atching Oppenheimer was a profoundly sombre experience. The way he found himself virtually shunned by the echelons of the US establishment, all in the purported name of national security, laid bare the true condition of individual freedom in the self-proclaimed ‘oldest democracy’ of the world during the early stages of the Cold War.

The edifice of civil liberties and personal freedoms has historically been erected upon the altar of national security. The cinematic masterpiece dedicated to this narrative has garnered an abundance of laudatory reviews — a recognition undeniably warranted in every aspect.

For context, it is imperative to cast our gaze upon the global events that followed the culmination of the Manhattan Project.

During the historic Potsdam Conference in July 1945, President Harry S Truman received ‘momentous’ news — the scientists of the Manhattan Project had accomplished the successful detonation of the world’s first nuclear device in New Mexico. As the gathering of the “Big Three”, including Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, proceeded to determine the post-World War II future of Germany, Truman shared the development with Stalin.

Approaching the Soviet premier casually, Truman disclosed the existence of a new and highly destructive weapon in the United States’ possession. Stalin showed only mild interest, expressing his hope that the weapon would be effectively utilised against Japan. Truman, reflecting on the encounter later in his memoir, Year of Decisions, made no mention of specific terms like “atomic” or “nuclear” during the exchange, leading the US side to believe that Stalin remained unaware of the precise nature of this groundbreaking weapon.

For Truman, the news of the Trinity test presented a momentous choice — whether or not to deploy this unprecedented weapon of mass destruction. It also brought a sense of relief, knowing that the US wouldn’t have to rely on the increasingly strained relations with the Soviet Union to engage Japan in the war.

Interestingly, Truman’s awareness of the top-secret US programme to develop atomic weapons had come only three months earlier after Franklin D Roosevelt’s passing. In contrast, unknown to Truman, Soviet intelligence had been gathering reports about the project since as early as September 1941.

While Stalin may not have immediately grasped the gravity of the atomic threat amidst the challenges posed by the German onslaught and occupation, Truman’s words during the Potsdam Conference had far-reaching consequences beyond the president’s realisation. It later came to light that Stalin promptly turned to his subordinates and emphasised the urgency of accelerating the Soviet atomic bomb project.

This revelation, as shared by Gregg Herken, author of The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War and Brotherhood of the Bomb, sheds light on the immediate impact Truman’s disclosure had on the Soviet leadership. Igor Kurchatov, the nuclear physicist heading the Soviet atomic bomb project, played a role akin to J Robert Oppenheimer, the mastermind behind the Manhattan Project.

The Potsdam Conference led to a series of seismic events. Just days after its conclusion, on August 6, 1945, the US bomber Enola Gay released the uranium bomb, named Little Boy, on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Despite the bomb’s devastating effects, Japan did not capitulate as the United States had hoped. On August 8, the Soviet forces launched an invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria, disregarding an earlier non-aggression pact with Japan.

According to Herken’s argument, the Soviet invasion dealt a significant blow to Japanese morale, potentially rivaling the psychological impact of the first atomic bomb. The Japanese government’s last hope, pinned on the peace faction, was that the Soviet Union might mediate peace negotiations with the United States as a neutral intermediary. The invasion of Manchuria dashed those hopes definitively.

On August 9, the US forces dropped the plutonium bomb, named Fat Man, on Nagasaki. Combined, the two atomic bombs wreaked unimaginable devastation, claiming the lives of over 300,000 people, including instant fatalities and those who succumbed to radiation and other lingering effects of the explosions. The tragic consequences of these bombings left an indelible mark on history.

On August 15, Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s resounding radio address marked Japan’s unconditional surrender, bringing an end to the tumultuous chapter of the World War II. Amid the peace negotiations at both Yalta and Potsdam, the ideological chasm between the Soviet Union and its Western allies became starkly apparent, particularly concerning the future of Eastern Europe.

Even in modern times, historians remain divided over the true motives behind the Truman administration’s decision to drop the atomic bomb. Some suggest political reasons may have influenced the move, particularly to intimidate the Soviet Union, rather than purely military considerations. Unraveling this enigma is a daunting task since the bomb’s secrecy left no room for formal meetings or official discussions about its deployment. Campbell Craig, a distinguished professor of international relations at Cardiff University and co-author of The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, highlights the challenge, acknowledging that much of the reasoning behind the bomb’s use remains speculative.

Regardless of the US intentions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin perceived America’s possession of the atomic bomb as a direct threat to the Soviet Union’s post-war position. Eager to restore balance, he was determined to level the playing field. Meanwhile, through atomic espionage, Soviet scientists were rapidly making strides towards their own bomb, adding another layer of complexity to the situation.

Within Truman’s administration, there were multiple viewpoints on how to handle the Soviet Union. Some advocated cooperation as a means to avoid a perilous nuclear arms race. A different perspective, eloquently presented by the State Department official, George Kennan in his famous document, Long Telegram, in early 1946, would carry significant influence. This perspective inspired the Truman Doctrine and the “containment” policy, which aimed to curtail Soviet and communist expansionism worldwide.

In 1946, a pivotal moment occurred during the inaugural gathering of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). The United States presented the Baruch Plan, a bold proposition demanding that the Soviets divulge every intricate detail of their atomic energy programme and grant access to international inspectors. It came as no surprise that the Soviets unequivocally rejected these demands. As historian Gregg Herken aptly points out, the Baruch Plan essentially required the Soviets to relinquish their sovereignty if they desired any involvement in atomic energy — an idea that Stalin would never entertain.

By 1949, any aspirations for cooperation had vanished completely. On August 29, the Soviets conducted a successful nuclear test, unleashing a 20-kiloton blast akin to the Trinity test. This landmark event marked the commencement of the nuclear arms race that defined the remainder of the Cold War. Both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, then engaged in an intense competition to amass the most weapons of mass destruction and uncover the most effective deployment strategies.

As underscored by Campbell Craig, the mere existence of the atomic bomb accelerated the urgency for the United States and the Soviet Union to confront one another. The bomb acted as a catalyst, forcing the two nations to grapple with each other’s aspirations much sooner than they would have had it not existed.

The writer is Professor in the faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore. He can be reached at tahir.kamran@bnu.edu.pk