ree and fair democratic elections remain a rarity in Pakistan. The legislators could not frame a constitution for nine years after independence in 1947. The 1956 constitution introduced so-called parity of seats in the National Assembly (NA) for both wings of the country – West and East Pakistan – at the behest of the establishment for fear of East Pakistan’s majority population permanently being able to dominate the country’s politics on the basis of one man, one vote. Naturally, the effect of this legerdemain was to depreciate the weight of an East Pakistani citizen’s vote as compared to a West Pakistani’s. This constitution was soon overtaken, via the military coup of 1958, by Ayub Khan’s 1962 constitution, which maintained the parity clause.

It was not until a people’s movement broke out in both wings of the country in 1968 and after a prolonged agitation till April 1969 yielded the removal of Ayub Khan by the army’s commander-in-chief Gen Yahya Khan that the establishment realised it could not maintain this unjust electoral structure. The Yahya regime made political concessions to defuse the momentum of the widespread agitation by the people. It broke One Unit, thereby restoring the historical provinces of West Pakistan, i.e. the Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North West Frontier Province or the NWFP), Sindh and Balochistan. It also undid parity as the basis for the proclaimed 1970 elections, which for the first time in the country’s history were held on the democratic principle of one man, one vote.

The 1970 elections are considered the freest and fairest in our history. This did not occur because the Yahya martial law regime had been persuaded to adopt democratic practices in this regard. The calculation of the Yahya regime was that the elections were likely to produce a fractured mandate, which would provide room to the regime to manipulate the political outcome in the shape of the government to be formed. However, the Yahya regime’s best laid plans came a cropper since the momentum of the 1968-69 people’s movement produced (for the regime, at least) unexpected results. In West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won a majority of the NA seats, largely on the basis of its victories in the Punjab and Sindh. In East Pakistan, historical grievances were enhanced by the tardy response of the Yahya regime to a devastating cyclone that struck the eastern wing on the eve of the elections. The enhanced mountain of grievances gave Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League (AL) the overwhelming majority of all but two seats in East Pakistan, thereby giving it an overall majority in the NA and, therefore, the popular mandate to form the federal government. However, Yahya, in collaboration and with the support of Bhutto, not only refused to honour the people’s mandate, but also launched a military crackdown, which in December 1971 resulted in the dismemberment of the country, with India’s help.

What remained of Jinnah’s Pakistan was pieced together by Bhutto, who was installed in power by a military junta that overthrew Yahya, on the basis of the (partial) results of the 1970 elections in a united Pakistan. Initially, the dire situation of a defeated country, the trauma of having lost the eastern wing and the majority of the populace, and the fact of thousands of Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian hands persuaded Bhutto to act diplomatically without (the Simla Agreement) and, up to a point, democratically within (the 1972 interim constitution conceded provincial governments in the NWFP and Balochistan to the opposition coalition of the National Awami Party and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam and the 1973 constitution). From 1973 onwards, the Bhutto regime slid further and further into a repressive mode, launching a military offensive in Balochistan, targeting the opposition in the NWFP and the rest of the country. By 1977, the situation was politically fraught – the PPP arguably no longer had the lustre of a populist Left party, and the entire opposition united against the regime. The 1977 elections held by the Bhutto regime spawned widespread charges of rigging. The united opposition launched an agitation against the election results, and despite negotiations being held after months of agitation, resulted in the overthrow of Bhutto by the Zia martial law.

Party-less elections were held in 1985 after the martial law was finally lifted. Some voices then began emerging to suggest that given Pakistan’s fraught history, as far as democracy and elections were concerned, the concept of neutral caretaker governments to conduct elections with a limited mandate of managing the country’s affairs on a day-to-day basis be considered. However, it took till the 1990 elections for the idea to find traction and implementation. Since then, with the exception of the less than credible 2002 elections under Musharraf, all elections have been held under caretaker governments at the Centre and in the provinces. Although the idea seemed good given the country’s history and the track record of elections, the neutrality of caretaker governments could not be sworn by in all cases. The argument in favour of non-political technocrats as caretakers found more and more traction as a result.

Today, trends appear to be veering in the opposite direction. From sifting all the chatter going around, a tentative forecast may be that political figures for caretakers as opposed to technocrats seems to have found favour. Without naming names (with the exception of former chief justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani), a list of five candidates appears to have been drawn. All that remains is for the allies of the Pakistan Democratic Movement to forge a consensus, and voila! we may have an agreed caretaker prime minister from amongst them. The formality of PM Shahbaz Sharif consulting the pliable Leader of the Opposition Raja Riaz remains a foregone conclusion. No surprises in store in that direction.

While the idea of neutral caretaker administrations conducting elections in Pakistan has a strong conceptual and empirical case, the objective situation still harbours a few niggling questions. If, as is being anticipated, the government dissolves the National Assembly before its tenure expires, the elections are to be held within 90 days. However, trail balloons are still being floated. Recently, PM Shahbaz Sharif did one himself by suggesting that the elections should be held on the basis of the results of the latest census. This implies a delay, since the accuracy of the census is being disputed (especially, in Sindh). Even if the results are accepted, the Election Commission of Pakistan will require several weeks to delimit the constituencies afresh. This does not appeal to logic or the best interests of a beleaguered Pakistan on the security, political and economic fronts. Adherence to the constitutionally mandated timeframe for holding the elections on the existing delimitations seems the best course. And then, of course, there is still the vexed question of the fate of Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI). Will he, and they, be around and allowed to participate in a hopefully free and fair election? The jury is out.

The writer, a veteran journalist, has held senior editorial positions in several newspapers