he concepts of nationhood and nation-state evolved in Europe under a very different set of circumstances than in South Asia. Strictly speaking, those are not always relevant in the context of the sub-continent. By definition, a nation shares some common attributes like ethnicity, culture, language, religion and ethos. Most of its members intermarry readily. None of this was true of the 19^th Century sub-continent. In the absence of a unifying force, historically, it had always splintered whenever – the mostly foreign – rule at the centre weakened. Its partition in 1947 was a repetition of this process and a natural outcome of recent events.

People in Pakistan, on the other hand, have a lot more in common. The country is unified and rendered indivisible economically by the River Indus and its tributaries. There is common history extending back to more than five thousand years to the Indus Valley Civilisation. Except for a few small groups, almost all the people have descended from the same Aryan stock. They are culturally similar and there is a common language they all understand. There are few social taboos and they readily intermarry.

There is much propaganda in certain quarters that Pakistan may not be a viable state and could break up soon.

History is a factual record of events and people. It is based on authentic and credible evidence and not conjecture or opinion. One cannot pick and choose events from it to make up a story to suit one’s purpose. All nations have had their ups and downs. Sadly, this has not always been clearly understood in the subcontinent. Some individuals have therefore taken liberties with facts to write books and articles that are far removed from reality.

What the Muslims of India had desired was briefly summed up in the resolution passed by the All India Muslim League in Lahore in March 1940. It directed the Muslim League Working Party to call for “… geographically contiguous units to be demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.” Only in the event that the Congress did not agree to this was a demand for partition to be made.

The resolution does not mention a Two-Nation Theory. Nor is the word Pakistan used. It neither calls for the partition of India as the first choice nor mentions Islam, the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of sharia. It was on this basis that in June 1946, the Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan which visualised three autonomous groupings of provinces.

Addressing the Muslim Legislators’ Conference in Delhi in April 1946, Jinnah had stated, “What are we aiming at? It is not for theocracy, nor for a theocratic state.” His vision for Pakistan was for it to become an Islamic democratic state where every citizen, regardless of race, religion or sect enjoyed equal rights.

It is noteworthy that at the time, all Islamic religious parties had opposed the partition of India and fielded their own candidates for the Muslim seats in the 1945 election against those of Muslim League, as had done Congress. In the end, the Muslim League won every single Muslim seat in the Central Legislature.

Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani of the Jamait-i-Ulema had gone so far as to issue a fatwa in October 1945 declaring it haraam for Muslims to vote for the Muslim League. Mazhar Ali Azhar and Maulana Ata Ullah Shah Bokhari of the Majlis-i-Ahrar used strong language in public addresses to denounce Jinnah. So did Jamaat-i-Islami’s founder Maulana Abul A’la Maudoodi in his writings. Allama Mashriqi’s Khaksars made two attempts on Jinnah’s life. Bacha Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgaars stood with the Congress and joined hands with it to form the government in the NWFP in 1946. GM Syed broke away from the Muslim League because some of the candidates nominated by him were not preferred in Sindh.

Yet, some parties and individuals in both India and Pakistan insist that Pakistan was based on religion and that Jinnah was a “communalist” and wanted to break up India because he “hated the Hindus.” There is not an iota of credible evidence to support such claims. Addressing the Muslim Legislators’ Conference in Delhi in April 1946, Jinnah had stated, “What are we aiming at? It is not for theocracy, nor for a theocratic state.” His vision for Pakistan was for her to become an Islamic democratic state in which every citizen, regardless of race, religion or sect enjoyed equal rights.

On April 15, 1947, Viceroy Mountbatten had made the British views quite clear when he told the provincial governors at their meeting, “Partition of India would be a most serious source of war… a quick decision would give Pakistan greater chance to fail on its demerits. The great problem was to reveal the limits of Pakistan so that the Muslim League could revert to a unified India with honour.” When the governor of Bengal told him that in the event of partition, “Eastern Bengal alone would not be a concern…,” Mountbatten replied, “Anything that resulted in torpedoing Pakistan was of advantage in that it led the way back to a more common sense solution.”

The plan to partition India was prepared by VP Menon, the reforms commissioner, after Nehru had turned down every other proposal for a settlement. Nehru found it acceptable but Jinnah was given no such choice. There are scores of highly authentic and extremely well-researched books on the subject by well-known historians that explain in fascinating detail, supported by impeccable references, why and how India came to be divided. These include Alex Von Tunzelmann’s Indian Summer, Patrick French’s Liberty or Death, Lawrence James’s The Raj, Andrew Roberts’s Eminent Churchillians, Ayesha Jalal’s Sole Spokesman. Readers are strongly urged to take a look at these and not go by the motivated storytelling in questionable publications and TV shows.