reat uncertainty prevails with regard to the current state of affairs in Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf and its prospects in the near future. Some of the questions lurking on the mental horizon of common citizens are: what will the rifts, divisions and factionalism within the PTI lead to; how far has the party been able to establish its credentials as a political force capable of challenging the status quo; is Pakistan moving towards a two-party system, or will multi-party scenarios continue to make for weak coalition governments; and, to what extent has the PTI lived up to its slogans?

Factionalism seems to be irrelevant to the question of the party’s survival in the near future. It is a populist party where everything revolves around its supreme leader, Imran Khan. It is virtually a single-leader party where no meaningful second or third tier of leadership exists. The 2024 general elections have shown this in unequivocal terms. The current level of factionalism and internal dissent can undermine its electoral performance and harm service delivery under its government but not cause its demise since the popular stature of Khan has always been the dominant factor in its following. An important difference between Donald Trump’s populism in the United States and Imran Khan’s in Pakistan is the way their tenures ended. While Trump was ousted by the electorate after people saw through the shallowness of his party programme, Imran’s government was terminated prematurely. This provided a significant stimulus to Khan’s following.

Despite taking power initially with the blessings of the establishment, Khan’s capacity for mobilisation as an opposition leader has been proven. However, his performance while in government was dismal, even if judged against predecessor governments. Had he completed his tenure, the PTI’s popularity may have declined due to the incumbency factor.

Its removal through a vote of no-confidence gave it a new lease of life. It might seem that the popularity of populist leaders can only be dented by using the same tools – populism counters populism. The policy pick-up of Maryam Nawaz in the Punjab, with populist overtures from the beginning, may thus look like an effective strategy. The use of social media, populist idiom and symbols can work too. However, traditional parties should beware of the dangers of rampaging populism.

A serious problem with the PTI has been its dependence on populist strategies and lack of a pragmatic party programme. Being tight-switched between its popularity in the rightist vote bank among the elite, middle class and low-income social strata across sectarian divides, it simultaneously engaged with parties as disparate as the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Sherani group), Majlis-i-Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen and Sunni Ittehad Council for a post-electoral alliance to secure the reserved seats. These engagements were necessitated by the imperative of keeping intact all sorts of vote bank across religious/ sectarian lines.

The problem with the PTI has been its total dependence on populist strategies with no pragmatic party programme on the cards. 

In its formative phase, 1997-2002, the PTI had operated as an anti-status quo party. However, it vacillated between supporting and opposing the dictatorial regime of Pervez Musharraf. The party’s rebirth in 2011 came with its close alignment with the forces of status quo. Although it superficially challenged dynastic politics and the traditional political elite, it reached out to electables and constituency influentials. It was also supported, overtly and covertly, by various influential persons in the establishment until the 2018 general elections when it received complete support.

Nonetheless, the party took a new turn in the 2024 elections. It was marginalised and muzzled before and during the elections to make a serious dent in its popularity and vote bank. However, these efforts proved counter-productive and its popularity increased. It had to launch many new faces because the traditional leadership of the party had deserted their leader in the aftermath of the May 9 events. This brought in youngsters, women, lawyers and some new faces from the middle class. Most of these newcomers hailed from the second tier traditional leadership and nouveau riche associated with real estate and property businesses. The PTI leadership still does not represent anti-status quo forces.

The PTI lacks democracy within its structure and in its decision-making processes. It operates along fascist lines, following one leader, with no mechanism or platform – such as general body, CEC or core committee – for internal debate. It is this weakness that keeps decision making shaky and fluid. A leader may announce that the party supremo has assigned him the task of negotiating with certain political parties; another may then bring contradictory news the very next day. The next day, the supremo may disagree with both. Every second tier leader is busy establishing his credentials as the most trusted and close aide of Imran Khan. A mayhem thus prevails in decision making and ownership of the party policy.

The party slogans are a jumble of diverse ideologies and world-views. For instance, saaf chali, shafaf chali (immaculate and transparent it goes), faisla emaan da, vote Imran da (voting for Imran is an imperative of faith), do naheen, eik Pakistan (not two, one Pakistan) and “absolutely not” represent contradictory views. All are populist in nature and do not commit the party to any substantive programme or line of action.

Currently, the party has a dual role, having the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and leading sizeable oppositions in the Punjab and at the Centre. It needs to engage with other political forces by accepting their share of representation. It also needs to take the constitutional course instead of writing letters to foreign entities. It needs to understand the value and dynamics of parliamentary politics and play an effective and mature role in the parliament to strengthen it.

The writer heads the History Department at University of Sargodha. He has worked as a research fellow at Royal Holloway College, University of London. He can be reached at abrar.zahoor@hotmail.com His X handle: @AbrarZahoor1