hy do ordinary people do atrocious things? This problem has vexed scholars and thinkers for centuries. Early theologians of every stripe spent an inordinate amount of time trying to reconcile the idea of a benevolent and omnipotent God who nonetheless allowed the evil to exist.

The darker side of human nature still troubles us, though nowadays we tend to seek more naturalistic explanations. This was never truer than after the World War II, which revealed deeply distressing depravity to which humans could sink.

One of the most important interventions in the field of existentialist ethics has been Hannah Arendt’s (1906-75) concept of the banality of evil. It formed the core of her book, Eichmann in Jerusalem. Hannah Arendt pondered the question of whether one could commit evil acts without being inherently evil.

After the 1961 trial of Nazi SS officer, Adolf Eichmann, the phrase captured the idea that evil acts were not necessarily perpetrated by evil people. They could also be the result of people dutifully obeying orders. Eichmann comported himself like any other person in the street. During the trial, he spoke of his actions with shocking mundanity: he was just following his superiors’ orders and getting the job done.

Eichmann just couldn’t see the horror of his crimes. This incapability to be empathetic towards those who suffered the consequences of his actions, or this “disconnect from reality,” in Arendt’s words, was caused by a peculiar mechanism of totalitarian governments, which she called “the rule of nobody” that “makes functionaries mere cogs in the administrative machinery and thus...dehumanises them.”

Arendt pointed out that the real evil, contrary to popular perceptions of it, is far from ostentatiously demonic. It doesn’t have to come from a perverse delight in heinous acts. It frequently comes from people falling victim to manipulation of thinking and judgment by oppressive political systems. Such manipulation causes a normalisation of the unthinkable. She examined this conundrum while reporting on the war crime trial of Adolf Eichmann, accused of orchestrating the transportation of millions of people to concentration camps.

Arendt’s surprising conclusion was that Eichmann, far from being a monstrous figure, was an ordinary bureaucrat who executed heinous acts due to thoughtlessness and an absence of empathy. She famously termed this phenomenon “the banality of evil.”

Arendt’s perspective ignited controversy. Some critics accused her of downplaying Eichmann’s evil and focusing too much on his unremarkable life. They argued that Eichmann did have evil motives. Some said that Arendt had missed an opportunity to delve deeper into the nature of evil by not extending her analysis beyond Eichmann.

Initially, she had regarded the Nazi evil as absolute and inhuman. However, later she viewed it as banal. This led to confusion and unanswered questions about her thesis. Nevertheless, Arendt did acknowledge Eichmann’s guilt and his role in genocide.

In a broader philosophical exploration, Arendt grappled with the idea that most evil is perpetrated by individuals who never consciously choose to be good or evil. She identified the “banality of evil” as a phenomenon where people thoughtlessly adopt immoral principles, gradually normalising them in the society. Arendt argued that combating this banality required critical thinking, empathy, and a critical examination of ingrained beliefs and behaviours.

It is by thinking independently and considering diverse perspectives that we can prevent ourselves from becoming unwitting supporters of harmful principles. Arendt’s insights extend beyond the context of Nazi Germany. She emphasises the importance of independent thought to counteract the gradual normalisation of evil.

In 1964, Arendt eschewed her earlier talk about “radical evil” to say that there was only “radical good.” In other words, evil (since it defies thought) doesn’t have depth; it only has extremes. It can never be radical. Doing good, however, is a product of thought. This lends an action depth. Only good may therefore be truly radical.

For Arendt, the banal nature of most acts of evil wasn’t an excuse to stop being horrified at them. Instead, she suggested the futility of a black-and-white morality that labels those who commit evil deeds as “monsters” and shuns them as deviant and dangerous individuals.

Evil, said Arendt, was much closer home. It was something – given persuasive enough circumstances – we were all capable of. That was why anti-fascist politics, questioning one’s own complicity in evil systems and the safeguarding of democratic regimes were so important.

Analysing the collusion of state institutions with tyrannical regimes in Pakistan through the lens of Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” offers valuable insights into the dynamics at play. Arendt suggests that individuals can commit evil acts without necessarily being inherently evil – often due to thoughtlessness, conformism, and a lack of moral reflection.

Some key conclusions follow:

The role of bureaucracy:

State institutions, particularly bureaucracies, play a central role in the execution of government policies. In the context of collusion with tyrannical regimes, state officials may act in a seemingly ‘normal’ manner, following orders and implementing policies without critically assessing their moral implications. This bureaucratic mindset can contribute to the banality of evil, where individuals prioritise their careers and roles within the system over ethical considerations.

Thoughtless conformism:

Conformity within institutions can be very dangerous. State officials might conform to the directives of tyrannical regimes, even when these directives involve human rights abuse and authoritarian actions. The absence of critical thinking or moral reflection can lead individuals to carry out unethical deeds without fully comprehending the consequences of their actions.

Justification and rationalisation:

Collusion with tyrannical regimes often involves justifying actions as serving a greater good, national interest or the stability of the state. State institutions may rationalise their involvement in authoritarian practices as necessary for maintaining power and control. This rationalisation can create a moral blind spot.

Absence of firm ideological convictions:

In Arendt’s view, individuals involved in evil acts often lack deep ideological beliefs or a clear moral compass. State institutions may prioritise political expediency and stability over a commitment to democratic values or human rights. This absence of firm convictions can make it easier for officials to engage in morally questionable actions.

Societal impact:

Collusion with tyrannical regimes, especially when normalised within state institutions, can have devastating consequences for a society. The banality of evil may lead to the acceptance of authoritarianism, human rights violations and repression as part of the ordinary functioning of the state. This normalisation can erode the moral fabric of society and make it challenging to hold individuals and institutions accountable for their actions.