here is no good or bad COP when discussing the annual Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This year it was the 28th COP; like the previous 27 COPs, it had good and bad news for each country, irrespective of their development status. If the sign of successful negotiations is that the outcome equally displeases the negotiating parties, then this COP was successful. Let us first begin with the good news in COP28’s final decisions, known as the Dubai Consensus.

First and foremost, this marked the first occasion since the Paris Agreement (2015), wherein countries submitted progress reports, termed global stocktaking, on their national plans (referred to as Nationally Determined Contributions). This provided crucial insight to assess how they fared in the task of containing an increase in mean global planet temperature.

Secondly, the hard-fought Loss and Damage Fund, a point of contention in COP27, is now operational. It was met with surprisingly little resistance from the developed world. During the inaugural ceremony, the UAE, the host nation, set an optimistic tone by pledging $100 million to the LDF.

Thirdly, a notable development involved fifty oil companies, including the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (headed by the COP28 president), voluntarily committing to reduce methane emissions. A similar commitment was made by the world’s five largest dairy players.

Fourthly, the agreement of 198 countries to triple their renewable energy capacity and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiencies by 2030 marked a significant stride. To achieve this, there is a consensus to phase out as soon as possible, inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty. Additionally, an acceleration in the phasedown of unabated coal power is also on the agenda.

Lastly, the big news is that for the first time, there is a global agreement to transition away from fossil fuels, encompassing coal, oil, and natural gas – the primary culprits behind global warming. The commitment to a “just, orderly and equitable” transition signals a pivotal moment, heralding the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era.

All of the above is music to the ears. But then there is bad news – the contradictions in the Dubai Consensus. Let me explain.

Global temperatures, projected to rise 2.9 degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels under current policies, far exceed the target set by the climate summit declaration. The global stocktaking reveals a significant deviation from the Paris Agreement goals.

To meet the 1.5-degree Celsius threshold, the Dubai Consensus acknowledges the necessity for a sustained 43 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and 60 percent by 2035, relative to 2019 levels. The glaring absence of a commitment to peak emissions by 2025 is disconcerting. Despite the welcomed reduction pledge in methane emissions, the consensus discreetly acknowledges the role of transitional fuels, like fossil gas, in facilitating the energy transition while ensuring energy security.

Furthermore, while agreeing to triple the share of renewable energy and double energy efficiency, the consensus text remains silent on the baseline that countries will use to achieve these targets. This omission was strategic, aiming to appease major fossil fuel consumers like China and India, who had reservations about these targets.

Under Saudi Arabia’s leadership, OPEC countries, including the UAE, openly opposed the inclusion of “phasing out of fossil fuels,” proposed by 130 countries in the Dubai declaration. The compromise was to replace “phase out” with “transition away” and include “accelerating zero- and low-emission technologies such as carbon capture, utilisation and storage technologies“ in the final declaration. However, the inclusion of CCUS raises concerns among scientists, who question their economic viability, scalability and effectiveness in capturing all emissions. This inherent loophole could be exploited by petro-states to continue producing and selling fossil fuels.

The major disappointment in Dubai Consensus is its hollowness on climate financing. Although there is some “improvement” on loss and damage, with it being mentioned in various sections of the Dubai Consensus; across the text, there are sections where loss and damage has not been mentioned, where it should be integrated alongside mitigation and adaptation as the third pillar of climate action, as reflected in the Paris agreement. This leaves efforts to address loss and damage feeling like an option rather than a critical component of climate action.

The lauded creation of the Loss and Damage Fund turned out to be more of a symbolic gesture. Despite the accolades, the pledges amounted to less than $1 billion, with a mere $20 million from the US during COP28. Developing countries should astutely anticipate that its fate might mirror that of the global climate fund. Back in 2015 (COP21), a promise was made that starting from 2020, developed countries would contribute $100 billion annually to this fund. Regrettably, to this day, the fulfillment of this commitment remains elusive.

Funding holds the key to advancing clean energy initiatives (mitigation), bolstering the resilience of vulnerable communities against intensifying climate impacts (adaptation) and aiding recovery post-disasters (loss and damage). While the text acknowledges the imperative of trillions of dollars in investments, it falls short in specifying the actual figures or timelines for allocation. The absence of concrete financial commitments renders discussions on climate action hollow and ineffectual.

Another bad news from COP28 is that a consensus on carbon markets could not be achieved, mainly due to disagreement between the US and EU over the proposed rules, especially the role of voluntary carbon market initiatives and the overall ambition of the carbon trading rules.

Pakistan, amidst super floods in 2022 and by virtue of its presidency of G77 plus China, was a major voice in COP27 and played a key role in getting the Loss and Damage Fund established. In COP28, it did not have that sort of a bargaining power. However, one must appreciate that the Pakistan pavilion remained a happening place this year. The Ministry of Climate Change facilitated all stakeholders, including provincial governments, the NDRMF, the delegation from the judiciary, senate, private sector (Overseas Investment Chambers and Commerce and Industry) and civil society (Malala Foundation, WWF, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Open Society Foundation, Fossil Fuel Treaty, Climate Action Network South Asia and Civil Society Coalition on Climate Change among others) to organise their side events in the Pakistan pavilion. The recommendations flowing through these discussions, especially on climate justice, just energy transition and need for climate financing were used by negotiators from Pakistan as well as other developing countries.

While one can identify numerous pros and cons within the Dubai Consensus based on individual perspectives, it is essential to acknowledge that the genie of bidding farewell to fossil fuels is finally out of the bottle. The future COPs will only turn the screws on dirty energy.

The writer heads the Sustainable Development Policy Institute. He posts his comments on X at @abidsuleri