquiries in 13 constituencies, disqualifying six PPP MNAs-elect over rigging allegations. The regime clipped the powers of the ECP. Following allegations of widespread rigging, boycott of the second phase of elections by the opposition and massive street protests Justice Jan proposed fresh elections. Later, to avoid confrontation with the regime, he proceeded on leave.

In the end, protest over the alleged rigging, derailed the democratic process and resulted in the imposition of Zia’s martial law. Zia twice postponed the promised elections so that the ECP did not get the chance to perform its constitutional role. Zia then reconstituted the ECP and its strength was raised to five members. In 1979, the ECP asked for fresh registration of political parties. Most leading political parties, including the PPP, refused to register themselves. The ECP went ahead with the exercise and registered 21 political parties out of the 78 applicants. In December 1984, Zia was declared elected president following a referendum dismissed by most people as a sham. Next, the ECP held party-less elections in 1985.

In the post-Zia era, too, the ECP failed to establish its neutrality although it was given more institutional autonomy and administrative powers than in the past. Elections held in 1988 allowed political parties and were seen as relatively free. However, allegations of massive rigging returned in 1990. It was alleged that electoral manipulation by the establishment in favour of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad was unchecked by the ECP. An Election Cell at the presidency was accused of masterminding the manipulation.

Elections held under the caretaker government of Moeen Qureshi in 1993 transferred power to the PPP. However, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, which emerged as the main opposition party, accepted the results. Not so the 1997 elections, when the PPP complained of the lack of a level playing field, which it said had facilitated a landslide victory for the PML-N. The low voter turnout too undermined the democratic legitimacy of the electoral exercise.

The ECP failed to assume an assertive role despite frequent elections over the decade. Its performance was largely dependent on the executive authority. The elections were relatively free when the establishment desired so. The political parties failed to empower the ECP.

Musharraf’s military regime reconstituted the ECP under Justice Irshad Hasan Khan, a former chief justice, with four other members. It was assigned the task of holding elections from local bodies to the national level in a four-phase plan of restoration of democratic processes. The commission not only facilitated rigging in the presidential referendum of April 2002, in which Musharraf was reported to have received 98 percent of the votes, but also restricted the participation of mainstream political leadership.

The regime used the university degree requirement and the National Accountability Bureau to disqualify many political leaders. The ECP was accused of operating as an arm of the military establishment to undermine the democratic development. When Musharraf relinquished the office of the Chief of Army Staff, his successor, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, ordered the withdrawal of military personnel from the political process. After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, mainstream political parties staged a comeback under the leadership of the PPP during the 2008 elections. A constitutional restructuring was then undertaken in the light of the Charter of Democracy.

The ECP was empowered through the 18th Amendment as a permanent constitutional body. The process of the appointment of the chief election commissioner and its members became more transparent and required formal consensus of democratic forces. The administrative and financial powers of the commission were increased. Justice Fakhr-ud Din G Ebrahim, was appointed the CEC through a parliamentary committee. The newly constituted ECP supervised the 2013 general election after the completion of the term of a democratic regime. The PML-N victory in the election was questioned by the PTI and its leader Imran Khan criticised the CEC and levelled allegations of partiality against the commission. Justice Ebrahim stepped down despite an excellent track record of upholding the rule of law. An inquiry commission formed later largely refuted the PTI allegations and declared the 2013 elections a free and fair electoral exercise.

After Panama leaks and removal of Nawaz Sharif, the ECP imposed several restrictions against his party and its leaders. Under the leadership of Justice Sardar Raza Khan, the ECP was accused of extending support to the establishment. The deployment of armed forces at polling stations and suspension of the RTS on the election night effectively undercut the legitimacy and transparency of the electoral exercise.

After the PTI formed the federal government, Sikandar Sultan Raja was appointed the new CEC in 2020. After the regime change in 2022, the ECP postponed elections to the Provincial Assemblies of the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after these were dissolved. This led to a constitutional crisis and a political deadlock. Since then, the PTI has faced several restrictions. Dissatisfied with the way its internal elections were held, the ECP withdrew its electoral symbol. Later, a number of its candidates were disqualified from the electoral races. The party complained of being deprived of a level playing field. It has also alleged that in many constituencies its electoral mandate was ‘stolen’ through manifest rigging. The party was also deprived of a proportionate share of seats reserved for women and religious minorities.

For most of Pakistan’s history, the ECP has been regarded as an institution violating its constitutional mandate of holding free and fair elections.

The author is an assistant professor in the Department of Pakistan Studies at the Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad. He holds a PhD from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. His expertise is electoral politics of Pakistan. He can be reached at sajidkhanhistorian@gmail.com. His X handle: @sajidkhanqau